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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis contributes to the fields of digital technology, consciousness studies and cultural 
theory by reassessing the relation of the contemporary subject to physical and digital worlds. 
By moving beyond the materiality of these worlds, this investigation will position the subject 
as a cyborg: a series of relations within consciousness that defines the reality and 
psychological construction of the subject across and through physical and digital perspectives. 
The functions of consciousness are set out as Existence, Meaning, Virtual, and Real, and their 
shifting relations defined in terms of physical and digital modes of consciousness. Using Slavoj 
Žižek’s conception of parallax, applied ontologically to digital technology, and introducing a 
new framework for analysing consciousness as a series of relations between functions, the 
void of subjectivity is defined as the gap between physical and digital worlds. Within this 
framework the work of Gilles Deleuze and the philosophy of quantum physics are employed 
to negotiate a disruption of conventional reality with the Virtuality of thought and matter 
respectively, towards the conception of the subject as an engaged spectator. These 
methodological tools are developed to analyse cultural phenomena that highlight and 
challenge our consciousness of the relation between physical and digital worlds. Online and 
gallery-based digital art interventions, avatar-mediated spaces, computer games and 
representations of digital technology and culture in literature are examined in order to assess 
specific relations between functions, drawing the discussion towards the antagonism between 
Virtuality and Reality within the construction of the cyborg subject. Through these analyses, a 
critical position is established through which the contemporary subject is able to achieve the 
rupture of a minimal distance towards its own parallax position to confront the void of 
subjectivity between Virtual and Real functions of consciousness and between physical and 
digital modes of cyborg reality. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
TERMS AS USED IN THIS THESIS 
Art game: Computer games that challenge the gaming medium aesthetically or conceptually, 
favouring the creation of new modes of experience over conventional game mechanics. See 
Chapter 4 The Undead Subject: Virtual Monsters in Games. 
Consciousness: Thought as a process; the self-positing of the subject as thought; the gesture 
of the cogito; the surface assemblage of the subject. See Introduction: Theoretical framework 
and terminology. 
Cyborg: The human subject between physical and digital worlds. Beyond the part-
human/part-machine prosthetic conception, this is an expansion of consciousness itself. The 
resolution of the internal antagonisms of the cyborg can be considered a state of 
posthumanism. See Introduction: The cyborg reconsidered. 
Engaged Spectator: The process of observation through which the subject and its world 
come into being, each marked by the other; in art, the necessary role of the viewer in the 
participatory or interactive gaze. 
Functions of Consciousness: The four processes by which consciousness creates itself to form 
the subject, the alignment of which defines the construction of physical and digital worlds: 
Existence: Being-function of consciousness; the gaze, denotation, the observed universe, appearance. 
Meaning: Communication-function of consciousness; signification, the conditions of truth, information. 
Real: Void-function of consciousness; objectification of the void, Lacanian objet petit a, drive, expression. 
Virtual: Function-function of consciousness; cognition, desire, illusion, surface. 
See Introduction: Theoretical framework and terminology. 
Parallax: The relative displacement of objects by a change in perspective; the ontological 
change in objective reality created by an epistemological shift in subjective position. See 
Introduction: Theoretical framework and terminology. 
 xii 
Subject: The perspectival position from which consciousness is thought; the assemblage of 
consciousness around this parallax void. See Introduction: Theoretical framework and 
terminology. 
Void: The absent, desubstantialised centre of the subject and its perspectival position of 
parallax. See Chapter 2 The Empty Subject: Void-in-Itself in Art. 
ABBREVIATIONS 
AR: Augmented Reality 
BwO: Body without Organs. Also OwB (Organs without Bodies) 
CMB: Cosmic Microwave Background 
RPG: Role-Playing Game. Also MMORPG (Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Game) 
SF: Science Fiction (literature) 
SL: Second Life 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
HYPOTHESIS/RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
There has not yet been a consistent philosophy of the digital. The present thesis responds to this 
problem by proposing the foundations of a philosophy of the digital that draws together the 
role of the technology itself (as a manifestation of the digital in general as a reality and mode 
of consciousness), its psychological constructs in relation to the individual, and its expression 
through art and culture. The formulation of this research is constructed through a series of 
hypotheses regarding the nature and state of the digital leading to the core research 
questions relating to this new conception of the contemporary cyborg subject. 
Hypothesis: There is an irreducible gap between physical and digital worlds. 
Hypothesis: This gap is internal to consciousness. 
Question: What constitutes this gap within consciousness? 
While digital technology has increasingly permeated the physical world, social reality and our 
everyday lives, there remains a tension between physical and digital realms, a separation built 
upon their designation as such. As a human construct the genesis of digital reality has obvious 
differences from the physical universe. However, this goes beyond the formation of language 
as layers of human signification atop a physical ground. Rather, the digital is founded upon an 
alternative logic, a different mode of consciousness, and cultural artefacts residing within 
digital space occupy an alternative mode of being in relation to consciousness. This thesis 
proposes that this fissure is internal to the manner in which ‘physical’ and ‘digital’ are 
conceived within the contemporary subject, as a cognitive and cultural construct. 
Furthermore, positioning the gap between worlds as a gap within the subject brings about a 
definition of the subject as a gap, a void within itself. Confronting the nature of this void of 
subjectivity around which consciousness operates will be a necessary step in a philosophy of 
the digital as it relates to consciousness. 
There has not yet been a consistent philosophy of the digital in relation to consciousness. 
The thesis attempts to form the basis for a unified philosophy of the digital through an 
interrogation of its relation to consciousness, outside the concerns of a materialist inclusion of 
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the digital as a part of the physical world. In order to overcome both the dualist separation of 
physical-digital realities and the reduction of the digital to an effect within physical reality, the 
thesis views materiality as appearance in the discussion of the construction of a cyborg 
subject as a causal consciousness between the two realms. Whilst materialist perspectives will 
be instructive for their critique of the reality that appears to the subject, this thesis is 
concerned with the functions of consciousness beneath and causing such appearance, to 
parallel the quantum physical forces of immateriality that underpin the appearance of 
physical material reality. This must also resist reducing the digital realm to an imaginary 
space, and discussions of fantasy are therefore similarly rooted in the structures of fantasy 
within consciousness that underpin the appearance of the imagination in the construction of 
physical and digital modes of consciousness. The appearance of the digital as a separate 
realm to and within consciousness necessitates its discussion as such in any theory of 
contemporary subjectivity. 
Hypothesis: Consciousness constructs physical and digital worlds in an ontological parallax. 
Hypothesis: The subject emerges in the functioning of consciousness as it creates physical and digital worlds. 
Question: How does consciousness posit itself as a subject between physical and digital worlds? 
Expanding upon Kojin Karatani’s reading of two irreducible perspectives through one another 
(2003), Slavoj Žižek’s notion of parallax (2009b) states that the shifting perspective of the 
subject creates ontological shifts in the objects it perceives. This thesis transfers this 
disruption of the apparent material world by active consciousness onto the irreducible 
difference between physical and digital realities and their relation to the subject. Both realities 
thus occur as part of a subjective reality, from a position within the gap between worlds. The 
positing of such a subject is entwined with the creation of worlds within consciousness, 
emerging simultaneously as a process or function. The differences between physical and 
digital modes of reality can be seen in the different modes and relations of this functioning of 
consciousness. To interrogate this process the thesis defines the functions that create the 
subject and its realities. Four terms are presented as functions of consciousness through 
which to analyse the construction of physical and digital worlds: Existence, Meaning, Real and 
Virtual. Within this framework the role of consciousness can be examined across physical and 
digital worlds while maintaining the antagonism of the difference between the two realms, in 
order to assess the subject as the gap between physical and digital realities. 
There has not yet been a consistent philosophy of the cyborg subject. This thesis proposes 
a cyborg as the necessary subject of a philosophy of consciousness that takes into account the 
manifold connections and relations of the functioning of consciousness as it actively engages 
with physical and digital worlds. 
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Hypothesis: The subject creating physical and digital worlds is a cyborg. 
Hypothesis: The cyborg subject is formed as a self-positing consciousness sustaining physical/digital reality. 
Question: How can the cyborg subject critically and creatively confront the functioning of its own 
consciousness? 
The subject between physical and digital realities, emerging as the self-positing of both 
worlds within consciousness, is a cyborg subject. A philosophy of the relation of physical and 
digital worlds to consciousness is necessarily a philosophy of the self-regulating system of 
thought that constructs the subject across realities, whereby a cybernetic analysis consists of 
“the science and art of the understanding of understanding” (Donaldson 1992). That is, such a 
philosophy must take into account the creation of subjective reality by the subject, and 
interrogate the role and position of such a subject between physical and digital worlds. 
To respond to these questions, Žižek’s parallax psychoanalysis is read alongside the 
theory of Gilles Deleuze and the philosophy of quantum physics to interrogate the internal 
relations of consciousness and its role in constructing the physical and digital realities of the 
cyborg subject. Subsidiary questions guide this discussion by extrapolating the functions of 
consciousness to interrogate methods of creating a space for critical interventions by the 
cyborg subject on itself: How do physical and digital worlds differ in their relation to 
consciousness? How does consciousness form a subject from the void of parallax between 
worlds? What is Real to such a cyborg subject between worlds? What is the relation of the 
Real to the Virtual within the consciousness of the cyborg subject? How might we reconceive 
the cyborg subject between the Virtual and the Real? This thesis thereby formulates and 
interrogates a philosophy of the digital in relation to consciousness as it forms from the void 
of a cyborg subject, using the functioning of consciousness as a key to analysing the 
construction of both physical and digital worlds within the ontological parallax of subjective 
reality. 
The contribution to knowledge offered within the scope of this thesis will thus be 
fourfold: a theorisation of the parallax between physical and digital at an ontological level; a 
new methodological approach fusing Žižek, Deleuze and quantum physics as parallel systems 
of thought applied directly to the digital; a study of creative digital technologies in relation to 
consciousness through the original framework of the functions of consciousness – Existence, 
Meaning, Virtual, Real – and their internal formation and relation; a problematisation of  
subjectivity within digital technology and its culture, against the dominance of materialism in 
current literature. 
 
 4 
 
CONTEXT 
 
TERRITORIES OF DIGITAL THEORY 
Current research on digital technology focuses on the effects of technology, usually on 
a singular area of society and theory. From the optimistic technologists and artists of the 
1990s to the more recent socio-cultural applications of digital theory, there is a disparate 
canon of the digital that is often entrenched in earlier debates from pre-existing fields. It was 
earlier technologists such as Michael Heim (1993) and Nicholas Negroponte (1996) who made 
the most radical steps towards a philosophy of the digital in-itself, yet they remained 
speculative, superficial and sanguine in their analyses, focusing on the changes within the 
technologies themselves as a material shift rather than the socio-cultural evolution of 
consciousness over time. More elaborate and influential theories are often based in issues of 
conventional media, particularly cinema and photography, such as the collection by Damian 
Sutton, Susan Brind, and Ray McKenzie (2007) which limits the analysis of the digital to its 
effects on these prior media fields, unconcerned with a philosophy of the digital as such. 
Approaching the digital as a mere extension of pre-existing media creates an instant barrier 
towards new modes of interactivity. Now an outdated term – having passed through its 
obverse of interpassivity and into notions of immersive art and alternative, freer modes of 
engagement – it is the inclusion of interactivity in conventional media that motivates many 
‘new media theories’ (see, for example, Manovich 2001). The sustaining of antagonism 
between different perspectives has been developed by Roy Ascott as the necessarily syncretic 
nature of an interdisciplinary cybernetic theory, whereby “in emphatic distinction to binary 
opposition, syncretism is a process between different elements, the in-between condition of 
'being both’” (2005). This state is developed here ontologically in the construction of the 
cyborg subject as the parallax relation of consciousness between physical and digital realities. 
The inherent role of consciousness in engagement remains to be fully theorised. Much 
work on the digital only “implicitly argues…that what is key to the phenomenon of New Media 
is our relation to it” (Creeber and Martin 2009, 4), rather than drawing it into full view as the 
focus of the debate. The definition of ‘new media’ emerged as an attempt to reconcile the 
effects of digital culture predating digital technology (Siapera 2012, 3-6). While emphasising 
the blurred lines of our relation to the digital, such a stance fails to engage fully with the effect 
of the digital on consciousness. The relation of the digital to consciousness necessarily 
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predates the proliferation or even existence of digital technology, as the shift has not been a 
single instantaneous event in which society transitioned from physical in one moment to 
digital in the next, but a process within consciousness that has allowed the digital as such to 
manifest. The term ‘new media’ has been perhaps most prominently emphasised by Lev 
Manovich (2001), whose background in film governs the framework of his discussion and 
definition of the term, replacing a concern with the digital as a new space for consciousness 
with the more clear and limited effects of digital technology on established film media theory. 
Martin Lister et al. (2003, 11) point out the ideological connotations of the term in relation to 
progress, which suggests that ‘new media’ is related directly to the technology as causal with 
secondary cultural relations, rather than exploring the causality of consciousness in the 
intertwined relations of the digital with contemporary subjectivity. Even writers such as 
Crispin Thurlow and Kristine Mroczek (2011), who acknowledge the importance of the digital 
in contemporary discourses, present a single theoretical application of media (sociolinguistics) 
rather than a confrontation with the digital in itself or in direct relation to consciousness. 
The problematic relation of consciousness to the world is not only of relevance in digital 
technology. Aside from the long history of the philosophy of mind that has dominated 
Western thought since Descartes, at the beginning of the twentieth century science had 
already unearthed the seeds of tension between the appearance of the material world and the 
role of consciousness in the causal processes that underpin it. Quantum physics, with its focus 
on wave/particle duality, disrupts classical notions of our relation to the physical world, 
moving beyond the subject-object separation towards the causal function of consciousness in 
collapsing the wave function and creating the appearance of matter. This notion remains 
pertinent and divisive within science, and while digital and cultural theory often use quantum 
physical concepts as illustrative of hidden processes, such as by Gregory Sholette (2011) 
where after a brief and vague allegorical framing the discussion rests firmly under the terms of 
the politics of art, there is a gap within theories of the digital across which the active role of 
consciousness seldom penetrates. This resistance to the fluidity of a causal consciousness in 
the construction of worlds is seen in the increasing emphasis on a materialism of the digital, 
entrenching the formerly immaterial realm into notions of embodiment and inert mass.  
THE CYBORG RECONSIDERED 
Here is where the term ‘cyborg’ must be redefined, against its use by Donna Haraway (1985). 
While her work, and socialist feminism in general, made an important shifting away from the 
solidity of essentialist identities towards a fluid and engaged cyborg, the framing of the 
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discussion under explicitly micro-political and bodily identity terms (see its inclusion in 
Haraway 1991) places a boundary of social power relations upon cyborg consciousness. This 
enforces the materialist conception of embodiment that impedes a full assessment of the 
subject as the relations of consciousness to physical and digital worlds by relating cyborgs 
only as a resistant political Other against dominant ideologies rather than as Other to itself in 
the void of subjectivity. It is for this reason, in the context of poststructural feminism and the 
problem of persisting micropolitical identities, that gender, race and disability will not be dealt 
with in the discussion of the formation of a cyborg as such rather than the narrow view of 
specific identified manifestations. Don Ihde acknowledges the fact that “in the light of the 
rapid changes in technologies, there must be reciprocal changes in the philosophies that 
respond to, reflect upon, and deal with technologies” (2012, 331), but undertakes this project 
in a similarly narrow conception of cybernetics as prosthesis, ignoring the need for a reciprocal 
change in philosophy across physical and digital realities and new modes of conceiving 
consciousness. He states that “what today is popularly called cyberspace is the technological 
capacity to bring the remote near.” (Ibid., 326), following a phenomenological approach that 
echoes what he hails in Haraway’s “biology-centred work” (Ibid., 331). Outside the lost fetish 
of physicality in prosthetic conceptions of the cyborg, cyberspace emerges as a creative 
alternative space with which consciousness can engage, not merely a tool for communicating 
across vast distances or simulating a lost physical reality. This difficulty in relinquishing 
conventional notions of embodiment even in their explicit critique can also be seen in the 
digital arts, for example the contributions in Mary Anne Moser’s collection (1996) that enforce 
the role of the physical body as a limiting factor on the experience of consciousness, or the 
work of Susan Kozel (2007) whose practice as a performance artist focuses her entire 
theoretical framework around her own body and its relation to external worlds. While these 
works and others take important steps towards problematising embodiment, the focus on the 
materiality of the digital further obscures its relation to consciousness. 
Katherine Hayles aligns the cyborg with a posthuman stage of evolution, stating that 
“the defining characteristics involve the construction of subjectivity, not the presence of 
nonbiological components” (1999, 4). While this establishes the subject as the centre of 
discussion, it reduces cybernetics to the prosthetics of physical loss rather than the 
augmentation of consciousness, and becomes mired in an obsession with reinserting 
embodiment against the posthuman view of “the body as the original prostheses” (Ibid., 3). 
While Hayles later recognised the need to move beyond her earlier “versions of the 
posthuman that would acknowledge the importance of embodiment” (2005, 2) towards an 
array of potential posthumans, she shifts the discussion once more into a form of 
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embodiment through a materiality of information in digital technologies rather than into the 
consciousness of parallax that defines our manner of overcoming the relation between the 
physical-digital antagonism within the subject itself. This emphasis on materiality arises in 
part from a misconception of Virtuality as “the cultural perception that material objects are 
interpenetrated by information” (Hayles 1999, 13). In this thesis the Virtual is the process by 
which consciousness creates the subject, with the simultaneous appearance of materiality and 
its structures of signification. It is not until recently that Hayles has emphasised the need to 
acknowledge the shift in perspective of subjects thinking with digital technology, and the view 
that “materiality, like the object itself, is not a pre-given entity but rather a dynamic process 
that changes as the focus of attention shifts” (2012, 14), albeit within the narrow context of 
comparative media studies and the impact of technology on scholarly activity. Here still, 
however, the limitations of embodiment linger with discussions of informational “node 
bodies” (Ibid., 15) and the “embodiment of material artifacts” (Hayles 2010, 328). 
Mark Hansen appears to make some progress in establishing the emerging need to 
discuss not separate physical and digital spaces but “a fluid interpretation of realms…a mixed 
reality stage”, yet limits himself to “the central role played by the body in the interface to the 
virtual” (2006, 2). This is based on the same error as Hayles and Ihde in defining the Virtual as 
a filling of (physical) space with information rather than as the functioning process of 
consciousness (or/as computation) between spaces. Hansen does, however, emphasise mixed 
reality for “its eschewal of representationalism and embrace of a functionalist perspective” 
(Ibid., 3), yet returns to the familiar paradigm which “foregrounds the constitutive or 
ontological role of the body in giving birth to the world” (Ibid., 5) in a return to pre-
technological (pre-reproduction) conceptions of “the aura that belongs indelibly to this 
singular actualization of data in embodied experience” (Hansen 2004, 3). While Hansen views 
embodiment as inseparable from cognitive neural processes, this too reduces the entire 
consciousness of the subject to a materiality of the physical body. We must move towards a 
functional approach to consciousness in itself if these theories of re-embodiment are to be re-
dis-embodied. Only by stepping outside of any situated bodily space can the parallax 
perspective of the void of subjectivity emerge for critical confrontation. 
Anna Munster (2006) also makes a purposeful effort to reinsert the body and affect into 
the digital, placing the Virtual as a part of materiality rather than a force in relation to 
consciousness. This work, with its focus on “the point of intersection that digital flows have 
with issues of embodiment” (Ibid., 24), remains entrenched within materiality. There is a clear 
Deleuzian influence in Munster’s work, and both Deleuze and Félix Guattari are referenced 
heavily in relation to the Virtual, as well as notions of flow, diagram and time. Indeed it is the 
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work of Deleuze that is placed in this thesis alongside the philosophy of quantum physics 
within the framework of Žižek’s parallax to interrogate the cyborg subject in relation to the 
gap between physical and digital worlds under the terms of a series of functions of 
consciousness. This is in part an attempt to confront a common thread throughout the history 
of digital theory: a failure to fully address the role of the subject amidst the increasing 
digitisation of the world. However, such works remain instructive for introducing the relevant 
questions and problems within scholarly discussion of the digital. For example, Sherry Turkle 
highlights the contemporary “disjuncture between theory (the unitary self is an illusion) and 
lived experience (the unitary self is the most basic reality)” (1997, 15) that draws notions of 
digital consciousness into the dilemma of modern physics, and Jean Baudrillard challenges 
that “the hypothesis of objective reality exerts such a hold on our mind only because it is by 
far the easiest solution” (2005, 47). This thesis places itself within the negotiations of digital 
technology that have established antagonisms within the relations of embodiment and 
objective reality and against the materialist insistence on the physical that dominates current 
scholarship, using cultural theory to analyse the expressions and impact of the digital and 
consciousness studies to confront the relation of the digital to the contemporary subject. This 
necessitates a return to earlier conceptions of cybernetics as an interdisciplinary pursuit for 
the expansion of human intellect (Ashby 1957; Licklider 1960; Engelbart 1962), a study of our 
cognitive behaviour and its relation to conceptual and technological processes. To this end, 
the thesis draws on theory from both within and without the fragmentary field of digital 
culture to assess the psychological, metaphysical and quantum functions of the cyborg 
subject as the gap between physical and digital realms. 
ŽIŽEK, DELEUZE, QUANTUM PHYSICS 
Within theories of digital technology and its culture two strands of a radical reassessment of 
the very terms of the discussion have emerged, centred around the problematic notion of 
‘Virtual Reality’ that has dominated cultural depictions of the digital world. Digital technology 
has called into question the appearance of ‘reality’, forcing even the most rigid materialism to 
have to take into account the possibility of other spaces with which the human subject can 
engage. How the individual relates to such other potential realities can be understood in 
redefining the term ‘Real’ along Lacanian lines, particularly as applied to cultural phenomena 
by Žižek. Writers such as David Gunkel (2010) have furthered this notion, drawing out the Real 
across physical and digital worlds as the hidden causality (for example, quantum wave 
functions, DNA or bits of computer code) that underpins the appearance of objective reality. 
This Real is inaccessible and terrifying, the traumatic abyss at the centre of contemporary 
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subjectivity (Žižek 2009b, 210). Counter to this development is the expansion of the term 
Virtual, often taking into account the definition developed by Deleuze as a surface that is not 
actual but with which the subject can engage. This has been applied as an alternative to the 
conflation of ‘virtual’ as ‘digital’ implied in the labels ‘virtual reality’ or ‘virtual worlds’, to 
instead connect the fluidity of digital surfaces to consciousness in a relation consistent with 
other generative effects  within the structures that form the idealist element in Deleuzian 
philosophy. Between these two expanded terms, however, there is little crossover in current 
literature. Nicholas Gane and David Beer (2008), for example, draw heavily on the work of 
Deleuze for notions of virtuality and the concept, while mentioning Jacques Lacan only briefly 
as an extension to Freudian memory. Throughout the field, the antagonism between 
Virtuality and Reality persists as a theoretical pariah in the parallax of physical and digital. 
Žižek’s own discussion defines Deleuze’s Virtual as Lacan’s Real which, while acknowledging 
the importance of the reality of the virtual over ‘virtual reality’ (Žižek 2012, 3), conflates the 
nuances of the two processes within consciousness and their functions in the generation of 
the cyborg subject. The antagonistic relation between the Real and the Virtual, in the 
expanded sense of both terms, forms an integral method of analysis throughout this thesis, 
and the productive conflict between Žižek and Deleuze assists in developing a theory of the 
digital founded upon the antagonistic relation between the Virtuality and Reality of the 
cyborg subject. 
Further consideration of the use of these two thinkers, alongside the philosophy of 
quantum physics, is required regarding their affiliation with the digital. Quantum physics, as a 
hard and abstract science, has at first glance little concern with digital culture. While the 
search for empirical proof of the particularities of fundamental particles may seem far 
removed from any cultural implications, the relation of immaterial processes to consciousness 
provides an illuminating cross-analysis between quantum and digital modes of thinking, and 
the cosmological impact of these forces in the formation and ultimate fate of the universe are 
instructive in the emergence and potential futures of our own consciousness and cybernetic 
multi-verse. Furthermore, the scope for an application of quantum physics to a philosophy of 
the digital reinforces the active role of consciousness in constructing a physical or digital 
reality. This can be seen in several examples: Hugh Everett’s many worlds theory (in DeWitt 
and Graham 1973) which confronts the superposition of actually occurring parallel universes 
defined only by which probability a consciousness perceives; David Bohm’s discussion of 
thought (1994) manifesting as an emergent system across quantum and cognitive disciplines; 
and John Wheeler’s it-from-bit theory (in Zurek 1990) in which fundamental physical 
processes precisely are binary digital operations decided by consciousness. 
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Similarly, Deleuze does not directly discuss digital technology in itself, however his 
work with Guattari establishes methods of analysis that can be applied to digital culture, and 
his notion of the Virtual has, as already discussed, formed an integral mode of reconceiving 
the immaterial flows of digital space. Žižek, on the other hand, oftern mentions digital culture 
in his cultural psychoanalysis. However, while his analysis of digital technologies is instructive, 
pointing out that “how cyberspace will affect us is not directly inscribed into its technological 
properties; rather it hinges on the network of socio-symbolic relations which always-already 
overdetermine the way cyberspace affects us” (Žižek in Wright and Wright 1999, 123), the 
digital remains within his work only ever either illustrative of a theory concerning ‘real’ 
physical life or symptomatic of broader socio-economic issues. While Lacan directly discussed 
psychoanalysis alongside cybernetics in the construction of signification (1988, 295f) – a view 
of machinic processes of thought in “the process of complete transformation” (Ibid., 31) 
expanding cybernetics to consider presence and absence within consciousness (Ibid., 300) – 
Žižek rejects any overtly positive connection with cybernetics and digital technology. Indeed, 
Žižek’s ultimate use for the digital realm is to destroy it in a “virtual catastrophe” that will 
“somehow redeem ‘real life’” (Žižek 2008a, 213). This thesis therefore re-applies Žižek’s 
theory in the framework of an explicitly digital study, utilising his psychoanalytical 
construction of the subject as a void and his cultural analysis of contemporary media and art 
while stripping them of the nostalgic preference for the physical world. Žižek is an overt 
materialist and, despite his insistence on materialism as being concerned with the non-
existence of matter (2009b, 17-8), his view on the dominance of the causality of physical 
matter reveals the need to extend his work if a deeper understanding of the digital in itself is 
to be sought. Similarly, his references to quantum physics (see, for example Žižek 2007, 189f) 
remain allegorical and noncommittal, using the immateriality of quantum processes to 
describe psychological processes that remain essentially disconnected from what he 
describes. This thesis reassesses these notions less allegorically, connecting the physical and 
digital realms in their relation to the construction of a genuinely cyborg subject. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Within this discussion of consciousness, technology and culture, the various strands of inquiry 
remain focused on the core research questions set out above, namely the relation of the 
functions of consciousness to physical and digital worlds in forming the cyborg subject as the 
void of an ontological parallax perspective. The thesis does not present a finished and 
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complete philosophy of the digital, for such a task is beyond the current inquiry, but rather 
outlines a new formulation of the contemporary subject that ultimately reconciles the 
expanded notions of both the Real and the Virtual within consciousness, establishing a 
method for examining our relations to theories and cultures of the digital. This is built upon an 
original framework of terms under which the functions of consciousness can be assessed 
across physical and digital modes of subjectivity: Existence, Meaning, Real, Virtual. The focus 
of the discussion is the individual subject rather than overtly social elements of digital 
technology, except in direct relation to consciousness, for example the extension of Meaning 
as communication or the abstract notion of Otherness expressed by Lacan (1977) as inherent 
within consciousness. Social reality is referred to as a presupposed externalisation of the 
functions of consciousness and its relation to other potential subjects. However, this is not the 
focus of the discussion but rather a way of approaching external cultural artefacts.  
The cultural artefacts that are used for an analysis of the construction and critical 
disturbance of physical and digital worlds centre on artistic interventions. While mass media is 
considered, as part of the general state of physical and digital worlds, it is those works that 
engage in a disruption of accepted media that allows for a space of critical distance to the 
smooth functioning of consciousness to be opened within the discussion, and thus enable an 
understanding and critique of the cyborg subject. Film, television and photography are 
therefore not directly confronted in the manner of other media, though they are drawn into 
the debate where they might inform a specific salient point concerning the nature of 
consciousness. Performance is also not directly assessed due to the focus in scholarship in this 
field, as well as in film and photography, on the effects of digital technology in changing a pre-
established medium. The aim of this thesis is to confront an analytical theory of the digital in 
itself rather than as a historicised moment within general media theory. Within the remit of 
specifically digital concerns, a defined set of cultural artefacts are analysed in relevance to 
each issue and as part of the overall argument of the thesis: the inversion of Existence and 
Meaning that creates the physical-digital gap, the simultaneous emergence of Real and 
Virtual from the void in the creation of the subject, the Real of the physical and its necessary 
link to a given world’s Virtuality, the structure of fantasy supporting the relation between 
Virtual and Real, building towards the resolved and sustained antagonism of Virtual and Real. 
The order of the chapters, including the focus on different creative practices utilising digital 
technologies, builds alongside the argument of the thesis, developing the theoretical point 
from the technology itself, moving inwards to the detailed construction of the subject and 
then outwards to the future resolution of the problematic relation of the cyborg subject to 
itself and its position within both contemporary society and a cybernetic society yet to come. 
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Digital fine art and online interventions are assessed in order to establish the 
construction of our perception of the digital world and offer an engaged form of spectatorship 
that draws the subject into both worlds as a creative force, both aesthetically in applied 
examples and ontologically within the theoretical framework of consciousness being 
hypothesised. Avatar-mediated spaces and artistic practice are utilised in provoking an anti-
materialist perspective on parallax as it relates to the digital, and the computer game 
paradigm of mass media is assessed through the practice of ‘art games’ that challenge the 
accepted conceptions of our engagement with the digital realm. Finally, to define art in its 
broadest sense, and in the extrapolation of cultural products in relation to ideas within 
consciousness, literary examples are used to suggest alternative methods of conceiving our 
relation to technology along with a series of extrapolations of potential problems and a series 
of cultural markers that have defined and expressed such relations and dilemmas throughout 
the development of digital technology. This use of speculation closes the discussion as the 
future of the cyborg is considered through literary stagings and the development of 
technological culture. Here film is of relevance, in combining alternative narratives with a 
visual expression, although it is precisely the non-visual nature of literature that enables an 
extension of abstract notions within consciousness. Throughout the analysis of these cultural 
artefacts, as expressions of the subjective relation to digital technology, the thesis focuses on 
establishing a mode of rethinking the contemporary subject as a cyborg: a consciousness 
around the void of a parallax perspective between physical and digital worlds. 
STRUCTURE 
The process through which this thesis contributes to scholarship concerning digital 
consciousness and its culture, and answers the research questions raised above, entails an 
analytical structure applied across each of the five chapters. Within the chapters, each a 
different position in relation to the functions of consciousness and a particular view on the 
cyborg subject, a common framework is applied. Firstly, the central question of the chapter is 
postulated in Žižekian terms, within the structures of parallax and the psychoanalytical 
construction of the subject, followed by Deleuzian and quantum physical analyses of a specific 
application of digital technology. These two separate approaches, focused around a particular 
text by Deleuze and interpretation of quantum theory, are drawn together in an in-depth 
analysis of a particular technology or artist’s work that exemplifies a critical position on digital 
technology and an informative expression of the particular nature of the subject in question. 
This flows back into an analysis in Žižekian-Lacanian terms and a confrontation with the core 
research aims of the thesis. Each chapter of the thesis confronts a specific interrogation of one 
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facet of this inquiry into the parallax of the digital, the functions of consciousness and the void 
of subjectivity. These questions are formulated around a specific relation between functions, 
or the relation of a specific function to the construction of the subject. Thus each chapter 
forms a different view of the cyborg subject and undertake a critique of digital consciousness 
from a different perspective, drawn together in the ongoing discussion of Virtuality and 
Reality in the formation and critique of digital parallax and cyborg consciousness. 
The first chapter, The Open Subject, outlines the fundamental difference of the physical 
and digital modes of reality within consciousness, formed through the inversion of Existence 
and Meaning. The internality of this gesture extrapolates the mediation of consciousness by 
itself, across both realities. This sets the tone for the other chapters by constructing the 
relation of the subject to the two realms. Focusing on online media and the critical potential of 
interventions within the abstract, global, purely digital space of the internet, a number of 
examples are elucidated that demonstrate the inversion creating new worlds, the obstacles of 
moving freely between the two worlds, steps being taken to open up new spaces for 
subjectivity within the coded digital space, and the conflicted position of the subject between 
digital spaces and their links to physical locations. Žižek’s problematic notion of matter is 
assessed in the context of digital information, before a discussion of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
conception of machines, particularly the war machine as part of their ‘nomadology’ (2004b, 
387f). This constant displacement of the subject across space as a destructive and critical force 
is placed alongside the shifting parameters of space itself in quantum physics. Using Bohm’s 
interpretation (2002) and Everett’s many worlds theory (in DeWitt and Graham 1973), the role 
of the subject is positioned amidst the conflicting dominance of Existence and Meaning across 
physical and digital worlds respectively, while suggesting the need for an interaction across 
multiple systems of reality. The conceptual work of Maurice Benayoun is used as a study of 
these ideas, with his critical use of technology in cutting across physical spaces through digital 
mediation and the subsequent construction of new immaterial spaces of informatic 
subjectivity. This analysis closes by reasserting Žižek’s parallax as a method of achieving a 
critical distance to the self-mediation of the subject, raising questions concerning the 
possibility and nature of a radical intervention within consciousness. 
In the second chapter, The Empty Subject, the inquiry withdraws from the specifics of 
physical and digital worlds to interrogate the emergence of the subject. The formation of 
consciousness as a functioning Virtuality from the inaccessible Real of the human mind 
informs the nature of this inaccessibility. Žižek’s definition of the perspectival position of 
parallax is suggested as a desubstantialisation of the contemporary subject. Rather than the 
decentring of the subject that has become commonplace in critical theory and 
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poststructuralism, the core of the subject is revealed as the void: the centred emptiness of 
consciousness. Jacques Rancière’s conception of the unrepresentable (2007) is used to 
extrapolate this notion in the Real function of consciousness as the objectification of this void 
within thought. The Deleuzian body without organs (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, 9f; 2004b, 
165f) is then used to interrogate the subject as a surface of Virtuality around this void core, 
with Deleuze and Guattari’s process of mapping (2004b 13; 181) applied to digital forms of 
diagrammatic art practice engaging with insubstantial spaces and informational structures, to 
reveal in the process by which consciousness emerges an indication of the counter-process by 
which the void is lost to thought. Conceptions of empty space in quantum physics illuminate 
the causal role of this void to consciousness, through an assessment of the quantum vacuum, 
dark spots in the CMB (Cosmic Microwave Background) and various forms of unperceivable 
particles, towards Wheeler’s ‘it from bit’ hypothesis that invokes the binary processes of the 
digital world as the fundamental causal operations of quantum physical reality (Wheeler in 
Zurek 1990, 309-336; Wheeler 1998), expressed through technological art as the primary and 
participatory act of engaged spectatorship. The computer-generated gallery art of Pascal 
Dombis, fusing algorithmic creation with lenticular distortion, is analysed in detail for directly 
approaching the problems of contemporary subjectivity that are at stake in this thesis. The 
causal gesture in his practice, drawing informational chaos into visual art, is expanded through 
post-digital works towards a confrontation with the cracks in both the digital symbolic world 
and the subject itself. This initiates a return to the digital application of Žižek’s parallax and 
the primary gesture of thought rendering itself inaccessible: the objectification of the void as 
the Real of consciousness and subsequent loss of self central to contemporary subjectivity. 
Expanding this negotiation of loss at the core of the cyborg subject, the third chapter, 
The Absent Subject, confronts the conflicting relations of the Real between physical and digital 
worlds. The loss of material certainty brought into the everyday life of the contemporary 
subject in its permeation by the symbolic spaces of digital technologies is framed as a 
discussion of the physical Real: the loss of physicality that brings about many of the tensions 
between physical and digital. Žižek’s challenge to Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s embodied 
phenomenology (2009b, 227) provides a starting point for an interrogation of embodiment in 
general and the physical body as a lost object. Avatar-mediated spaces provide the cultural 
artefacts for analysis, using Deleuze’s interlinked concepts of difference and repetition 
(2004a), to unearth the processes at work in a consciousness that can occupy, interact 
through and move between physical and digital bodies in material and symbolic spaces. The 
quantum physical role of observation extends this disembodiment into the fragmentation of 
external physical reality, leading through the wave/particle duality and Werner Heisenberg’s 
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uncertainty principle (1949; 2000) towards a hypertextual role of embodiment as a mode of 
participation for the subject as an engaged spectator of physical and digital worlds. The 
avatar-mediated environment of Second Life, by Linden Labs, provides a specific example in 
developing the digital body of the avatar as an object, as the lost object cause of desire in 
Lacan’s objet petit a (1977, 67f; 263-274), as an expression, of difference from and within the 
subject, and as an interface, in a hypertextual definition of embodiment as cognitive 
engagement. This returns to Žižek’s extension of Lacanian concepts in undermining the hold 
the physical body has retained over perception and cognition in recent research, revealing the 
symbolic control that embodiment enforces upon the subject through both physical and 
digital body. From the lost object of the Real within the bodily shell the subject presumes to 
inhabit, to the Virtuality of big Other in the illusion of materiality such embodiment creates, 
the need for a distance towards the body is asserted, to allow for the desubstantialised 
parallax position of the cyborg subject to emerge. 
This structure through which the Virtual desire maintains dominance over the lost Real 
of the subjective position is confronted in the fourth chapter, The Undead Subject. Taking the 
Real to what Žižek describes as its traumatic, horrifying and monstrous conclusions, its 
relation to the Virtual functioning of consciousness is interrogated through the medium of 
computer games. Built around a structure of desire in the paradigm of completing the 
objectives, alongside the horror of death and losing the game, this medium is explored 
through the state of undeath that the cyborg subject enters between the continued life of 
Virtuality and the death drive of the terrifying Real. Using Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of 
becoming, expanded here from becoming-animal (2004b, 256f) to becoming-death, a series 
of art games are analysed that challenge the traditional gaming structures and insert a critical 
conceptual or aesthetic rupture in the relation of the player towards digital death. This 
perpetual process and unattainability of death is followed by a discussion of the quantum 
immortal, as described by Max Tegmark (1998; 2007a) in his elaboration of Everett’s many 
worlds theory. Where the quantum immortal cannot perceive its many possibilities of living 
and dying through any situation, in the digital medium the subject can simultaneously live and 
die, even reversing time to undo or relive a particular instance of death. This entering of a 
state between deaths, between the Virtual and the Real, is applied to the structures of desire 
in a close analysis of Valve Corporation’s Portal series of games, in which an immortal artificial 
intelligence, built from a human-computer hybrid, torments the human character in a 
constant state of testing, dying and re-testing. The relation of humanity to purely digital 
being is interrogated in relation to the finality of death and its suspension in computer games, 
to expand the definition of the cyborg subject as a consciousness able to perceive and engage 
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with impossible superpositions of itself beyond physicality and mortality. Žižek’s 
psychoanalytical project of staging the fundamental fantasy (in Wright and Wright 1999, 102-
124), the structure supporting desire, is then interrogated through the digital medium in 
creating a space whereby the Real can emerge from beneath the Virtual surface of the purely 
human subject in a critical gesture of expression, self-destruction and rebirth as a self-aware 
cyborg subject. 
The potential for the cyborg subject to extend beyond the boundaries of physical 
humanity is explored more fully in the fifth and final chapter, The Impossible Subject, which 
uses cultural representations of the digital, particularly speculative fiction, to assess the 
potential for reconceiving the relation of Virtual and Real. By applying Žižek’s method of 
inserting a minimal difference towards a situation in order to critique it to Fredric Jameson’s 
utopic construction of science fiction (2007), the development of cyberpunk is analysed as a 
critique of the state of digital culture. By positing a future system of thought relations to 
technology, and the various forms of subject and society that it might produce, a critical 
distance to the present allows for an assessment of the way in which the digital world is 
currently thought and the creation of a space into which another mode of thinking can be 
brought forward. Using Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of a minor literature (1986; 2004b), 
the cyberpunk genre is confronted, with consideration given to the backgrounds of artists, 
writers and thinkers and the impact of their work between creative and scientific realms of 
inquiry in contact with developments in the cultural application and representation of digital 
technology. This is extended into recent ‘hard science fiction’ that speculates on the 
implications of different possibilities regarding the fundamental laws of physics and the 
potential horror embedded within the ontological role of observation for the engaged 
spectator. A study of Hannu Rajaniemi’s work (2010; 2012; 2014a) draws these themes – the 
technological protagonist in literature, recent trends in science fiction and the positing of 
other modes of subjectivity – into confrontation with extensions of digital culture that suggest 
an awareness of the future of the cyborg subject in the fusion of Virtual and Real. The cyborg 
subject is thus interrogated as a potential step towards the posthuman: a method of thinking 
otherwise as consciousness engages freely across physical and digital (and possible other) 
realities. To draw the thesis to its conclusion, this chapter, through positing other and future 
modes of consciousness, forms a critique of the current mode of thinking digital technology 
and our relation to it, in order to answer the question of how the cyborg subject might 
critically and creatively confront the functioning of its own consciousness from the parallax 
position between physical and digital realities. 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND TERMINOLOGY1 
 
The methodology dictates that a set of theoretical terms be defined for consistent use 
throughout the thesis. As previously discussed, efforts are made to reconcile apparently 
conflicting conceptions of thought and the psychological construction of the subject, and the 
precise understanding of the terms reflects this productive yet antagonistic relationship 
between parallel philosophical positions. Firstly, the relation between subject and 
consciousness is explicated, followed by the original schema of Existence, Meaning, Real and 
Virtual that constitute the functions of consciousness. These terms, emerging from the 
research as a suitable framework for discussion, are defined in relation to Žižek, Deleuze and 
quantum physics in order to construct a coherent set of definitions that can be used 
throughout the structure of the chapters. The relations between these terms are then 
delineated as their coalescence into physical and digital modes of consciousness and reality, 
followed by a discussion of the process of parallax itself in the formation of the cyborg subject. 
SUBJECT/CONSCIOUSNESS 
The first terms that must be defined involve the difference between the subject and 
consciousness. While they amount to the same construction of the cyborg as a contemporary 
extension of what is commonly designated ‘human’, subject and consciousness occupy 
specific roles within such a structure, as the void and the surface respectively. Consciousness 
is the process of thought itself as a series of machinic functions. It is the act of self-positing 
that forms the surface of the subject as a pure Virtuality. The subject itself is, rather, the 
position from which consciousness is thought, the void of the parallax perspective and the 
assemblage of functions and worlds around such a void. This structure from and around which 
consciousness takes place is what Žižek describes as the cogito, “not a substantial entity but a 
pure structural function, an empty place” (Žižek 2009b, 8), yet from this vacant structure all 
manner of wondrous realities burst forth. If consciousness is the process of thought, it is the 
subject that announces ‘ergo sum’ as the position from which consciousness speaks. The 
machinic nature of consciousness remains always a process, whereas the subject is a position. 
This position, however, is located in the gap between physical and digital worlds as a rupture 
                                                                    
1
 A concise classification of these terms can also be found, with other terms bearing a specific 
significance within the thesis, in the Glossary of Terms at the front of this text. 
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at the heart of reality. Žižek labels this the “‘I of the storm’, the void in the centre of the 
incessant vortex/whirlpool of elusive mental events…the void that is nothing in itself…which 
nonetheless serves as the unrepresentable point of reference” (2006, 102). Applied to the 
construction of physical and digital within the functioning of consciousness (the ‘elusive 
mental events’), the subject thus appears as a cyborg: an expression of consciousness as the 
gap between and engaging with both worlds. The subject becomes an engaged spectator 
through consciousness, while consciousness functions around the void-core of the subject. 
The functions of consciousness – Existence, Meaning, Real, Virtual – can therefore be 
considered both essential to the creation of a subject and the way in which the subject is 
alienated from itself. As Žižek states, “the subject fails by definition” (2000, 117), for in order 
to form through the functioning of consciousness the subject must conceal the inaccessibility 
of its void-core. It is the nature of this functioning that must be scrutinised if the construction 
of the cyborg subject between physical and digital worlds is to be understood. 
EXISTENCE 
The first function is Existence, the being-function, that is, the first phenomenological step of 
engaged spectatorship that ascertains the being of the subject and the world it perceives itself 
to be in. This is also the ontological presupposition of the possibility of existence and the 
gesture of the gaze that suggests an external world and draws the subject into being in such a 
world. Jean-Paul Sartre, speaking of our relation to being as image, insists that “all 
consciousness is consciousness of something” (2004, 11), and this conception of an existence 
reliant on engagement has resounded not only through philosophy, but also quantum physics, 
in our understanding of the constitutive correlation between ‘perception’ and ‘perceived’, 
‘observer’ and ‘object’. As Bohm suggests, “instead of saying ‘an observer looks at an object’, 
we can more appropriately say, ‘observation is going on, in an undivided moment involving 
those abstractions customarily called “the human being” and “the object he is looking at”’” 
(2002, 37). The subject does not commit the act of Existence alone; it requires a world to 
appear before it. The subject is therefore as dependent on the object of Existence as the 
object itself. Yet this is not a consciousness of an external ‘objective reality’, but rather a 
reliance on a subjective engagement with the very conditions of appearance. This 
appearance-as-such fulfils Deleuze’s logic of denotation (2004b, 16), the stating of a particular 
external world by the subject, and the first form of consciousness for both philosophy and 
physics. Henri Lefebvre states that the subject “changes that which he observes” (2004, 25), 
echoed by Everett: “in order to say that an observer, O, has observed an event a, it is 
necessary that the state of O has become changed forever from its former state to a new state 
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which is dependent on a” (in DeWitt and Graham 1973, 63-4). Existence takes on here the 
negative connotations of collapse or decoherence as being constructs a limiting force on the 
uncertainty and potentiality of unknowable flux. This interdependent causal loop always 
leaves in appearance the mark of the void of subjectivity, what Žižek’s ontological gaze 
describes as “traces of the subject himself…in the object” (2009c, 103).  Existence therefore 
becomes the composite of the gaze and its conditions, the fact that something exists, in the 
active role of the individual through the positing of the self, mirrored in the object. 
MEANING 
The second function is here named Meaning, the communication-function, the sharing of 
experience between subjects and the conditions that make such communication possible. 
This is not the particular signifier attached to an object, but rather the possibility of truth that 
enables the process of signification. In conjunction with the being-function, the 
communication-function constitutes and presupposes an axis of existence and essence, thus 
positing ontology and epistemology respectively. This process of signification is founded not 
on an independent idea tied to a particular or universal object, but on the thought of the idea 
as it is posited as a function within consciousness. We might apply Deleuze’s interpretation 
that “the logical value of signification…is no longer the truth…but rather the condition of 
truth” (2004b, 18). This condition of truth that establishes the positing within consciousness of 
an essence of the object thus always lacks actual truth. As Žižek states, “‘essence’ itself is 
nothing but the inadequacy of the appearance to itself” (2008b, 234), that is the necessary 
illusion of an impossible state in which an object is its own signification inherent to the 
symbolic order. Bohm’s system of thought is of particular relevance here in the relation of the 
essential disjunction or distance of the signifying process within consciousness. He writes, 
“thought is incomplete…a signification, or an ‘abstraction’…a representation of what you are 
thinking about” (1994, 92). Through a quantum physical lens, we can envisage Meaning as “a 
joint product of all the information that is exchanged between those who communicate” 
(Wheeler in Brown & Davies 1986, 68). Meaning is neither certain nor exact, but an 
approximation based on the possibility of truth as an emergent phenomena. information is 
therefore a flow or line, not passive or immobile truth but “active information” as a path to or 
passage through wholeness (Bohm in Ibid., 128). The work of Baudrillard is of importance in 
this process of signification as the production of simulacra, in that it both “masks the absence 
of a profound reality” and “has no relation to any reality whatsoever” (1994, 6) in its nature as 
a process of thought on the surface of consciousness. We can attribute to Meaning a 
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quantising effect, forcing ideas into frames of signification for consciousness to communicate, 
the line of flow from subjects to each other and external worlds. 
REAL 
The third function relates directly to the subject as gap as the void-function of consciousness. 
The Real, as it is used in this thesis, is heavily influenced by the later Lacanian Real (Lacan 
1977), though more specifically the objet petit a as the objectification of the void and its role in 
drive. If subjective reality is a void around which worlds form, then the Real is the absent or 
quasi-cause at the heart of the parallax that determines the manner in which reality appears 
to the subject. This Real is not an objective reality, but rather the excessive lack within the 
subject that presupposes an external causality. However, if, as Žižek states, “all 
presuppositions are already minimally posited” (2000, 119), then the Real is that which is 
presupposed as lost, what he labels the “coincidence of emergence and loss…objet petit a” 
(2008a, 15). Throughout Žižek’s interpretation of Lacan, the Real as objet a is the excess and 
lack of an underlying ‘Real-ity’: excess in terms of a mystical beyond or supposed causal force 
more than the subject; lack in its unattainable nature derived from its positing within (and 
objectification of the void of) the subject. From this position, the Real functions according to 
the logic of that which is expressed. This is Deleuze’s conception of sense which “brings that 
which expresses it into existence” (2004b, 190), “is essentially produced” (Ibid., 109) and “is 
always presupposed as soon as I begin to speak; I would not be able to begin without this 
presupposition” (Ibid., 35). Sense manifests the Real as a functional logic: that which is 
expressed, yet cannot be directly confronted; the object of the proposition that is not included 
in it; the quasi-cause of the void-function. This conception of the Real can be seen in the 
underlying reality of the quantum universe in which “all is flux…what is is the process of 
becoming itself” (Bohm 2002, 61). As Heisenberg warned, “one should be especially careful in 
using the words “reality”, “actually”, etc.” (1949, 15n), and his uncertainty principle elucidates 
that we can never ‘really’ know the state of things in the flux of quantum reality. The Real is 
the objectification of this flux within consciousness, and through Žižek we can arrive at the 
conclusion that “reality is never directly ‘itself’” (2006, 241). In this way the Real portrays a 
void-function within consciousness, the inaccessibility of the void of subjective reality. 
VIRTUAL 
The final function is the role of consciousness in perpetuating itself; the subject as process; the 
function-function of consciousness in which the subject imagines and posits its own 
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functioning. This function forms an axis of becoming, based on the desire that leads always 
towards the Real, yet never achieves its goal, in what Deleuze would call the Virtual. While this 
Deleuzian Virtual is taken into account as a function of immateriality operating within 
thought, its position within a schema of real and actual that relies too heavily on objectivity 
limits its direct transferral onto the terms as used here. The Virtual here is manifestation, the 
“I” of the enunciation as the establishing of the process of consciousness, a “statement of 
desire” (Deleuze 2004b, 17). Within the structures of consciousness the subject “imagines 
himself to be…merely by virtue of the fact that he imagines himself” (Lacan, 1977, 142). It is 
the functioning of consciousness that bars the subject from itself. This is the grand illusion of 
consciousness, covering over the inherent alienation of the subject from itself, concealing the 
void of subjectivity with the surface of consciousness. The Virtual thus takes on the role of the 
big Other, the structure of desire that is always already in the unconscious (Ibid., 130). This 
predicate for the manifestation of the cogito as the enunciating subject does not exist outside 
of consciousness but supports the whole symbolic structure necessary for the subject to 
function. This internal illusion is echoed in quantum physics, where the Virtual forms the field 
of forces in which the scope of consciousness covers over quantum processes in the guise of 
‘classical physics’, whereby the desire for empirically comprehensible links between theory 
and appearance necessitates a shift in thought. It is the Virtual that makes consciousness 
always-already false and, somewhat paradoxically, enables the subject to conceive of the 
substance of objective reality that obscures the internal positing of the assemblage of worlds, 
thus Žižek’s conclusion: “reality always-already was virtual” (2007, 193). Indeed, all worlds are 
formed and all of subjective reality defined by the constant process of desire as the Virtual 
function of consciousness. As desire, what Deleuze and Guattari define as “a process of 
production without reference to any exterior agency” (2004a, 170-1), the Virtual both sustains 
the illusion of objectivity in relation to the subject and enables the subjective self that “exists 
only on the basis of the misrecognition of its own conditions” (Žižek 2008b, 73). The Virtual is 
the function-function of consciousness, its function as such essential to the assemblage of 
worlds and the creative formation of subjective reality. 
PHYSICAL 
The physical mode of subjectivity emerges when Existence combines with the Real, the world 
as it appears with an absent causality. Following the phenomenological dictum that existence 
precedes essence, Virtual-Meaning then occurs as a constructed truth within consciousness 
and its social relations. The entrance of consciousness into the physical world marks the initial 
passage from nothing to something, our first concrete Existence must be founded upon the 
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objectification of the void in the Real. This Real-Existence, the first stage of physical ontology 
within consciousness, is seen in terms of quantum physics: “what we experience is empty 
space. But this may also be regarded as the fullness of space, which is the ground of all 
existence. Matter is, then, a small variation on this ground” (Bohm 1994, 172). We see here an 
acknowledgement that physicality is brought into Existence as an appearance of solid matter 
out of an unknowable flux of the Real in an epistemological gesture of variation within 
consciousness. Thus “‘atoms’ are nothing but configurations of the void” (Žižek 2009c, 148), 
returning to the void once the moment of perception passes. This is Žižek’s quantum parallax 
whereby “the ‘appearance’ (perception) of a particle determines its reality” (in Sutton, Brind & 
McKenzie 2007, 188), and not only the particle or object’s reality but also our own physicality 
as subjective being. This appearance of physicality leads back into consciousness in the 
process of signification, the human desire for communication. This is where Virtual-Meaning 
is formed, in the process combining the conditions of truth with the functioning of 
consciousness. As Žižek states, “the multitude of ‘floating signifiers’…is structured into a 
unified field through the intervention of a certain ‘nodal point’ which ‘quilts’ them, stops their 
sliding and fixes their meaning” (2008b, 95). The Virtual, as desire and the big Other, acts as 
this condensing point upon and against which Meaning can be certified, wherein “by the mere 
act of speaking, we suppose the existence of the big Other as guarantor of our meaning” 
(Žižek 1991, 153). Our interpretation of the physical world relies upon this Virtual-Meaning. 
Signification must become manifestation and the subject must form itself in a relation to 
symbolic truth and presuppose an external validity to such truth in order to engage in the use 
of individual visual, linguistic and cultural signifiers. This process of creating a symbolic 
structure based on a presupposed external physical reality is the cycle of the physical world, 
whereby each moment passes from perception to thought before the Virtual returns to cover 
over the Real as signifiers define the framework for future observations and the signified 
world expands within a Virtualised consciousness. 
DIGITAL 
Conversely, the digital subject condenses when the Real combines with Meaning, the absolute 
truth in code. This binary causality only ever has indirect contact with the subject, through 
layers of programming language that are constructed to enable communication. This is 
brought into Virtual Existence not as a simulation but, rather, as a simulation-of-simulation; 
the appearance of appearance instigated by a conscious intentionality linked directly to the 
underlying machine code (in its most basic form this is the act of ‘turning on’ the digital 
device). This inversion of essence before existence still maintains the originary quasi-causality 
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of the Real followed by the process of the Virtual. The digital world is not built from material 
substance, but from the abstract and absolute code of the machinic computer. Such a formal, 
logic-based realm can be considered the fulfilment of electric technology as “pure information 
without any content to restrict its transforming and informing power” (McLuhan 2001, 57). 
Binary logic is “contentless and silent” (Heim 1993, 93), built upon the numbers one (being) 
and zero (nothing). Jameson tells us that “numbers have no content” (2007, 229), thus the 
being and nothingness of binary ontology are purely formal, in-themselves devoid of content, 
lacking. This is what Žižek calls the “minimal difference of part(s)/no part, 1 and 0” (2009a, 
128), through the coalescence of Meaning with the Real in the fundamental positing of a 
digital universe. Virtual-Existence then appears as a realm of the imaginary in the superficial 
light of the interface screen. The purity of such a ‘perfect’ imaginary world based on formally 
‘perfect’ logic fails at the very moment of engagement. The subject as physical being is 
seldom able to detach itself, neither sensorially nor cognitively, from its analogue Existence. 
Memories of ‘real’ places seep in, ‘realistic’ graphics hook our imaginations back into already 
established functions of (false) consciousness and we hold that “even a no-place must be put 
together out of already existing representations” (Jameson 2007, 24). However, this is a 
misguided short circuit of physical consciousness and analogue representations onto digital 
creativity, for “synthetic computer-generated imagery is not an inferior representation of our 
reality, but a realistic representation of a different reality” (Manovich 2001, 202). We should 
not consider Virtual-Existence as an illusory or imaginary interpretation of physical Real-
Existence, for the relation of Real to Virtual does not here imply a judgement of truth. Rather, 
the digital image should be regarded as an illusion of appearance, the simulation-of-
simulation whereby phenomena precisely are their signification in the primary causality of 
computer code. The Virtuality of Existence returns to the Real in concealing such presupposed 
code beneath the sensory data that appears on screen. 
PARALLAX 
Between these two modes of consciousness lies the subject: a cyborg perspective caught 
adrift in the void of both realities. A given world, whether physical, digital or any number of 
other potential domains, is a specific self-organisation or assemblage of the functions of 
consciousness. Beyond notions of materiality, physical and digital worlds do not, in 
themselves, differ ontologically. Rather, the specific ordering and condensing of the functions 
of consciousness creates a different knowledge and experience of each world, which precisely 
brings about the perceived changes between realities. The shift in epistemological position 
that creates an ontological difference between worlds is what we have seen in Žižek’s 
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conception of parallax (2009b, 17). However, where he applies this model to a cultural 
ontology of subjective positions within a social reality, here it is interpreted not as a shift 
between individual objects but a parallax of worlds as the subject exerts a functional causality 
from within consciousness itself. Throughout Žižek’s work there is the basis for this 
framework of parallax and its relation to a machinic consciousness, in the proliferation of the 
“always-already” of posited-as-presupposed conditions (for example 2008a, 184), as well as 
the Lacan-inspired role of fantasy in cyberspace (Žižek in Wright & Wright, 1999, 104-123) and 
as “a screen masking a void” in reality (Žižek 2008b, 141). This structure of fantasy is of crucial 
importance in assessing the fundamental relation within consciousness that allows the subject 
to form: the Real and the Virtual. Fantasy, then, becomes the illusory structure between 
desire and drive that allows the Virtual to cover over the void of the Real in the continued 
functioning of consciousness, on the surface of the subject. What a critical approach of 
parallax aims for is the insertion of a ““minimal difference” (the noncoincidence of the one 
with itself)” (2009b, 11), under which a distance to our own subjective position can be 
achieved and the void-core (around which the parallax is centred) exposed. To break through 
the structures of fantasy in relation to digital technology is the purpose of this thesis, in a 
confrontation with the smooth functioning of consciousness in such a way that makes clear 
simultaneously the parallax relations to physical and digital worlds within subjective reality. 
By approaching the various relations of the functions of consciousness to each other and the 
subject in general, as well as their role within the fantasy that is the subject, a critical distance 
is inserted within the cyborg subject as it beholds its position in the void of parallax between 
physical and digital worlds. 
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1 THE OPEN SUBJECT 
MEDIA(TION) BETWEEN WORLDS 
 
This chapter sets out the defining shift in the functions of consciousness that differentiates 
physical and digital modes of reality: the inversion of Existence and Meaning. The shift in 
alignment of these with the Virtual and the Real is shown to control the fundamental forces at 
play in each reality. In either world, mediation is integral to the formation of the subject. The 
control of this inversion of function is analysed in the self-mediating processes of 
consciousness that allow both realities to form around the parallax subject. Therefore 
concerns over mediation by digital technology should be secondary to the internal functioning 
of consciousness in concealing its own machinic processes and the illusion of separate realities 
in the parallax of physical and digital worlds. 
To effect a change in consciousness, achieving a critique of self-mediation rather than a 
simple statement of digital mediation, the chapter assesses a series of works that act as 
cultural interventions upon relations internal to consciousness itself, rather than political 
interventions attempting to act directly upon social or technological forces. By setting aside 
concerns of the conflict between specific ideologies – and the additional forces of desire 
defined by their location in social reality – and by reducing the analysis of mediation to those 
forces internal to consciousness, a critical distance is sought from the smooth functioning of 
the subject, in which the mediation of consciousness by technology can be confronted within 
the mediation of consciousness by itself. 
The inversion of Existence and Meaning that establishes the conflicting physical and 
digital ontologies is outlined in Žižekian terms as the disruption of materiality in 
contemporary thought. This is pursued through Deleuze and Guattari’s nomadology, applied 
to the shifting landscapes of the cyborg world, and through quantum physical questions 
raised in theorising multiple levels of reality and their simultaneous engagement. The analysis 
of Benayoun’s work shows one attempt to overcome the borders between physical and digital 
that exist in current consciousness, suggesting alternative modes of viewing digital 
technology as extensions and expressions of collective thought. The chapter concludes with 
further consideration of the role of self-mediation, returning to the research question – how 
physical and digital worlds differ in their relation to consciousness – to support the ongoing 
discussion of the position of the cyborg subject within parallax reality. 
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1.1 REMEDIATIONS OF THOUGHT 
 
Any philosophy of the digital and its creative use by an engaged subject must, fundamentally, 
be a philosophy of the techno-semantic mediation of consciousness. Any creative practice 
that engages with such mediation is thus a confrontation with the assemblage of subjectivity 
across mind, world and technology. Benayoun labels art as “an advanced form of human 
mediations” (2012a) and thus an appropriate object for analysing the cultural relation of 
digital technology to the consciousness of the human subject. The remediation of thought by 
itself through technology is the manner in which art emerges from subjectivity, spanning 
physical and digital modes of expression in mapping a specific assemblage of the functions of 
a consciousness and its relation to others. In the parallax of the contemporary subject, (digital) 
art acts as a cartograph of the underlying functions and perspectival position of a given 
subject or groups of subjects. The cartography of language has defined the age of human 
consciousness, bound by the schema of the physical world into the machinic functioning of 
Real-Existence and Virtual-Meaning. Through the inversion of Existence and Meaning in 
digital technology, a schematic of Real-Meaning and Virtual Existence emerges. We are now 
entering the age of cyborg consciousness, defined by cybernetic mappings through the hybrid 
technological territories of a fusion of physical and digital consciousness. This is not a rapid 
shift. Language took thousands of years to develop and so too will the cybernetic age take 
many more years to fully evolve. Now only in its infancy, a technological singularity remains 
distant, yet digital technology is ever permeating our lives, ever expanding our consciousness. 
Guattari hails this “age of planetary computerization” as creating “a machinic subjectivity of a 
new type” (2013, 11). While language has a tendency towards linear modes of thought, the 
immaterial and fluid maps of cybernetic communication open up a rhizomatic potentiality to 
creative consciousness. 
What impact will these new digital technologies have on cyborg consciousness? It 
might be said that the subject loses its nomadic potential as ever-expanding databases 
secretly hoard information purporting to define each individual human, and the increasingly 
ubiquitous devices we all bear track our movements along stratified confines of corporate and 
state machines. It might be said that humanity itself is being stratified and codified, traced 
and territorialised according to the whims of power and the structures of fantasy and desire 
that are made manifest within the digital realm. However, the blurring of digital technologies 
with human consciousness will be shown to generate potential tools for a nomadic approach 
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to subjectivity, expanding the very notion of humanity by enabling a move outside the 
interiority of traditional conceptions of human consciousness. Technology generates both the 
dilemma and possible solutions, such that it is its relation to the desires of the cyborg subjects 
using it that defines its purpose. The grand structure of technology as an abstract machine 
acts as a big Other (Lacan 1977), which in its nonexistence appears as the Virtual function of 
consciousness. It is thus the self-positing of the subject that brings the use of technology into 
specific roles of oppression or salvation, destruction or creation. The position of subjective 
parallax as it relates to technology within consciousness determines the measure of any such 
uses. The role of thought in mediating itself defines any theory of technology, and provides 
the underlying split between physical and digital. The cyborg subject, appearing through the 
self-positing assemblage of the functions of consciousness, creates the gap between physical 
and digital worlds through its own reorganisation and remediation. 
1.1.1 REALIGNING REALITIES 
The realignment of the functions of consciousness that forms the differentiating factor 
between physical and digital modes of reality is the inversion of Existence and Meaning. The 
creation of the digital realm in code by human subjects according to the system of logics 
developed by centuries of conscious thought places binary Meaning as presupposed. The Real 
of the digital, the absent presupposition, is Meaning rather than Existence – code rather than 
being. The digital world as such is merely an unseen stream of ones and zeroes organised 
according to preordained principals. As Simon Pope and Matthew Fuller describe, “Computers 
are embodied culture, hardwired epistemology” (1995), or rather, the digital world, created 
from the assemblage of human culture (including language, logic, mathematics, etc.), is only 
our knowledge of it. Thus Virtual Existence arises when we make the conscious choice to 
‘know’ the world the code contains, to unleash digital ‘being’ on screen. Here the self-positing 
nature of reality is brought clearly into view as consciousness wittingly creates and recreates 
the semantic world of the digital in its appearance through the chosen interface. In linking this 
presupposed and primary Meaning to the Lacanian Real as the psychological underpinning of 
what appears to consciousness as ‘reality’, Žižek attempts to define the ultra-nominalism of 
Deleuze’s Idealism in contemporary society as a form of ‘spectral materialism’: 
in the information revolution, matter is reduced to the medium of purely digitalized information; in 
biogenetics, the biological body is reduced to the medium of the reproduction of the genetic code; in quantum 
physics, reality itself, the density of matter, is reduced to the collapse of the virtuality of wave oscillations 
(Žižek 2012, 22) 
The permeation of human consciousness and its engaged worlds by digital technology, which 
includes the elements of the physical world made observable only by digital technologies 
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(genetic code and subatomic particles), brings the reduction of all being to its primary code (of 
Existence to its presupposed Meaning) directly and abruptly into the assemblage of 
consciousness. Our initial experience of the world, in which Existence precedes Meaning, what 
Sartre describes as “the primacy of existence over essence” (2003, 12), is invaded by the 
functioning of digital consciousness, to the extent that Meaning begins to override Existence, 
entangling the interplay of Virtual and Real in the inversion. Žižek (in Davis 2009, 89) further 
identifies in quantum mechanics, particularly in Heisenberg’s ‘uncertainty principle’ and 
opposed to Einstein’s relativity, a necessary ontological gap within this assemblage of reality 
(rather than a gap in quantum theory as was Einstein’s accusation). Žižek exemplifies this 
through digital reality, in which the only ontological necessity is that which is included in a 
subjective perspective at any given moment in time: the rendering of only exterior surfaces of 
simulated human figures rather than full inner biology; the inexistence of text scrolled beyond 
the screen. This is seen, in both quantum and digital worlds and against our familiar ‘concrete’ 
primary experience of classical physical reality, as the primacy of Meaning over Existence, 
whereby the appearance of the world becomes solely that which is necessary for 
communication in connection with the Real as the presupposed conditions of such a reality.  
The rapid expansion of digital technology in its relation to consciousness and our 
engagement with reality necessitates the development of new methods of thinking human 
consciousness and what it means to be a subject in cyborg society. Heim tells us that 
“technology is, in essence, a mode of human existence” (1993, 60), and the contemporary 
subject must negotiate and critique these new modes of Existence in relation to Meaning from 
the parallax position around which the functions of consciousness shift and form cybernetic 
reality. In Meaning, technology is thus a form of Existence, whether it is computer code or its 
use in developing codes of genetics or wave functions. Virtual-Existence appears from Real-
Meaning within consciousness, adding what Heim labels a “new layer of reality” (Ibid., 118) 
that must be seen as an integral part of the new subjective assemblages, yet viewed critically 
in its relation to the construction of a self-aware and engaged creative consciousness. If 
consciousness, and what it means to be a human subject, is changing in the wake of digital 
technologies, a creative intervention is necessary in guiding our modes of thinking about 
technology, humanity and society. In light of these issues, the technologist Negroponte 
identified that, amidst the vast creative potentialities for digital technology in relation to 
human subjectivity, “the real opportunity comes from the digital artist providing the hooks for 
mutation and change” (1996, 224). Heim, referring specifically to digital worlds under the now 
outdated term ‘virtual reality’, also raised the importance of the role of art by suggesting that 
“perhaps the essence of VR ultimately lies not in technology but in art…to redeem our 
 29 
awareness of reality” (1993, 124). This must avoid a nostalgic redemption of a lost ‘physical 
reality’ within the flexible and ever-evolving digital world, instead emphasising an awareness 
that the construction of subjective reality by consciousness requires a negotiation and 
creative exploitation of digital technology in order to comprehend the new and ever-changing 
complexities of the assemblage of subjectivity around individual parallax perspectives. 
 
1.2 CYBER-WAR MACHINES AND VIRTUAL NOMADS 
 
1.2.1 TOOLS TO WEAPONS 
The relation of the human subject to technology is built upon its conditions as part of a 
presupposed assemblage of worlds and purpose. This is an innate mediation of consciousness 
by itself. The enslavement of the subject by the Virtuality of its own functioning, the big Other 
of thought, acts as the stratifying, codifying and limiting factors attributed to the imaginary 
Otherness of state and capitalist machines, reducing technologies to their most crude 
function as ‘tools’ for production. Deleuze and Guattari (2004b, 435-45) define the use of the 
same technology as either a tool or a weapon. The tool is moved by the subject in a relative 
speed of linear displacement: a set task with a scope of change limited to the preordained 
purpose of the territorialising and stratifying functioning of consciousness. By contrast, the 
weapon is always moving in an absolute speed along with the subject: a manifestation of force 
in space and time as a free action with unlimited scope. The definition of any single 
technology as tool or weapon is derived from its presupposed purpose, what Deleuze and 
Guattari state as “the machinic assemblage that determines what is a technical element at a 
given moment, what is its usage, extension, comprehension, etc.” (Ibid., 439). This is ‘the self-
mediation of consciousness’, with the individual functions and specific technologies as 
technical elements in the machinic assemblage of the cyborg subject. In the functioning of the 
subject it is the presupposed formation of the assemblage that defines its purpose. Just as 
physical and digital worlds are defined by the placement of Existence or Meaning in line with 
the presupposed Real (which is the presupposed as such), so too are the technologies with 
which we might engage bound to the modes of thinking presupposed by their purpose as part 
of the subjective assemblage. 
It is the role of critical digital culture to challenge this systemic remediation of the 
subject in relation to itself in general and the digital in particular. Michael Betancourt points 
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out that “the digital is a semiotic realm where the meaning present in a work is separated 
from the physical representation of that work” (2010), which is an alternate expression of the 
distinct alignment of Real-Meaning and Virtual-Existence within our functioning 
consciousness of the digital. The image of a digital work of art is only ever an appearance of 
appearance. Though the work’s underlying Meaning may be separated from its visual 
representation (its Virtual-Existence), the representation is exactly defined by the Real-
Meaning of absolute code. Thus the work appears as a simulation-of-simulation, whereby the 
Existence, the visual image, of the work is inextricably derived from the meaningful 
interpretation of code. This certainty generates an inherent problem regarding 
communication by digital means, for the fixity of the digital echoes the imagined fixing of 
semantic content in all human communication that seeks to remove subjective interpretation. 
However, it is the mediation according to the logic of (state/capitalist) tools that defines the 
certainty of the digital, concealing the Real under the big Other of the computer system. The 
task of a critical culture is to break and reveal this system of desire in a re-mediation of the 
technology as a nomadic weapon that moves across the potentialities of genuine 
intersubjective Meaning and allows contact with the Real. One such work is Gift Horse (2013), 
the proposed ‘Fourth Plinth’ work by Hans Haacke: 
Instead of the statue of William III astride a horse, as originally planned for the empty plinth, Hans Haacke 
proposes a skeleton of a riderless, strutting horse. Tied to the horse’s front leg is an electronic ribbon which 
displays live the ticker of the London Stock Exchange. The horse is derived from an etching by George Stubbs, 
whose studies of equine anatomy were published the year after the birth of the reputedly decadent king, 
whose statue was abandoned due to a lack of funds. Haacke’s proposal makes visible a number of ordinarily 
hidden substructures, tied up with a bow as if a gift to all. (Greater London Authority 2013) 
The initial commentary revealing the inner Real of the structure of the horse – perhaps a 
sculptural visualisation of a strand of horse DNA would function more completely, if less 
explicitly – combines with a critique of the role of London as a military and economic centre of 
power and desire. The intrusion of the digital element, however, inserts the critical use of 
code made visible as a ‘gift’ to the people of London and visitors from around the world. The 
work converts the medium of the plinth, the equine statue and the digital display into a 
weapon that disrupts the functioning of the location and stock market, revealing the role of 
desire in economic production and gift-giving as a non-functional work that references the 
nomadicity of the horse and the war machine.  
Deleuze and Guattari insist on the necessary non-functioning of desiring machines and 
relate this disruption of systems to artistic critique, whereby “desiring-production is used to 
short-circuit social production, and to interfere with the reproductive function of technical 
machines by introducing an element of dysfunction...breaking down is part of the very 
functioning of desiring-machines” (2004a, 34). The displacement of location through a 
 31 
‘misuse’ of technology – converting the tools of economics into weapons of art – emerges 
through an act of interference against the mediated functioning of consciousness confined by 
the big Other of its own Virtual structures. Chris Land explains that the machine “only exists in 
relation to the flows that it emits and breaks” (2005, 29), in an inherent and critically 
necessary move towards a nomadic conception of technology and its relation to subjects and 
their worlds. One such (ab)use of this nomadic, weaponised functioning of machines in a more 
strictly digital setting is the intervention by Eva and Franco Mattes, as radical art collective 
0100101110101101, on the United States government. The work 404 – Justice (Mattes and 
Mattes 2001) exploits a hack of the pentagon website, whereby entering the url 
http://pentagon.osd.mil/justice returns a 404 error with justice apparently ‘unavailable’ at the 
US department of defence. The artists later pasted screenshots of the result across Düsseldorf 
(2011), invading the Real-Existence of physical space with the Real-Meaning of the digital 
hack. This artistic defrauding of an online resource fits into a larger repertoire of 
reappropriation of other websites, other artists and even themselves in the use of the internet 
as a cultural weapon that constantly shifts the Meaning of data in relation to the Real of a 
series of remediated subjectivities. 
Explicitly political and activist interventions – such as the ‘blackout’ on 18th January 2012 
against SOPA and PIPA legislation, by Wikipedia, Reddit, Wired, Wordpress, Mozilla and 
partially by Google and Flickr – act upon the internal social or technological relations in 
themselves, regardless of the world they are played out upon. Cultural interventions, 
however, achieve their critique by their very failure in confronting social and technological 
relations, thereby acting on the individual consciousness directly, with social change as a 
contingent by-product, rather than aiming for social change as activism does without 
unleashing an expression of the Real in digital Meaning. The blackout event, protesting 
government control over digital information, as well as any number of digital ‘sit-ins’ by 
organisations such as the Electronic Civil Disobedience group, can only fail in their direct 
confrontation of state/capitalist machines, for their own desire is linked directly to the desire 
of the oppressive big Other, a Virtual problem acting only on appearance. The cybernetic 
cultural intervention, however, in expressing the inexpressible, succeeds in its necessary 
failure, for it turns itself into a new desiring-machine that breaks itself down as it breaks down 
the systems it critiques. Art and culture have the potential to embrace the digital mediation of 
consciousness by itself, directly in confronting the Real of code and the potentialities of open 
Meaning as a creative weapon before it becomes caught in the predetermined tools of Virtual 
Existence. It is necessary to creatively re-write the conditions of critique and mediation in 
order for the subject to change the modes of thinking it is ready to accept. In order to confront 
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the digital world in itself, art must act on the level of Real-Meaning, the excessive loss of code, 
and thus bring into view of consciousness the parallax position of the shifting assemblage of 
Existence and Meaning through the interplay of Virtual and Real. 
1.2.2 ANTI-SOCIAL NETWORK 
But how does art insert ambiguity into Meaning through the strictures of code? This 
seemingly paradoxical situation, whereby the very rigidity of binary logic reveals an open 
potentiality, is formed from art works being situated as the full digital assemblage of Real-
Meaning and Virtual-Existence between the functioning consciousness of many different 
subjects, each with their own breaking down desires and semantic assemblages across which 
the work moves. It is contact with the Real (the objectification of the void of subjectivity) 
made possible through art that enables this remediation of the potentiality of the digital 
world. If, according to Deleuze’s propositional logic, Meaning is understood as signification, 
the conceptual implication that enables connections across propositions and across subjects 
(2004b, 18), then it is the signifying process of code that creates the interpretable links across 
the gaps of and between subjects. Real-Meaning (as computer code) presupposes a 
framework of understanding out of the chaos or void of each individual subject, unifying 
different propositions not through the specific signified interpretation but through the 
presupposed possibility of the process of sharing knowledge. Code thus exists as signification 
in its simultaneous excess, over the totality it represents (Lacan 2001, 139), and lack, as 
disappearance (Lacan 1977, 218): the impossible rigidity of absolute truth as the conditions for 
the possibility of truth are lost in the desire for a specific reading. Between subjects, the digital 
artefact is the creation of a cognitive space in which two or more assemblages of 
consciousness both posit the potentiality of connection and a sharing of the expression of 
subjectivity. This expression, however, when it makes contact with the Real of the human 
subject, appears as a connection with the terrifying void-core of the other subject. 
The fixing in code of such horror constructs an assemblage of trauma with which the 
spectator can engage, respond or ignore. This horror is exemplified in the work by 
0100101110101101 titled No Fun (2010), in which a video chat user shows a man who has 
hanged himself. This online performance work incites a range of reactions: shock at the 
anxiety of human mortality confronting the subject directly on screen; mocking laughter or 
sceptical disbelief at a supposed prank (or perhaps displaying a more sociopathic response); 
ignorance from those who simply continue the self-indulgent narcissism of a perpetual 
soliloquy to an anonymous and irrelevant other. The failure of most users to engage with the 
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Fig.1 No Fun (2011) © Eva and Franco Mattes 
Video chat partners react to Franco Mattes’s apparent suicide, ranging from panic to disbelief. 
‘performer’, to commit to a social assemblage with the void of and between the Other, is 
demonstrative of the inability to accept the void within their own subjectivity. The 
presupposed truth of the code that carries the disturbing images of the video feed to the 
individual user requires a different mode of engagement in the act of digital perception. As 
Virtual-Existence, the gaze is linked to the functioning of consciousness, a cognitive 
perception whereby the image must be thought by the subject. No Fun forces such a cognitive 
interaction with visual stimuli in order to comprehend what is occurring, while leaving the 
interpretation of the fixed images open not only to the computer processor that converts the 
ones and zeroes into the visual output but also to the subject that observes the performance 
by presupposing the physical other in the video chat window. In making contact with a primal 
human concern, derived directly from the void of subjectivity, the assemblage crosses 
physical and digital modes of thought in a short circuit that promotes a genuinely cognitive 
engagement with the perception, interpretation and interaction of the digital work between 
the physical performer, physical viewer and the mediation of the digital space in which the 
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work occurs. 
Enacted fully, works that draw subjects into such a shared space create both an 
anticipatory unity of a shared assemblage and an exploration of the antagonistic parallax 
nature of the separate subjective positions. This is what Rancière describes as both the “direct 
anticipation of ‘being together’ in ‘being apart’” and the critical process of “constructing the 
work as the very tension between the apart and the together” (2011, 78). This aesthetic 
creation of a community-through-separation is the full force, ultimate conclusion and 
underlying horror of Marshall McLuhan’s “global village” (2001, 5): a ghost town filled with the 
spectres of subjects in which expression breaks down production to reveal desires. When this 
desire is the social itself, we approach what Deleuze and Guattari label ‘the people yet to 
come’. They discern that “there is extracted from chaos the shadow of the “people to come” 
in the form that art, but also philosophy and science, summon forth: mass-people, world-
people, brain-people, chaos-people” (1994, 218). This chaos of which Deleuze and Guattari 
speak is the void of subjectivity, the inherent nonexistence of consciousness and worlds from 
which all assemblages emerge and which can only be observed as a shadow in the Real. 
A further work by 0100101110101101 makes clear the chaos from which an anticipated 
people may spring, while inserting a stark critique of the ‘apartness’ of online ‘communities’. 
Freedom (2010), an online performance in which computer game players are asked not to kill 
the character while he films an art piece, reveals the worrying attitude towards 
communication and the social (even between those supposedly on the same ‘team’). A string 
of individual players, or groups who take offence at this reappropriation of the gaming 
discourse, kill the performer with little hesitation, as if removing this alternate way of thinking 
the medium will return the order of clear objective-based repetitive gaming activity. As the 
performer attempts to communicate with the other players, asking to be allowed to film his 
work, the verbal response by the gamers echoes their actions. The collective here is formed 
only through action, and that action is killing, thereby displacing the death drive onto an 
anonymous other. Communication of this future people appears as murder. As a performance 
this reveals not a film in the style of a machinima set in the game world but a critique of the 
nature of this collective assemblage between individual subjects separated by physical space. 
This is a non-community that, despite the suspension of disbelief inherent to avatar- and 
game-based activity, reinserts the apartness of these subjects acting ‘together’. The work 
succeeds as a non-work; the inability to complete a performance turns the performance itself 
into a series of rapid endings and abrupt conclusions that open a space within the definitions 
of ‘apart’ and ‘together’. The title, Freedom, takes on a particularly apt role in its attempts to 
open up a space of debate around the construction of online gaming ‘communities’. As Bohm 
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suggests, “freedom is the creative perception of a new order of necessity” (1994, 120), and 
Freedom forces a new mode of thinking the very terms of the online social assemblage. The 
construction of a critically engaged ‘people’ through art, philosophy and science requires a 
nonart, nonphilosophy and nonscience (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 218). These nondisciplines 
are formed from a rejection of the framework in which the question is asked, the insertion of 
what is inaccessible to each field in a step towards a constructive interdisciplinarity, or 
indisciplinarity (Rancière 2008), through a confrontation between the plane of thought and 
underlying chaos, the tension of the Virtual and the Real. This is demonstrated in the works by 
0100101110101101, derived from the same shadow of the Real in the void of the elusive 
parallax position. The Real of the digital social space is the absence of the social amidst the 
solipsistic emergence of individual subjects, made visible only by revealing the parallax 
position of the single consciousness in relation to others as part of the future-social 
assemblage. 
The very language used to construct the culture of such digital social assemblages 
emphasises the need to look to the parallax positions of the individual subjects and make 
connections across the gaps within and between subjectivities. The term ‘internet’ itself 
suggests an infinitely expandable assemblage with a focus on the ‘between’ rather than the 
individual nodal points, highlighting the importance of connections across space over the 
specific spaces involved. This is furthered by the French term for an internet user, particularly 
one who is adept at manipulating the technologies: an internaute. The link to the ancient 
 
Fig.2 Freedom (2011) © Eva and Franco Mattes 
The artist’s performance is repeatedly short-lived as the gaming ‘community’ swiftly and violently reject 
the player unwilling to conform to the structures of the game. 
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Greek word for sailor displays the subject engaged with digital technology as a ‘between-
sailor’, a nomad moving across shifting landscapes. The sea-faring imagery seen also in the 
term ‘surfing the net’ further recalls the basis for the term ‘cybernetics’, described by William 
Ashby as “the art of steermanship…it treats, not things but ways of behaving” (1957, 1). The 
derivation again from Greek sailing terminology places the engaged cyborg subject in control, 
allowing for a nomadic rethinking of the human user under its own remediation of the self in 
relation to technology. There is an inherent rethinking of the nature of space at play in digital 
culture, towards what Deleuze hails as “no longer a division of that which is distributed but 
rather a division among those who distribute themselves in an open space – a space which is 
unlimited, or at least without precise limits” (2004a, 36). Jay Hetrick summarises this in 
specific relation to a nomadic art as an “unpartitioned distribution” (2012, 37), which can be 
applied to the digital in the very construction of the conceptual framework and creative and 
social space in which we engage. The self-positing nature of the subject must not become 
fixed in the Meaning of code, but embrace the potentiality of communication as a possibility 
in connection with the Real of the subject. Virtual-Existence then emerges as a mobile 
thought-gaze that is nomadic within landscapes that are themselves ever shifting into new 
subjective, collective and creative assemblages. 
1.2.3 SELF-DESTRUCTION 
This embracing of nomadic behaviour and creative control over the manifestations of 
subjective engagement across physical and digital worlds establishes a seeming antagonism 
with technological devices. Instilling a set interpretation of binary logic is necessary in order 
for computers to function and interact, which enforces the appearance of absolute fixity on 
code that often obscures the subjective void and the possibility in communication that 
presupposes Real-Meaning. The focus of art on unveiling this psychological void of humanity, 
the gap between physical and digital worlds, thus creates itself as a seemingly (self-) 
destructive process. This is epitomised in the performative nature of WORM Rotterdam’s Web 
2.0 Suicidemachine (2009), an application that systematically deletes the user’s entire social 
media existence. This is an act of utter destruction, rather than simply closing or archiving as 
is the case with many sites such as Facebook, where a seemingly ‘deleted’ account can be 
reopened at a later date. Against the rigid fixity of technologies that confine the individual 
subject to a series of data points in a globally accessible database, this closing of the user 
opens up the use of code to signs of dissent against the economic and cultural structures of 
the mediation of humans by digital technology according to state/capitalist machines and 
allows a nomadic flight amidst the symbolic representation of self-destruction. Žižek insists 
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that such annihilation is the only ethical act and the only work of art possible to the subject 
aware of a parallax reality (Žižek 2009a, 76 and 128). In such gestures, the engaged subject 
removes a part of itself from the assemblage of worlds, the ‘stain’ of the parallax perception 
whereby the observer appears in the world as gap (Ibid., 17). The creative process of such a 
removal, constructing the subject as an assemblage across worlds with the perspectival gap 
brought into cognition, thus forms a self-conscious remediation of the functions of 
consciousness in critical opposition to the simple mediation of the subject by technology. The 
appearance of objective realities can therefore be reconstructed in a creative gesture as part 
of the emergence of a new subjective reality. 
 
1.3 PARALLAX THOUGHT IN PARALLEL WORLDS 
 
1.3.1 REDEFINING THE PARAMETERS 
New methods of thinking the apparent solidity of ‘objective’ reality have been at the forefront 
of scientific theory for the past hundred years. Even earlier than explicit interpretations of 
quantum theory, Thomas Young’s ‘double-slit experiment’ (1802; 1807, 457-71) established 
the theoretical foundation for both the wave/particle duality and the integral role of the 
observer in defining the material world. The expansion of science into quantum mechanics 
has brought many questions concerning the nature of Existence, the role of the Virtual in 
defining it, the underlying Real of the universe and our understanding of its Meaning. Lying 
outside our everyday experience, the role of consciousness has proven increasingly complex 
and fervently debated in relation to both the objective and subjective conditions of reality. A 
key interpretation of this dilemma is the de Broglie-Bohm theory, established by Bohm as the 
‘hidden variable’ theory (1952). While Bohm’s developments attempt to remove the role of 
the observer, the focus on a hidden or implicate causality and a simultaneous wave-and-
particle reality display great similarity with an observer-dependent construction of Existence 
between two forms of reality (to Bohm wave and particle or classical and quantum; here 
physical and digital) through a parallax of the material universe governed by the nature of the 
observation between two apparently contradictory states coexisting according to an 
unobservable factor. Bohm’s labelling of this theory as a ‘causal’ or ‘ontological’ interpretation 
of quantum mechanics displays the role of his ‘hidden variable’ within subjective experience as 
the Real of all realities. Mark Buchanan states that no interpretation of quantum theory yet 
defines how superpositions occur, or even which variable (position or speed, according to 
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Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle) is superposed, but that “neither picture is more correct 
than the other” (Buchanan 2007, 17). What is brought into the defining role becomes the 
structure in which we make such decisions: the problem of the appearance of materiality or its 
potential for truth and its understanding. This is the core ontological-epistemological debate 
that defines philosophical study, and it is also the problem of the inversion of Existence and 
Meaning between physical and digital worlds. The unknown position from which we view such 
shifts, the void of subjectivity, forms the key dilemma which neither philosophy nor science 
has been able to resolve. Critical digital culture takes this unknown position as its subject, 
expressing the multiplicity of an observer’s viewpoint; opening the engaged creative subject 
to the parallax of its wave/particle duality, its uncertainty and its hidden causality, through the 
very failure of expressing the inexpressible. This superposed dualism that maintains both sides 
of the antagonism simultaneously is seen in the expression of Real-Meaning against Virtual-
Existence through technological mediation and subsequent subjective remediation. 
The Art is Motion (2013) project by Sergio Albaic for the Lexus IS 300h converts the car, 
a key signifier of technological innovation and objectified movement in contemporary culture, 
along with the computer, into a creative medium.2 The generative art piece reconstructs a 
photo of the driver according to the nature of their driving style: speed defines the accuracy 
and abstraction of the brush strokes; the choice of electric or petrol engine shifts towards 
‘colder’ or ‘more virulent’ colours respectively; acceleration speed and RPM insert red and blue 
strokes for aggressive or gentle driving. The remediated face constantly evolves over time, 
emerging as a fixed work through the motion of the car. From the initial digital photograph to 
the final image uploaded to the project’s website, the mediating forces of the driver, the 
technology (of the work and the car) and the rules of the artwork set up by the artist in the 
rigidity of the code transform the human and its interaction with the environment into a real-
time art work. The links to nomadicity are made clear, while the position of the ‘artist’ is 
obscured. Is the creator of the work the designer of the code (Albaic), the car-manufacturer 
(Lexus) or the driver? The position from which the work is viewed displays a parallax of 
Meaning depending on whether the image is seen in real time or in its final incarnation, as a 
wave or a particle, and differs when viewed as a visual expression or as a collection of data 
(the speed, RPM and engine hybridity values over time are also collected for analysis by 
Lexus) according to the potentiality of the stream of fixed values determined by the physical 
experience of the driver. The everyday interaction with a physical vehicle in the physical world 
is reduced to the Real-Meaning of data, mediated by the Real-Meaning of the work’s code and 
                                                                    
2
 See http://www.artismotion.com/ for a video of the project and examples of the works. 
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constructed as a Virtual-Existence both in the car and online. The artist defines the project as 
“the construction of the identity as a hybrid between genetics and experience, which will be 
represented by a photograph of the driver and the driving experience” (Albaic in Lexus 2013). 
The layering of multiple Meanings, of genetic disposition, interpretation of the driver and 
code of the work, is combined with the Real of the subjective experience and its unknowable 
position, to highlight the position of the individual subject across worlds. The participant 
engages with a series of Real-Meanings derived from a cultural assemblage surrounding the 
work. Bohm says of Meaning, that “in society we have a culture. I say a culture is basically a 
shared meaning” (1994, 189), foregrounding the role of possibility and potential assemblage 
that emerges through the interaction of subjects and their worlds. Wheeler, a proponent of 
the ‘many worlds’ interpretation of quantum mechanics, further defines Meaning as “a joint 
product of all the information that is exchanged between those who communicate” (in Brown 
and Davies 1986, 68), emphasising the collective assemblage that in contemporary global 
society spreads out through digital media across space and time, across social particles and 
waves into a flexible assemblage built around the perspectival gaps between subjects. 
However, the flow of information in Art is Motion remains under the control of 
stratifying capitalist machines that seek to fix Real-Meaning as data points that track the 
movements of the driver through the collected information, reducing the mobile subjective 
experience to a static set of particles to be used to increase profit. Furthermore, the entire 
project rests in the realm of advertising, inserting corporate desire into the Real of the 
subjective viewpoint that is expressed through the work, tainting the free and open critique of 
the parallax of physical-digital worlds. It is possible to locate similar relations between 
technology, the subject and the antagonistic superposition of parallax worlds in the work 
Google Street Ghosts (2012), a purposefully nomadic and artistic intervention by Paolo Cirio. 
The ongoing global project uses images of human subjects as seen in Google Street View, 
selected for their obvious disruption of or disjuncture with their physical location. These 
images are printed and pasted onto the location in which they were originally photographed, 
converting the Real-Meaning of the code that is gradually fixing the streets of the world 
within the structures of Google’s databases into a Virtual-Existence between physical and 
digital locations. This is further remediated by Cirio photographing the new images fixed into 
their physical location and displaying them digitally on the project website, appropriately 
displayed as pins on its own Googlemap. This triple expression of subjects deemed excessive 
to Google’s codifying of world space, labelled as “victims…obscure figures…biopolitical 
surplus” (Cirio 2012) by the artist, explicitly engages and critiques the multiple layerings of 
realities and their respective control by the original subjects, corporations and the artist. The 
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exploitation of exploitation offers a creative intervention in the fixing of the digital by 
“confronting the public with the aesthetic qualities of the data” (Ibid.) to make clear the 
parallax of physical and digital worlds and the superposition of iterative remediation between 
subjects, worlds and technologies. What is brought into play through this process echoes the 
‘decoherence’ that governs the blurred lines between quantum and classical realities, what 
Phillip Ball describes as “a sort of leaking away of quantum behaviour when a particle interacts 
with its surroundings” (2008, 23). This disappearance of the underlying nature of matter that 
physicists are constantly trying to observe and explain is the same process that Cirio is 
attempting to bring into view through “ghosts haunting the streets and sometimes 
reappearing from the ethereal hells of digital archives…the murky intersection of two overlain 
worlds” (Cirio 2012). The presupposed causality of a subjective engagement with a world or 
environment, whether (classical or quantum) physical or digital, will always revert to the state 
of ‘hidden variable’ in the void at the heart of parallax reality. 
1.3.2 ALTERNATE WORLDS AND SYSTEMS 
The artistic intervention that moves towards a glimpse of the parallax position, the 
perspectival hidden variable at the core of subjective reality, constructs its affective force in 
disrupting the functioning of consciousness through the simultaneous construction of 
multiple alternative realities. Buchanan states that “a growing number of physicists, especially 
those working in quantum information and cosmology,” (2007, 16) turn to Everett’s ‘many 
worlds’ interpretation of quantum theory to sustain this multiplicity of realities, what Deleuze 
expresses in art as “a question of different and divergent stories, as if an absolutely distinct 
landscape corresponded to each point of view” (2004b, 297-8). Everett’s theory (in DeWitt and 
Graham 1973) removes the need for a ‘collapse’ into fixed particles, sustaining the 
superposition of the wave function by postulating a new and distinct world for each 
   
Fig.3 Google Street Ghosts (2012) © Paolo Cirio 
Images of people stored as ‘ghosts’ in Google Street View are pasted in place, photographed, and 
displayed online as the digital spectres are shifted between worlds. 
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potentiality. David Deutsch, who extrapolates a series of simultaneous worlds from this 
notion, embraces the multiplicity of actualised superposition: 
In this view…our Universe is only a tiny facet of a larger multiverse, a highly structured object that contains 
many universes. Everything in our Universe – including you and me, every atom and every galaxy – has 
counterparts in these other universes. (in Buchanan 2007, 16) 
This sustaining of the inherent antagonism created at the quantum level by wave/particle 
duality and the unknowable flux underpinning all forms of reality is embodied and expanded 
in the digital realm, where human subjects shift seamlessly between worlds that in physical 
reality are inaccessible. However, the user can not only shift between different ‘worlds’, such 
as teleporting from one location to another in virtual environments such as Second Life or 
between different server locations in MMORPGs such as World of Warcraft (2004) – in which 
server choice defines the rules of the chosen reality that govern player-to-player interaction 
(specifically levels of violence allowed between players) – but there is also the possibility of 
viewing multiple worlds simultaneously. Expanding our definition of ‘world’ in the 
semantically-defined digital realm controlled by sets of Real-Meaning, the creation of the 
‘window’ on the interface screen allows a vast number of spaces to be viewed simultaneously. 
Text, images, videos, interactive environments and other spaces all enter the gaze-space of 
the screen, their antagonistic differences in code or medium held in suspension without 
‘collapsing’ into one mode of being. Virtual-Existence thus takes on a multiplicitous nature as 
if we are simultaneously viewing conflicting universes. 
This notion is culturally expressed in relation to the functions of desire in the 120 days of 
*buntu project by Danja Vasiliev and Gordan Savičić (2011). Highlighting the awarding of the 
Golden Nike to the open-source Linux operating system as an art work in the Ars Electronica 
festival in 1999, the artists have instigated a series of ‘OS interventions’ that seek to draw out 
the paradoxes within the apparent economic and creative freedoms of open-source operating 
systems as an engaged choice, themselves earning an Honorary Mention at the same awards 
in 2011. The use of code as an art form and intervention enacts the dilemmas facing human 
construction of and interaction with the Real-Meaning of computer code. As artist Florian 
Cramer has commented on the project: 
Each mutation of the computer operating system becomes a statement…enforced onto people's everyday 
work environment, as if one was wearing a straightjacket or were forced to do carpentry with a hammer that 
had been oddly constructed for political-poetic reasons. (Cramer in Vasiliev and Savičić, 2011, 12) 
The creation of 120 different incarnations of the Ubuntu distribution unveils a vast array of 
desires at work in the interpretation and framing of the Real-Meaning at a fundamental level 
of the digital world and the constraints it places on the Virtual-Existence of the human subject 
as user. Examples that directly target the Virtuality (desire) of art and the digital, seeking to 
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make contact with a  subjective Real through the exploitation of code, include 
whitecubebuntu, which acts as a blank canvas in visually “expanding the curatorial vacuum of 
the world famous commercial galleries into conceptual software-art which eventually will 
unite art, life and software” (Vasiliev and Savičić, 2011, 52), or aabuntu and firebuntu, which 
use ASCII graphics to visually reconstruct the screen. Several are of particular note to the Real 
of code: mondrianbuntu uses colourful divisible panes to emable multiple simultaneous 
command-line applications in a neoplastic conceptual space; rebuntu creates a fractal 
repetition by continually reloading copies of itself within itself; shufflebuntu uses the code-
defined ‘random number generator’ to erratically and autonomously control the computer as 
a self-operating-system; dadbuntu converts every value on every available memory to zero, 
thus rendering the entire system as the void beneath reality. Between these conflicting, 
contradictory, and essentially useless systems lies a critique of the role of the subject in 
choosing the conditions of its own digital reality, highlighting the constricting impact of such 
a choice and the emergence of bizarre expressions of the digital Real through the exploitation 
of the fixity enabled by entrenched Meaning.  
   
  
Fig.4 the 120 days of *buntu (Creative Commons)  
[Attribution Unported license 3.0: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/]  
(2011) Danja Vasiliev and Gordan Savičić 
Alternative operating system interfaces: (clockwise from top left) whitecubebuntu, mondrianbuntu, 
firebuntu, aabuntu. 
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This rendering visible of the constraining impact of code acts as the fixing of Real-
Meaning that risks losing contact with the indeterminacy of the Real. The 120 days of *buntu 
project as a whole forms an instructive critique of the construction of digital worlds, but each 
individual distribution falls into the certainty of a truth-based Meaning that removes 
potentiality. One attempt at maintaining the critique while also sustaining a potentiality is 
offered in projects by Marko Manriquez that utilise moss as graffiti in an on-going artistic 
practice highlighting the parallax position in relation to the Meaning of data in both physical 
and digital worlds. The ‘Tactical Moss Graffiti’ work Ecology Without Nature (2012) disrupts 
urban physical spaces as custom-made moss grows naturally as a harmless parasite on 
postindustrial buildings, yet within the living elements are a variety of sensors that monitor air 
quality, pollution and radiation, with the results viewable online or in Augmented Reality. The 
gap between material and semantic worlds is crossed, highlighting the rupture of thought-
perception itself as we negotiate and undermine the physical landscape of a world in the grip 
of digital capitalism. An earlier version of the work, Moss Invaders (2010), takes a more overtly 
digital tone, with the moss creations shaped like Space Invaders and containing touch sensors 
to play 8-bit sound effects. The imagery makes a clear comment on the cultural disjuncture 
between ecological and digital universes, and the data collected displays an awareness of the 
fragility of the physical world. Bohm states that “fragmentation is now very widespread, not 
only throughout society, but also in each individual” (2002, 1-2), and the works by Manriquez 
show the flexibility of signification surrounding our understanding of the Meaning of these 
fragmented worlds within our own individual subjective experience. Inserting themselves in 
two universes simultaneously, the parallax parasites of the moss creations form expressions of 
the Real and its alignment with the inversion of Existence and Meaning across both planes: 
the organic (physical) realm governed by the genetics of the moss intruding as an inverted 
stain of life through its growing Existence in the decaying landscape; and the digital realm 
governed by the code in which the data collected finds Meaning in its signified inclusion of the 
online availability of the project. The use of Augmented Reality to display the collected data 
superimposes a Virtual-Existence over the physical world, remediating the Real once more 
across fractured experiences of multiplicitous realities. Concerning the prevalent 
fragmentation in our world(s), Bohm adds that “the notion that all these fragments are 
separately existent is evidently an illusion” (Ibid.), highlighting the emergence of the 
assemblage of parallel worlds through the thought processes of the Virtual function of 
consciousness within itself and across the gap of subjectivity. Thus he suggests that, in the 
construction of realities, “in some sense each region contains a total structure ‘enfolded’ 
within it.” (Ibid., 188). This approaches what Deleuze labels the fold, which is the inseparable 
relation of the subject to Being (2006a, 90) as the doubling of thought creating the space of 
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the subject (O’Sullivan in Parr 2010, 107), which in turn can be associated with parallax 
ontology where the subject appears as the inherent stain in and against the world it beholds. 
This is the assemblage of subjective reality from ever-shifting functions inverted, overlapping 
and folding one another within the constantly evolving Virtuality of consciousness. 
1.3.3 SELF-AUGMENTATION 
The creative use of Augmented Reality, such as Manriquez uses to display the data collected 
in his moss-based works, challenges the current technological and cultural conceptions of the 
nature and role of the computer within our physical and social reality. As computers become 
increasingly ubiquitous, the traditional view of the physical world is being overlaid with the 
perpetual presence of the digital. This is a shift from a window into the digital towards a 
cyborg window of digital parallax over or alongside the physical. The extension of hand-held 
devices, touch-screen surfaces and the direct perception alteration of technologies such as 
Google Glass are logically extended into the realm of AR, and creative interventions that 
utilise the increasing availability of AR enable a greater potential for making contact with the 
Real that underpins all forms of reality. Work that has made significant moves towards this 
superposition of fragmented universes includes the uninvited AR exhibition WeARinMoMA 
(2010) at the Museum of Modern Art organised by Sander Veenhof and Mark Skwarek. The 
‘invasion’ of the gallery space by an explicitly Virtual-Existence has prompted questions of 
ownership at such sites of conflict, prompting MoMA’s response with a notification: “No 
augmented reality beyond this point please” (in Veenhof and Skwarek 2010), although the 
uninvited curators actively encouraged independent artists to add their own layers of parallel 
virtual exhibitions and Veenhof’s collaboration Augmented Reality Flash Mob (2010) with 
Johannes La Poutre and Tobias Domian is referred to on MoMA’s website, mentioned as part 
of their own AR and Communication Design exhibition Talk to Me (2011), as part of what is 
labelled an increasing practice of “information parkour” (MoMA 2011). 
This nomadic movement and uninvited appropriation of space utilises the increasing 
flexibility of Virtual-Existence as the codes available in Real-Meaning become more elaborate, 
to the point that “‘AR’ technology allows anyone to (re-)shape anything, anywhere!” (Veenhof 
and Skwarek 2010), as demonstrated by the exhibition I Occupy at Kasa Gallery in Istanbul, 
which assesses the layered critique and artistic intervention of not only physical urban space 
but also socio-political landscapes. While the direct link to the Occupy Movement establishes 
its own codified agenda, the exhibition’s critique of what constitutes occupation of a 
conceptual space and its expansion into other worlds retains a similarly instructive relation to 
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ontological artistic parallax as WeARinMoMA. The focus of the works in I Occupy (2013) is 
global interventions and the transcendence of physical and political limitations on art, 
combining institutional critique, radical politics and the social construction of technological 
society. The force of technology is shown not only to be marching ever-forwards in the tools 
that are available, but creates opportunities to render the conceptual grounding of 
conventional boundaries and divisions of space as obsolete. The question across the gap 
between physical and digital, and within any given individual or social reality, becomes a 
matter of “redefining the aesthetic and cultural understanding of the environments we 
operate in” (Aceti 2013). Just as quantum physics has necessitated a radical conceptual 
rethinking of the nature of the discussion on reality, so too is art seeking new forms of 
expressing the void of subjectivity between any and all conceivable realities. The 
contemporary digital artist attempts to move freely across spatial and social constraints, 
through the abstractions of data and arbitrary divisions of culture, and into the simultaneous 
perception of individual realities as part of the subjective assemblage. 
 
1.4 MAURICE BENAYOUN: THIS IS NOT TECHNOLOGY3 
 
1.4.1 NOT OBJECT, NOT IMMATERIAL 
This interplay of Existence and Meaning in the shifting realities of physical and digital 
consciousness is articulated by the artistic and theoretical work of Maurice Benayoun. Since 
his early work, The Quarxs (1991-3), which is counted among the first 3D computer animated 
series, Benayoun has explored the collision of alternative modes of thinking physical, digital, 
semantic, biological and emotional realities. Drawing on his scientific background, The Quarxs 
literally tackles this notion through the creation of a fictional set of entities from “a world in 
which the great principles of physics, biology and optics find themselves out of place and 
ridiculous, ignored, altered into opposites of themselves” (Benyoun 1991). This use of digital 
technology challenges traditional notions of the construction of reality through absurd, 
parodic representations of the ‘popularized science’ programs that have brought scientific 
information into the home in an accessible format, marking a shift in mass media from 
analogue to digital modes of creation, a theme that reoccurs in Benayoun’s theoretical 
conceptions of technology as the “sudden appearance of reality in fiction (reality shows, news 
                                                                    
3
 The subtitles for this section refer to key statements in Benayoun’s essay Art After Technology (2008). 
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shows, documentary dramas)” (2008). This relation of Meaning to Existence is disrupted in a 
step towards what Benayoun sees in technology as the “possible fusion between fiction and 
reality” (Ibid.). This is a crossing over of Meaning and Existence within digital art and its 
relation to traditional physical mass media, moving beyond the objective world while 
remaining also short of the truly immaterial. The computer graphics in The Quarxs are used to 
stage impossible physical relations, shifting our perceptions between and beyond both 
physical and digital worlds. There is an emergent reality at work here, an artistic and 
subjective space in which the possible is made manifest without actualisation.  
This space of what Benayoun labels “the concept artist” as opposed to “the conceptual 
artist” (2006a), in which the art work need not be actualised in order to be effective (or 
affective in relation to altering our perception of the universe), entails a stepping outside of 
reality into the realm of consciousness and ideas. Meaning is preceding Existence in 
Benayoun’s digital works, yet the conceptual construction of reality in which his oeuvre is 
situated lies between the structures of Existence-to-Meaning and Meaning-to-Existence. His 
use of technology and its interaction with impossible reconstructions of our modes of 
conceiving reality rests in the space of cybernetics, in its conception between material and 
mental worlds. As Ashby stated in the early stages of cybernetics research, “cybernetics 
started by being closely associated in many ways with physics, but it depends in no essential 
way on the laws of physics or on the properties of matter…the materiality is irrelevant” (1957, 
1). This is the effect of Benayoun’s disruption and interpolation of Existence and Meaning. The 
relation of this cyborg practice to the classical laws of physics is nomadic, shifting not only 
into quantum mechanics and biotechnologies but also beyond all known scientific paradigms 
into the pure Virtuality of creative consciousness engaging freely across shifting landscapes of 
flexible worlds. 
Benayoun extends this critical conflation of realities in the search for spaces of 
consciousness between fixed worlds to his conception of the construction of space itself. 
Through the image and text of transarchitecture project Missing Matter (1998), which 
visualises and theorises a digital manipulation of space, Benayoun suggests that “Virtuality is 
reality before it is going to happen. Virtual architecture deals with information and 
communication. Its material are meaning and exchange”, creating what he calls “infra-reality” 
in which “the virtual is a personally directed world, loaded with meaning: more human than 
real” (Benayoun in Brouwer et al. 1998). This expresses the dominance of the Virtual over the 
Real in the internal relations of the functions of consciousness within subjective reality. The 
use of digital technology in Benayoun’s work suggests this opening of a cybernetic space in 
which consciousness can confront itself, using the distortion of Existence and Meaning to 
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reveal the quasi-causal interaction and realignment of Virtual and Real forces in forming 
specific worlds and spaces. This discussion of immaterial objecthood is developed through a 
series of telepresence works by Benayoun. Starting with The Tunnel under the Atlantic (1995), 
in which the Pompidou Centre in Paris is linked with the Museum of Contemporary Art of 
Montréal as a combined video-link and shifting digital tunnel on screens embedded in the 
apparent ends of a two-metre diameter physical tunnel. The interaction between physical 
spaces occurs not through the ocean or the earth’s crust, but through “a block of symbolic 
matter in which the geological strata leave the place to iconographic strata” (Benayoun 1995). 
This construction of a ‘televirtual’ presence, in Meaning rendered visible as Existence in digital 
symbolic space, exeplifies what Natalie Bookchin and Alexej Shulgin demanded in net art as 
“Immediacy. Immateriality. Temporality” (1999). There is here a disruption of the familiar 
physical landscape through the nomadic intersection with digital space, as if a wormhole is 
being opened through a symbolic dimension. In this challenge to the materiality of our 
Existence in the physical world, Benayoun explains that “free from the physics constraints, 
Space then is a function of Time. There, speed is not the best way to speed up the meeting, 
but a way of specifying everyone's position within information” (Benayoun 1995). While the 
ends of the tunnel are static, and the link between the two places masquerades as a direct, 
linear, spatial connection, the construction of the digital tunnel opens a space within the 
interaction whereby the specific material and the very conception of ‘material’ may shift 
around the semantic interpretation of the Real-Meaning through which the subjects pass and 
by which the Virtual-Existence appears to disrupt the Real-Existence of the physical gallery 
space. 
The work was recreated as The Paris-New Delhi Tunnel (1998), linking the Cité des 
Sciences in Paris with India, exposing the Parisian observers to a new range of cultural 
‘material’ through which to communicate. The concept was then expanded to a global array 
of connections in Tunnels Around the World (2012). Benayoun insists that this new work 
    
Fig.5 Tunnels Under the Atlantic (1995) ©Maurice Benayoun 
The interface, embedded in what appears as a physical tunnel, connects Paris to Montreal, allowing 
communication through the ‘substance’ of both the earth ‘s crust and the digital medium. 
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“doesn’t mimic the original “digging” tool” (2012b), but rather forms an actualisation of the 
original intention of the project using newly available technologies. Connecting Seoul, 
California, Hong Kong, Montréal, New York and other sites, the work is transformed from a 
single tunnel that carves a set path through one exchange of cultural material to a shifting 
network in which the landscape itself becomes truly nomadic. The images themselves have 
become, instead of textures on ‘solid’ tunnel walls, slices to be passed directly through. The 
tunnel itself has become immaterial and symbolic, creating depth simultaneously in visual and 
semantic dimensions of the “psychological environment” (Ibid.). By further expanding the 
work in its online public version after the initial exhibition, the tunnels have become a 
conceptual embodiment of the gap between physical and digital worlds, a space of 
subjectivity where Existence and Meaning are constantly intertwined. The Virtuality of 
Benayoun’s telepresence model, in its construction of a new conceptual and psychological 
space between physical and digital worlds stages what Pickering labels “cybernetics as 
ontological theater” (2010, 381). The performative nature of the cybernetic interaction is 
made clear in both the burrowing through symbolic and visual matter and the interaction with 
the global other. Benayoun’s aim in his work, and his suggested aim for art in general, is the 
“dematerialisation of the sensitive and reification of the intelligible” (2008), seen in the tunnel 
works as a contact with the Real in the cybernetic space of consciousness made visible 
through our interaction with others across and within the gaps of subjectivity. While the 
conventional structures of the computer screen, in the fixity of Real-Meaning under state and 
capitalist machines, often turns the interface window into “a forcing device for the behaviour 
of the user” (Fuller 1997), Benayoun’s deconstruction of the immateriality of the digital world, 
bringing the symbolic into view as a substance that can be dug into and peered through, 
pushes towards a freeing of the gaze through technology. As he suggests, “it may be that we 
will discover that important technological changes often have an effect that is not necessarily 
technological in character, but gives another reading of the universe” (Benayoun 2008). 
Through the artistic intervention in the modes of perception that have become entrenched in 
   
Fig.6 Tunnels Around the World (2012) ©Maurice Benayoun 
The tunnels here are a more abstracted and obviously digital construct displaying the complex web of 
global information networks and cybernetic communication. 
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human behaviour, new spaces can be created that open the subject into new universes and 
thus new methods of spectatorship of our own present universe. The conversion of 
technology as a tool into a nomadic weapon against the rigid self-mediation of consciousness 
allows for a new critical space from which to view our ontological parallax. 
1.4.2 NOT CUT OFF FROM THE WORLD 
This remediation of consciousness, even into the space created between worlds in art, does 
not sever consciousness completely from the engaged worlds in which it interacts. The 
spectator must always be engaged. Just as consciousness creates physical and digital worlds 
within subjective reality, presupposing the externality of one or many universes, so too must 
consciousness construct itself in relation to such worlds. While worlds and consciousness are 
Virtual entities, their conditions are mutual in this Virtuality of the self-positing subject. 
Benayoun’s work Stolen Life (2006) demonstrates this need to maintain an engagement with 
both worlds even while attempting to create a space in between to reach a critical distance 
towards our engaged parallax position. The work contains two rooms, two conceptual worlds. 
One contains a tree with computer-controlled lighting and watering. The other allows a 
spectator to enter, thus triggering the light and water and keeping the tree alive. Images are 
taken and displayed on screens outside the rooms each time there is movement of the 
spectator or the tree (when, for example, a leaf falls). The tree’s continued survival depends 
on the engagement of the spectator. If the spectator is not in one world, neither world can 
exist. The work approaches Bohm’s notion of utopia, in which “communication would take 
place as a creative act” (1994, 223), which is here extended to the on-going participation of 
spectators in communication with the world and the tree. Benayoun derives the project from 
the rise of two concepts in contemporary creation: “the first is the idea that it is the spectator 
who creates the picture and the second is that the life of a creation can be dependent on its 
owner (the Tamagochi)” (Benayoun 2006b). It is worth noting here Žižek’s placing of 
Tamagochi as god, a technological big Other (in Wright and Wright 1999, 108), the Virtuality 
of a non-existent entity that controls and mediates desire through the signals of an engaged 
communication. The desire of Stolen Life is that the subject be in the world, in the work, and 
thus bring about self-posited emergence of a creative communication between the engaged 
spectator and both physical (tree) and digital (computer controlled environment) worlds. 
The visibility of the work to the external world, however, emerges positively and 
negatively: during a spectator’s engagement; after a time of dis-engagement (the tree is 
dying and leaves fall). Here Benayoun is making clear the antagonism of a parallax between 
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the ‘survival structure’ and ‘observation structure’ of the work, between a dying tree and the 
flow of spectators whose temporary engagement passes through the worlds of the work as a 
point on their nomadic line of the Virtuality of their own continued consciousness. The 
partitioning of the work and its display on two distinct screens could thus be said to create the 
effect of what Deleuze and Guattari describe as “a kind of deframing following lines of flight 
that pass through the territory only in order to open it onto the universe” (1994, 187). The very 
structures of the ‘frame’ in Stolen Life bring to light the desire for continued engagement 
within one specific arrangement of worlds (the rooms of the work) while acknowledging the 
impossibility of such permanence in the necessarily nomadic and fleeting nature of each 
individual spectator’s engagement. The work displays the tree to the outside world only as it 
dies, promoting an emotional engagement of the spectator across the mediated space in the 
causal relation of the individual to the death of the tree, a possible sense of guilt arising from 
the ontological responsibility of engagement that underpins parallax reality in the causal 
gesture of subjective reality. 
This shifting interrelation and interpolation between the constant realignments of 
Existence and Meaning within the structure of the Virtual and the Real within consciousness, 
displays an increasing permeation and permutation of digital and physical worlds by one 
another. What we conceive as two separate worlds, held apart by the gap within 
consciousness, is becoming a blurred assemblage of fragmented worlds that coalesce around 
the void-core of the human psyche to form subjective reality. Benayoun acknowledges this 
process as an increasing ‘impurity’ of digital technology: 
This impurity might characterize the mature stage of the medium, and the merging of the virtual and the 
physical world is probably the extension of the human trend of converting the objective environment into an 
informational system. These concerns affect the art world as well. The artist is more and more involved in the 
development of the understanding of medias, creating new interfaces, adapting the narrative and the building 
of meaning to new media, bringing the breaks through coming from technology far from the pixel, the sound 
sample, and the HMD [head-mounted display] straight to the other fields of human activity. (Benayoun 2001) 
   
Fig.7 Stolen Life (2006) ©Maurice Benayoun 
The tree and the artwork are inversely dependent on the spectator’s engagement; the tree’s life is 
dependent on a spectator’s presence, while the artwork is visible only when as leaves fall and the tree dies. 
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These conversions between worlds across the parallax gap of consciousness reveal a great 
deal in the nature of their translation. The creative intervention that brings the evolving 
nature of technology into art, broader cultural significance and everyday life displays a trace 
or stain of the artist making such a conversion, defined by their own parallax position as 
engaged spectator of worlds. Benayoun engages with these notions in The Art Collider (2010) 
project. Utilising ‘IN/OUT’ research at CITU, the project enables a collaborative and 
experimental ‘peer-to-peer’ creative network, whereby one collaborator (research institute, 
artist, etc.) takes an input of data from another user, enacts a creative process upon it and 
outputs it to another collaborator. The inputs and outputs can be a range of media, including 
text, image and sound feeds, while the processes occurring in the ‘black box’ of the individual 
subject evolves the input or converts it into another medium (for example, converting a 
stream of text into images drawn from a database or online search engine). This unseen 
process, in the Real-Meaning of the individual institution’s server, is not only the code of a 
specific process but the unobservable parallax position that underlies any human-world 
system. As Ashby describes in relation to cybernetics, “what is being suggested now is not 
that Black Boxes behave somewhat like real objects but that the real objects are in fact all 
Black Boxes, and that we have in fact been operating with Black Boxes all our lives” (1957, 
110). Any and all systems between a subject and a world it constructs contain unobservable 
(quantum/psychological) variables and forces. 
The transition across the gap of a subject in The Art Collider is the creation of impurities, 
the nomadicity of the work emerging across a landscape of functions that convert each 
computer in the network from a tool to an affective weapon (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, 
435f), a force that deterritorialises the data and the medium itself in its constantly shifting 
remediation between locations and specific manifestations of information. In doing so, the 
project is attempting to redefine the nature of art as an emergent process across the gaps 
within the world created by human cognition of the digital, insisting on subjects’ engagement 
in the evolution of cultural paradigms. Another such adaptation and corruption of the cultural 
notion of space is seen in Benayoun’s concept art work Art Total (2010), taken from The Dump 
(2006a), an ongoing online repository of unrealised works existing only as Idea without the 
need for concrete actualisation. The Art Total concept is to fill a gallery space with an 
inflatable structure that exactly replicates and fills the entire physical space. It is impossible 
not to see the logic of the digital medium here intruding on physical space.  
The filling of the gallery moves beyond similar conceptual works, such as Walter De 
Maria’s New York Earth Room (1977) which inserts a large quantity of earth 56cm deep into a 
highly urban gallery location, or Martin Creed’s Half the Air in a Given Space  series (1999; 
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2007; various others), which half fill a gallery with balloons. While the Earth Room juxtaposes 
forms of physical space and a disjuncture of landscapes, Art Total recalls a digital image file 
where even blank space is filled with data for every pixel. While Creed’s balloon works use a 
similar method of filling the space, they appear as a collection of partial objects that 
spectators can walk through compared to the impenetrable surface of Benayoun’s inflated 
BwO. The excess of Benayoun’s work within the gallery renders the entire exhibition invisible, 
only accessible to a spectator through any glass walls the gallery might possess (Benayoun 
identifies a glass-walled gallery as the ideal location as it confronts the audience directly with 
their inability to enter the space). Thus the excess of the Real reveals a lack of usefulness, 
weaponising the gallery for artistic purposes beyond the ‘tool’ logic of a productive space for 
an audience experience. The negation of perspective inside the work brings forth a literal void 
of parallax whereby the spectator is disengaged from the world by its very fullness – a 
simultaneous lack and excess that denies and critiques our engaged spectatorship – exposing 
the world as a whole as a lost object. As Lacan insists, “the objet a in the field of the visible is 
the gaze” (1977, 105), and common throughout Benayoun’s work is the exposure of the 
parallax position as the stain in the world despite the subject’s necessary engagement with it. 
The denial of the gaze in penetrating the work forces our perspective into a nomadic relation 
with art as a force which always emerges as process through and across worlds. The 
disruption of Existence by Meaning in these works displays an insertion of digital modes of 
thinking the world even into the familiar physical environment in a short-circuiting of the 
modes of consciousness. 
1.4.3 NOT FINISHED 
The attempts to reconfigure consciousness evident in Benayoun’s work display a concerted 
effort toward challenging current conceptions of the self-mediation of the engaged subject as 
artist and spectator. There is an emphasis in his writing (2001; 2008) and art practice (for 
example The Mechanics of Emotion, 2005) that it is the role of consciousness in the cultural 
relation of humanity to technology that defines the structures of mediation. The overt 
rejection of technology by art only serves to cement the importance of technology in its 
entangled relation with contemporary consciousness. As Benayoun insists: 
One of the important impacts of technology on art will probably be the absolute refusal by the world of art to 
accept it, and there are already a large number of projects flourishing that are low tech and unplugged and for 
which it is difficult to ignore the fact that technology is too visibly rejected for it not to be the true subject 
matter. (Benayoun 2008) 
These attempts at the denial of technological mediation highlight the integral role of 
technology in the cyberneticisation of contemporary subjectivity, and its removal from works 
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places the subject without technology as an objet a in the functioning of mediation as such. 
This gives rise to an increasing nostalgia of the physical world, particularly prevalent in films 
such as Andrew Bujalski’s Computer Chess (2013), praised for being “endearingly fetishistic 
about analogue technology” (Hayden in British Film Institute 2013, 62), whereby the physical 
world and thus ‘pure’ physical subject is considered a lost object. What this superficial critique 
of technological mediation conceals, however, is the innate mediation inherent to 
consciousness, in the self-positing Virtuality of human subjectivity. Benayoun’s work, by 
contrast, targets the overlapping mediations of physical and digital worlds and modes of 
consciousness to make contact with what is Real in both dimensions of the contemporary 
cybernetic subject. Benayoun’s bold claim, in what is a prolific output of clearly technological 
practice, that “this is not technology” (2008) demonstrates his true concerns: the future of art 
in general is tied to the development of technology as part of the overall progression of 
society (/culture/space/reality) and how we (re-)think it. 
This rethinking of the nature of consciousness in and as the world is developed through 
Benayoun’s long, and thus far unfinished, series of works The Mechanics of Emotions (2005), 
described as “an art opera in 15+ parts – each part can be a statement, an event, an 
installation, an object, a concert, a performance, a web site, a business…” (Benayoun 2005). 
The works posit the entire structure of the internet as a global nervous system for a collective 
unconscious, placing the Real of computer code in contact with the Real of the physical 
human experience and the Real of the parallax void itself. As a series of interventions, the 
works embody the processual nature of weaponised digital art in which Benayoun views the 
work as “constantly in progress, not in the making” with its “completion in emerging symbolic 
processes” (Benayoun 2008). The functioning of The Mechanics of Emotion therefore performs 
the construction of a Meaning-based emergent collective reality on a global cognitive stage. 
Works from the series, such as Emotion Forecast (2010) and Occupy Wall Screens (2011) utilise 
live feeds drawing statistical and symbolic data from the internet to display the real time 
variations in a range of emotions across over three thousand cities worldwide. Beginning as a 
weather forecast, this information is also displayed as and juxtaposed to the real-time stock 
exchange to identify the indirect proportionality of the relations between economic and 
mental growth. The reduction of humanity to data alongside the raw numerical data of 
economics is contrasted to the perceived situation in occupied physical space (particularly 
those sites involved in the ‘Occupy’ movement). The resistance to economic pressures 
attempts to posit the independence of human expression from (and against) productive state 
and capitalist machines, instead revealing the fluid and temporary nature of emergent 
subjective assemblages out of the self-mediation of contemporary society. 
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These works display a desire to connect with a Meaning that is both presupposed 
beneath the emotional data and constructed through the very act of its signification: the 
affective Real as the causal relation behind emotions-as-data. Deleuze and Guattari write: 
If nerve connections and cerebral integrations presuppose a brain-force as faculty of feeling coexistent with the 
tissues, it is reasonable to suppose also a faculty of feeling that coexists with embryonic tissues and that 
appears in the Species as a collective brain. (1994, 212) 
It is the construction of the signified value of the data in Benayoun’s work that presupposes, 
and thus creates, the collective brain itself. By positing the internet as a global nervous 
system, these works also posit the Real from which such a collective cognitive system can 
emerge: not only analysing the current situation but suggesting a ‘people yet to come’ 
through the remediation and reappropriation of physical and digital worlds. If the 
construction of subjective reality is formed from the Virtual and exists as a self-sustaining 
Virtuality of consciousness, then it is necessary to consistently construct and reconstruct 
forms of cultural consciousness that engage with the shifting manifestations of Existence and 
Meaning in defining our parallax positions of viewing realities. As Benayoun’s early writing 
claims: “L’artifice est une modalité du monde. C’est le versant damné du reel. Un effet de l’art 
[Artifice is a mode of the world. It is the damned side of the real. An effect of art]” (Benayoun 
1996, translation own), and it is the Virtual artifice, the self-positing of consciousness as such, 
that constructs the world in opposition to the Real. The perpetual structures of Virtuality that 
mediate consciousness by itself are never complete in their concealing of the Real. The 
construction of worlds is the construction of art, a cognitive self-mediation of the subject. 
 
Fig.8 Emotion Forecast for Urban Screen (2011) ©Maurice Benayoun 
Statistics representing psychological states in cities around the world are displayed in a live global stock 
exchange of emotions. 
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Benayoun’s work aims to create such Virtualities while making contact with the Real of 
emotional/digital/physical ‘data’, disrupting the current smooth running of consciousness to 
open up a critical space for new modes of expression and thought to emerge. 
 
1.5 SELF-MEDIATION 
 
The role of a cultural intervention in the relation of digital technology to consciousness is thus 
twofold: firstly, to construct a mapping of the interplay and inversion of Existence and 
Meaning within the Virtuality of thought in self-positing consciousness; and secondly, to 
create a rupture in any such new structures through which contact with the Real of 
subjectivity might be made. This necessitates shifting the subject between worlds, disallowing 
any settling on a stratified mode of consciousness in fixed reality. The nomadic shift of such a 
subject can then be used to bring into view new perspectives on the position of parallax that 
defines the subject’s view on any reality, the framing of observation and spectatorship as 
such, in order to gain a critical “minimal distance” (Žižek 2006, 11) towards it. Exposing the 
noncoincidence of the subject and its engaged self within worlds levels the immateriality of 
both physical and digital worlds, whereby the inversion of Existence and Meaning, of 
denotation and signification, only occurs within consciousness itself. Beyond this, a symbiotic 
relationship between worlds can occur at the symbolic level, whereby the antagonism of 
parallax is maintained through the fusion of desubstantialised consciousness with its 
functional engagement within reality. Žižek outlines this effect as a result of technology: 
What looms at the horizon of the “digital revolution” is nothing other than the prospect that human beings will 
acquire the capacity of…“intellectual intuition”: the closing of the gap between mind and reality, a mental 
process which, in a causal way, directly influences reality. (in Davis 2009, 276) 
What is at stake here is not the development of technology apart from human subjects. The 
digital world is neither an alternative nor challenge to the ‘physical’ human, but a genuinely 
alternative realm for cyborg consciousness as extensions of the Ideal with which engagement 
is possible. Beyond the concrete tyranny of the primacy of physical Existence, and in a critical 
interaction with the codes of digital Meaning, we are moving towards a truly cybernetic form 
of subjectivity and one of the key roles of digital culture is to create and insert into collective 
consciousness new methods of thinking subjectivity within such a shift. We are being 
confronted with the disappearance of individual mind-independent realities, creating new 
questions of how we might engage with the assemblage of a subjective mode of reality. 
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The question of engagement has become of great importance to the contemporary 
subject, and in particular to the relation between digital artist and spectator. Manovich has 
warned us that “new media, more often than not, turn the subject into a user” (2001, 205), and 
digital art has acknowledged the need to move beyond the passivity that threatens both art 
and technology. Benayoun has identified that, in the proliferation of ‘interactive’ works of art, 
“the spectator becomes a visitor experiencing the symbolic universe” (2008). The problem 
remains how to construct such a situation, both practically in terms of ensuring that the 
advancing technologies available are adaptable to the artistic purposes of forcing a 
questioning of perception, and also culturally or cognitively in redefining the parameters of 
how ‘spectator’ is conceived. Neal Stephenson comments on the problematic persistence of 
humanity within an audience, even taken to its absurd conclusion through digital technology: 
We have not yet been able to create a digital audience. If you were talking to a digital audience, and noticed 
that they had, in the last few moments, become hopelessly confused, you could just hit Undo a few times and 
restore them to their previous state of mental clarity. Terminally confused audiences could be dragged to the 
Trash and replaced with fresh ones. (Stephenson 2001) 
He is suggesting a confrontation between the digital medium and its potential for rewriting 
how the audience is conceived and constructed. However, it is not sufficient to relocate 
contemporary subjects into the digital world. This error has plagued digital utopianism such as 
John Perry Barlow’s ‘Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace’, which claims that “we 
will create a civilization of the Mind in Cyberspace. May it be more humane and fair than the 
world your governments have made before” (1996). There is an inherent contradiction in the 
claim of a forthcoming purely digital consciousness alongside a desire for the essence of 
‘humanity’. Stephenson’s absurdity reveals what Barlow refuses to acknowledge, the 
necessarily interwoven parallax of physical and digital consciousness for a critique of 
contemporary society and subjectivity. Such a critique cannot occur only in one domain, but 
must act upon consciousness itself as it engages with both worlds. Only by taking into account 
such a split reality of the cyborg subject can a distance towards either one take place. That is, 
only through engaged spectatorship can the subject temporarily disengage, to view its own 
perspectival position of parallax between the two realms as defined by the self-mediation of 
its own consciousness. 
 
1.6 CONCLUSION  
 
The apparent paradox of an engaged critical distance towards the self-mediation of the 
subject is the true stake in our understanding of cybernetic consciousness. This understanding 
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is the task of a digital philosophy, and creating a space of critical experience through which 
such understanding emerges is the task of digital culture. This chapter has demonstrated that 
not only must a rupture be created within the perpetual Virtual processes that form the 
illusion of a substantial subject, but a new emergent space must emerge from and within such 
a rupture that continues to exist without being subsumed into the subjective assemblage. This 
process of forming ruptures in the smooth functioning of the subject is expressed in Deleuze 
and Guattari’s nomadology, which can be readily applied to digital culture, converting 
technologies from productive tools to disruptive weapons against the fixing of cultural, social 
and cognitive territories. There is a tendency, within the structures of consciousness that 
perpetuate the self-mediation of the human mind, to return to Virtuality and conceal the 
inversion of Existence and Meaning between realities. To deterritorialise these inversions, a 
critical culture must reveal and maintain the antagonism of parallax in order for the minimal 
distance to be sustained and communicated. Heisenberg identified this problem in 
established modes of thinking against quantum physics. Such rejections “would prefer to 
come back to the idea of an objective real world whose smallest parts exist objectively in the 
same sense as stones or trees exist, independently of whether or not we observe them” (2000, 
83). This insistence on conventional thinking is, to Heisenberg, impossible, just as the ruptured 
subject that perceives the parallax position underpinning its conception of reality cannot 
return unaltered to the physical assemblage. Quantum mechanics must be included in the 
progression of a philosophy of science and so too must the digital realm be included in a 
philosophy of the contemporary subject, an integral factor in twenty-first century collective 
and cultural consciousness. The task, then, is to insert a minimal difference into subjective 
reality in such a way that consciousness becomes aware of its own self-mediation and thus re-
mediate its return to ‘reality’ in a new, emergent, critically engaged and open assemblage of 
cybernetic subjectivity. 
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2 THE EMPTY SUBJECT 
VOID-IN-ITSELF IN ART 
 
This chapter explores the nature of the subject in itself at the heart of the parallax of worlds, 
the void of the perspectival position. In approaching the subject as this void, the 
poststructural decentred subject must be developed from a constant displacement between 
symbolic realms towards a desubstantialised subject existing in neither physical nor digital 
worlds. This is the ‘nowhere’ of the subject amidst Virtuality of consciousness. The passage 
from void to Virtual reveals the problematic relation of the subject to itself and the 
impossibility of representing the inaccessible core of humanity, delineated in Žižek’s terms of 
lack and excess between the Real, as the objectification of the void, and the Virtual, as the 
desire for the continued functioning of the subject. This uses Rancière’s notion of the 
unrepresentable as a necessary condition for representation, transferred from (political) visual 
regimes to the ontological realm of consciousness in the cyborg subject. The Virtual surface of 
consciousness is explicated from Deleuze and Guattari’s Body without Organs (BwO), 
developed through Žižek’s critique of this concept and the inclusion of the void within the 
surface of consciousness as the Real, to suggest a ‘Body without Organs without Bodies’. The 
placing of the BwO itself as a lost object of desire, the Virtuality of consciousness, reveals the 
impossibility of mapping consciousness as a whole, explored through the problematic 
mapping of digital symbolic spaces as relational flows around the subject.  
The emergence of this surface from the void is further explored in terms of the abstract 
notion of the vacuum in quantum physics, along with a consideration of various forms of 
invisible particles that make up such spaces. This substance of the void is interrogated as a 
field of emergent immaterial forces, such as the dark energy necessary for the universe to 
form, returning always to the impossibility of viewing such forces directly despite their causal 
relation to the formation of worlds within consciousness. These inaccessible forces are 
discussed in the context of creative practices and a detailed study of the work of Pascal 
Dombis, who makes a direct and explicit confrontation with excess and irrationality in the gap 
within contemporary subjectivity, making clear the impossibility of representing the void and 
bringing the processes of parallax into view. Thus in answering how consciousness forms a 
subject from the void of parallax between worlds, the impossibility of beholding the void 
directly is shifted into a critical confrontation with the processes of Virtuality that make the 
void necessarily inaccessible to consciousness. 
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2.1 NOT DECENTRED BUT DESUBSTANTIALISED 
 
In discussing the notion of the parallax subject as the gap between physical and digital worlds, 
the emergence of the subject and its constitution as gap must be interrogated. Žižek tells us 
that the subject “‘is’ a non-substantial void…the empty Nothingness of pure self-relating” 
(2007, 124). If the subject is nothing but a void from and around which consciousness posits 
itself, we must question the nature of this void. Žižek highlights the fact that “cyberspace 
phenomena render palpable in our everyday existence the deconstructionist ‘decentred 
subject’” (2006, 99), removing the distance of the illusion of centring and requiring a critical 
understanding of a new type. For Žižek, however, the subject is not simply located elsewhere 
but nowhere, or rather, there is no substance of the subject to be located anywhere. The 
nature of this void of the subject is integral to our understanding of consciousness and how it 
emerges, for the void refers here to what is commonly termed the unconscious. The 
antagonism between consciousness and the unconscious determines not only how both are 
brought into being, but the entire function of parallax. This is one of the fundamental 
dilemmas of psychoanalysis, the shift into or creation of the human as a ‘subject’, the 
emergence of consciousness from the unconscious that separates human reason from the 
instinctual behaviour of animals. Here we must confront the Lacanian problem of the 
“‘beginning of the world’…the passage from the pre-symbolic chaos of the Real to the 
universe of logos” (Žižek 2007, 7). If our understanding of the universe is always from an 
impenetrable position of parallax, in which we cannot observe the point of our own 
perspective it is because the position of our subjectivity is the void. The ‘stain’ in the gaze that 
forms the function of parallax and allows us a speculative glimpse at the nature of this process 
is the subjective void itself, a desubstantialised position from which the entire universe is 
brought into cognition and reality. Thus within the appearance of substance is no hidden truth 
or a trail outwards to a subject that is merely dislocated, but rather “the subject is interior to 
substance precisely as its constitutive gap; it is the void” (Žižek 2006, 40). The construction of 
the subject emerges from nothing, around nothing, and remains in-itself nothing. Against, or 
beyond, the poststructural trend of viewing the subject as decentred, we must insist on a view 
of the subject as desubstantialised. 
In terms of the digital realm, where the familiar functions of consciousness can be 
inverted, a realm of fiction and fantasy where Meaning precedes Existence and the interplay 
of the Real and the Virtual can be staged, reconceiving the subject as desubstantialised 
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provides a major point of clarity in our understanding of our relation to any given world. 
Focusing on decentring implies that the subject is wholly shifted from one realm to the other, 
from the symbolic system and social/physical realities to the logic of computer code and the 
fleeting images of digital reality. Although such an approach suggests the constant relocation 
of the subject between worlds, it can be reduced to the suggestion that the subject simply 
exists in an alternative symbolic space to the one in which it perceives itself. The key point of a 
parallax reality is that the subject does not exist in any of the symbolic spaces in which it 
might be engaged, whereby “an individual is paradoxically more present as subject in the 
traces he leaves about himself than in his full presence” (Vighi 2012, 104). Desubstantialisation 
brings to the fore the functional nature of the subject as a machinic array of processes in the 
ever self-positing emergence of consciousness. The relations of consciousness to physical and 
digital worlds must be approached outside of substance, in order to gain an understanding of 
the nature of the void of subjectivity. 
2.1.1 ONE OR MANY GAPS? 
In its most reduced form, the question of the nature of the subject-void entails a question of 
whether all subjects are formed of one singular void or whether a distinct void exists for each 
individual consciousness. However, the differentiation of the void into one or more subjects is 
less a matter of the substance of the void, although this is a consistent concern throughout 
this chapter, than a matter of the differentiation itself. Žižek tells us that “consciousness 
arises from the primordial act which separates present-actual consciousness from the 
spectral, shadowy realm of the unconscious” (2007, 33) but also that the unconscious itself is 
“the highest deed of my self-positing” (Ibid., 34). That is, the subject, as the functions of 
consciousness, emerges in the act of separating itself from the void. By positing something 
rather than nothing the void is separated and defined as the contents of either a single 
subject, a group of subjects or indeed as a collective subjectivity. This gesture of distinction is 
the symbolic passage from the chaotic Real to a world that humans can comprehend. Žižek 
marks this shift as a differentiation between the Thing (das Ding) and the objet petit a as two 
forms of the void: “das Ding is the absolute void, the lethal abyss which swallows the subject; 
while objet petit a designates that which remains of the Thing after it has undergone the 
process of symbolization” (2008a, 105). The Thing is the primordial horror of the abyss of 
subjectivity, the void-core of humanity that underlies subjective reality. The objet a, however, 
is the function of the Real within consciousness, the objectification of this void. Thus the void 
is neither singular nor multiple, for the notion of the void escapes classification as any form of 
countable substance, and is rather the unknowability as such of the subject to itself. This void, 
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although it constitutes the very ‘substance’ (or de-substance) of the subject, remains always 
inaccessible to consciousness. Žižek labels this fundamental level of the self the “void that is 
nothing in itself…which nonetheless serves as the unrepresentable point of reference” (2006, 
102). From this desubstantialised reference point of subjective parallax, however, the Real 
forms the void as it is knowable to consciousness, as a function within thought. Here the role 
of the objet a becomes clear: in its most basic form it is the lack of substance of the subject 
itself and the lost cause of desire that instigates the necessary illusion of substantiality of the 
subject in our everyday perceptions. The formation and smooth running of the subject 
necessitates this objectified void brought into the functioning of consciousness in a way that 
remains elusive but is not entirely inaccessible. 
Thus the question of one or many voids is not between subjects but within the subject 
itself. The void as such remains unknown and chaotic, while the void that forms the Real is the 
functional pull towards the void that keeps the Virtuality of self-positing consciousness from a 
constant flight into pure abstraction (or insanity). The need for substance is the quasi-causal 
relation that enables and inspires human subjects to construct itself through symbolic traces, 
and the presence of this rupture of the void as lost within any world we engage with allows for 
a critical confrontation of the self-perpetuating illusion of Virtual consciousness. In this sense, 
the void is not to be conceived as a morbid force, even though the Real is often associated 
with the death drive, but rather as an affirming negation that creates a space in which the 
antagonism of parallax can be sustained and a minimal (critical) distance towards it achieved. 
As Fabio Vighi illustrates, “the subject qua abstract negativity can only apprehend itself 
through an “objective correlative” of such negativity – the very “stuff” of which objet a is 
made” (2012, 104), and it is here that we insert a conscious mark or ‘stain’ in the smooth 
experience of subjective reality: contact with the void and its ‘materialisation’ as objet a 
through expression. This separation of the unrepresentable void and a representable-as-lost 
form in the Real is the integral function of the void in the structures of signification that 
support the entire process of our construction of reality within consciousness. Rancière states: 
Some things are unrepresentable as a function of the conditions to which a subject of representation must 
submit if it is to be part of a determinate regime of art, a specific regime of the relations between exhibition 
and signification. (Rancière 2007, 136) 
It is here the act of distinction itself that is necessary. There must be some element that 
cannot be representable in order for representation to occur, just as in our formation of reality 
there must be the inaccessible void in order for an accessible form of reality to appear to 
consciousness and in which a conscious subject can engage. As Žižek insists, “‘atoms’ are 
nothing but configurations of the void” (2009c, 148), and it is this antagonistic relation 
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between the void and any structure of reality that creates the parallax of the subject and 
through which we can approach the formation of the subject from the functions of 
consciousness, inserting a critical intervention between the subject of void (the objectified 
Real as void-function) and the subject as void (the desubstantialised position of parallax). 
 
2.2 BODIES WITHOUT ORGANS WITHOUT BODIES 
 
2.2.1 THE SURFACE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
Žižek’s notion that “the subject “is” only the activity of its own self-positing…a purely virtual 
entity” (2012, 61) informs a Deleuzian construction of the subject as a surface. The desiring-
machine of the Virtual function of consciousness is the process of this self-positing: a gesture 
of demarcation that separates from the void a space of subjectivity. While this does not create 
a substance of the subject, for desire is never achieved but rather acts as the process of 
desiring and producing desire itself, it enables subjective reality to form within consciousness. 
Deleuze and Guattari write that “desiring-machines work only when they break down, and by 
continually breaking down” (2004a, 9), and it is the constant failure of producing a subject 
from the void that insists on the demarcation. This bordering creates a surface, which is the 
Body without Organs (BwO), the fundamental process of desiring the formation of 
subjectivity itself. Deleuze and Guattari define the BwO as “desire; it is that which one desires 
and by which one desires” (2004b, 183) and which is “perpetually reinserted into the process 
of production” (2004a, 9). The Virtual function of consciousness, which is this desiring-
machine, thus opens a crack in the void that forms a shell, a surface on which the subject can 
occur. Where Deleuze and Guattari view desiring-machines as organs, by placing them here as 
self-positing functions in the Virtuality of consciousness the antagonism between desiring-
machines and the BwO is precisely what sustains the constant re-positing of the surface of the 
subject. As subjective expression, this gesture necessitates a constant engagement, desiring 
the creation of a space in which it can appear.  
This is exemplified in Christa Sommerer and Laruence Mignonneau’s Excavate (2012b) 
where an engaged spectatorship is necessary to view the surface of the work. The viewer 
carries an antique magic lantern into a cold war military shelter, projecting light disrupted by 
dark particles onto various parts of the walls. As the spectator lingers in one place these 
particles form into isopods and eventually into the scared faces of children. There is no 
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explanation of why these images have appeared onto the surface of the dark, wet and humid 
cave. It is the presence of the engaged spectator with their mediating apparatus that brings 
forth the active surface of a Virtual world atop the apparent physical space. The Virtuality of 
the spectator creates the desire for the work, which emerges through an engagement with 
the mediating processes as a pure visual surface that will disappear again when the subject 
moves away. There is here the antagonism between the work as a complete surface of the 
BwO and the ‘organs’ of the spectator, lantern/projector and individual elements of the 
projection. These individual elements, however, act beyond the simple role of organs, 
functioning as affective objects which “determine a zone of intensity as an imprint or zone on 
a BwO” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, 173). Through these zones of intensity – the inherent 
antagonism and fragmentation of desire that always fails to display the whole visual field – 
the work constructs a shifting surface on and as which a BwO appears as a presupposed 
entity. This is furthered in the work Wissengewächs (Mignonneau and Sommerer 2007), which 
inverts the relation by creating an interactive façade on a ‘greenhouse’ containing a science 
exchange library. The screens form part of this surface of glass that contains knowledge. The 
title, translated as ‘growth of knowledge’ emerges as sensors convert the presence of 
spectators into the growth of a digital garden on the screens. If the work itself is viewed as 
expressing the subject, then the Otherness of the spectators is a necessary force in the desire 
 
Fig.9 Wissensgewächs 
© 2007, Christa Sommerer & Laurent Mignonneau 
Interactive media façade developed for the City of Science, Braunschweig 
The presence of spectators influences the growth of the digital garden around a science exchange library. 
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of the work to grow and create images and movement on the transparent glass surface that 
contains consciousness as the potential knowledge obtainable by the public through entering 
the space. In relation to the void, the BwO as desire is here the formation of a subject as Other 
to the void; the creation of a reality of something outside of the internal nothing. In this 
manner it forms as difference, of the subject to itself and the inclusion of the imaginary big 
Other as the Virtual function of consciousness. 
What is this surface on, through and as which the subject emerges? What lies beneath? 
Deleuze writes that “there is nothing behind the curtain except unnameable mixtures, nothing 
above the carpet except the empty sky” (2004b, 150). To engage with this depthless surface 
requires an act of perversion as the “extraordinary art of surfaces” (Ibid., 151). Furthermore, 
after designating the artist as both patient and doctor of civilisation in relation to its critique, 
Deleuze states that in a genuine approach to analysis of subjectivity, “the artist is not only the 
patient and doctor of civilization, but is also its pervert” (Ibid., 274). Here there is an intrinsic 
role of creative activity in the negotiation of the surface of the subject, as demonstrated in 
Ralf Baecker’s The Conversation (2009). This work, constructed as a ring of 99 sensor-actuator 
pairs autonomously maintaining the tension of three rubber bands, displays the notion of the 
BwO as a surface created and sustained by organs-as-functions. Beyond the allegorical 
surface around a void created by the rubber band structure that recalls the visual imagery of a 
strange attractor, the work, part of a practice described as “proto-computational - where 
artists seem to be stripping digital computing down to its raw materials, only to rebuild it as 
 
Fig.10 The Conversation (2009) © Ralf Baecker 
A ring of sensor-actuators autonymously maintain the tension of the three bands that form a surface 
around a void in the centre of the device. 
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something weirder” (Whitelaw 2013), suggests the role of desiring-machines as forces rather 
than objects. The individual functions desire balance, the creation of a stable subject, while 
the subject itself, in the rubber bands, mediates these desiring-machines as a surface on 
which the forces can be made manifest.  
The artist writes that the work “incorporates an analogous and a digital part. These 
almost inseparable elements try to adapt to each other. As the process does not have a linear 
program it is not obvious which part controls whom” (Baecker 2009). The disruption of 
causality in this self-referential cybernetic activity displays the relation of self-positing Virtual 
consciousness to its surface as the BwO. After setting up the array and the initial states of the 
bands, what we might label the objectification of the void as the quasi-causal Real function of 
consciousness, the only engagement by the artist is turning on the machine, inserting the 
fundamental gesture of a desiring-subject, of minimal difference, of something rather than 
nothing. In answering the question ‘how do you make yourself a body without organs’, 
Deleuze and Guattari explain: 
At any rate, you have one (or several). It’s not so much that it pre-exists or comes ready-made, although in 
certain respects it is pre-existent…an inevitable exercise or experimentation, already accomplished the 
moment you undertake it, unaccomplished as long as you don’t…You never reach the Body without Organs, 
you can’t reach it, you are forever attaining it, it is a limit. (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, 166) 
What they are describing is here the function of the Virtual in its fundamental role as the 
desire of consciousness to produce itself, seen in Baecker’s work as forces structuring an 
apparently premade surface maintained only through the constant processes of desire that 
require it and posit it as presupposed. The BwO thus acts as an attractor, a Virtual surface 
displaying the function of consciousness as such, drawing together the other functions 
through the designation of a difference separating the subject from its void. Baecker 
“considers computers and cybernetic machines as epistemological hardware rather than 
tools” (2013), and the relation of the BwO as a surface of the subject across digital and 
physical planes suggests the role of cyborg consciousness also as ‘epistemological hardware’: 
a Virtuality enabling knowledge of the surface of the subject as self-posited only through the 
process of desiring-subjectivity. 
2.2.2 HYPER-CARTOGRAPHY 
Knowledge of the surface of subjectivity, the actualisation of a BwO that can make contact 
with Otherness (the positing of the Virtual big Other as the prerequisite for Otherness as 
such), risks a codifying of consciousness in the desiring-machine of excessively self-cognising 
Virtuality. As soon as there is a surface, there is a cognitive landscape, and in our epistemic 
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quest across this surface a schema of functions can appear as objectifications of the subject. 
The completeness of the BwO, is what Deleuze calls the “good object…by nature a lost object. 
It only shows itself and appears from the start as already lost, as having been lost” (2004b, 
218). Here we see the antagonism between the void and the surface, for the void is only 
acknowledged as void when it is lost beneath the surface of the subject, and in so doing the 
surface itself appears lacking in its inclusion of the void as the Real function of consciousness. 
The perpetual desire of the Virtual, in the interplay of Existence and Meaning, enacts a coding 
of cognitive space that overly territorialises the subject to appear as a static image rather than 
as the constant processes of functions. The nature of this coding in the processes of 
consciousness is where the ‘perversion’ of artistic creation must interject through thought, 
rupturing the self-referential loop of Virtuality constructing the fantasy of a substantial 
subject concealing the functions of consciousness and creating the appearance of a static 
reality of organs and (partial) objects. How, then, might we construct a knowledge of the 
surface without losing sight of the processes at work? Deleuze and Guattari warn us of “the 
logic of tracing and reproduction” (2004b, 13), an inherent risk of the self-perpetuating 
Virtuality of consciousness whereby the need for desiring-machines to produce themselves 
simply traces and retraces the codifications of consciousness without a space for critical 
interrogation of the void. Deleuze and Guattari instead instruct us to “make a map, not a 
tracing…The map does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself; it constructs the 
unconscious. It fosters connections between fields…The map is open and connectable in all of 
its dimensions” (Ibid.). In the demarcation of the void through the Virtual function of 
consciousness, this suggests a broadening of codification beyond merely self-duplication and 
into a cartographic practice as an integral part of the very construction of the individual 
subject as consciousness constantly maps and re-maps the reality of its own unconscious Real. 
This is a problem of the representation of non-physical spaces, such as the digital realm, 
and of consciousness. The self-negating effect of embodying and mapping data reverts to the 
logic of tracing in its attempts to plot non-geographical spaces such as the internet. Alexander 
Galloway (2011) draws on Rancière’s notion of the unrepresentable (2007) regarding attempts 
at visualising data: “data have no necessary visual form…any data visualization is first and 
foremost a visualization of the conversion rules themselves…the artifice is more evident than 
anything else” (Galloway 2011, 88). Here manifests the antagonism between the Virtual 
surface and the depth of the void. The Real of data forms the unrepresentable as the 
necessary predicate for the Virtuality of consciousness. The underlying void remains 
inaccessible and detached from the surface, and we can only acknowledge the 
unrepresentability of the void through its objectification as the always-already lost Real. 
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Galloway furthers this notion by separating information from data; here this is separating 
Meaning from the Real in the digital, and the subsequent problems of mapping the 
inexpressible of data. In contrast to unrepresentable data, in the regime of information: 
Every map of the internet looks the same…All operate within a single uniform set of aesthetic codes. The size 
of the aesthetic space is one…A single symbolic code reigns, iterated universally. And where there is only one, 
there is nothing. For a representation of the one is, in fact, a representation of nothing. (Galloway 2011, 90) 
This impossibility of mapping the internet, and the fluidity of digital communication in 
general, stems from the “hub-and-spoke aesthetic” (Ibid.) that dominates such visualisation. 
Even when maps avoid the literal visual reference of spider webs, such as Ruslan Enikeev’s 
Internet Map (2012)4 that displays the size of internet domains as circles placed in proximity to 
their most commonly linked counterparts, the relations between objects appear secondary to 
the nodal view of static sites. In this visualisation of partial objects, separated by symbolic 
space, there appear Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘organs’, each with their own alienated identity. 
The constant process of desire constructs a binary procedure of production from an 
apparently singular root or genesis that can achieve diversity only by splitting into branches of 
an ‘arborescent’ mode of codification. But Deleuze and Guattari insist that “thought is not 
arborescent, and the brain is not a rooted or ramified matter” (2004b, 17), and our 
consciousness emerges as all functions, self-posited as presupposed, simultaneously. This 
rhizomatic approach to the surface necessitates a map that avoids the rigidity of identifying 
partial objects, focusing instead on the relations of forces within the Virtuality of the BwO. In 
constructing a diagram, described by Deleuze as “a map, or rather several superimposed 
maps” (2006a, 37), Ronald Bogue emphasises a “cartography of desire that charts the fissures 
and rifts of metamorphoses and becoming” (2004, 41). In both consciousness and the digital 
there is the need for a level of ‘hyper-mapping’ outside of physical conceptions of space. 
This moves against the maps produced by research groups such as the Oxford Internet 
Institute, which focus on limited visual representations tracing digital activity onto 
geographical ‘maps’ of the physical world.5 Negroponte states that “the digital world is 
intrinsically scalable” (1996, 43), seen in modes of hyper-mapping that extend beyond our 
familiar codes of physical space-time. Tools such as Google Maps allow for a mapping that 
augments the territory by overlaying hyperlinks to semantically related data, and even places 
the map within the territory through Street View and user-generated content. Conversely, 
apps such as GoogleGoggles augment the location itself with hypertextual mapping drawn 
                                                                    
4
 See http://internet-map.net/. 
5
 See http://geography.oii.ox.ac.uk/ for a range of such maps as a representational tracing of data 
rather than a true cartography of the digital. 
 69 
from images scanned in situ. These technologies draw the subject simultaneously into both 
the territory and the ever expanding map. The same cartographies are needed for the 
scalability of consciousness, whereby the BwO that constitutes the Virtual surface of the 
subject exists at a scale encompassing all aspects of subjective reality, reconstituting itself 
into a new assemblage with each new form of reality that takes into account all the relations 
and forces of the functioning of consciousness. The subject is not a fixed entity but a constant 
reproduction in the Virtual, and the surface emerges only as a series of interconnected 
functions. Land states that “the connections that are made and the flows that produce these 
circuits trace out the full range of possible, or rather ‘virtual’, connections and circuits whose 
totality comprises the body-without-organs” (Land 2005, 29), and this necessitates not only a 
map of fluid spaces but a map that is fluid itself, for the territories of the subject are 
themselves ever shifting into new assemblages and new BwOs. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s nomadic approach to subjectivity, worlds and culture follows 
through to their cartography, as an artistic intervention that constantly deterritorialises the 
representation of space through hypertextual gestures of a constant and creative remapping.  
Sommerer and Mignonneau’s Escape (2012a) inserts such a visual mapping into a seemingly 
fixed space, with their intentional depiction of a failed “flight attempt” that displaces its 
subject into an internal flight of symbolic transformation (Mignonneau and Sommerer 2012). 
An antique projector displays what appears to be a fly on the screen. Turning the handle of the 
machine makes the fly move frantically, as if attempting to escape, before multiplying into a 
swarm and eventually transmuting into text from Kafka’s The Metamorphosis, specifically the 
moment when Gregor Samsa becomes aware of his transformation. Here the need for escape, 
for a ‘line of flight’, is taken first literally by the fly and then as an insistence on the 
transformation of the subject. The metamorphosis escapes the surface of the space as BwO, 
the human physical body of the character and the visual image of the fly, unleashing the 
horror beneath the structures of desire that support the illusion of a fixed substantial subject. 
This line of flight changes the very terms of the map, from human to something Other, 
reconfiguring the Virtual surface of the subject as a space on which and by which a 
transformation of consciousness can occur. The engagement of the spectator in Escape, as 
with the necessary critical engagement of consciousness, places the hyper-cartographic 
intervention beyond a visual map or even a cognitive map but into an experiential map 
through which a shift in the parallax can make visible the Real as an objectification of the void. 
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2.2.3 THE FLOW OF VIRTUAL AND REAL 
Žižek identifies the seemingly inseparable parallax relation between Deleuzian desire, as the 
BwO free of partiality and lack, and his own Lacanian drive as an OwB (Organs without 
Bodies), in which the lacking objects themselves constitute the fragmented parts of the 
subject (Žižek 2012, xii). Here a relation of function must be discerned to sustain the 
antagonism and thus inject a space within our parallax position regarding the Virtual (desire, 
BwO) and the Real (drive, OwB). The Real here exists within flux, when freed from the 
hierarchies of the organism that consciousness often seeks to codify and stratify, while the 
Virtual is the process of flux that ensures the continued functioning of consciousness. The 
relation of these functions to consciousness, and the creation of a subject around the void, 
manifests in cybernetic flows. It is both desire and drive, the Virtual and the Real, the BwO 
and the OwB, that are necessary to create the cyborg subject and spaces for a critical distance 
towards it. Sommerer and Mignonneau’s The Living Web (2002) creates such a space in 
relation to digital consciousness, with an immersive web browser placing a vast array of digital 
entities on the surface of a CAVE installation, streaming material according to spectators’ 
conversations fed through speech recognition software and internet searches. The aim for an 
 
Fig.11 The Living Web 
©2002, Christa Sommerer, Laurent Mignonneau & Roberto Lopez-Gulliver 
Interacting with a complex 3D data environment at the Art-of-Immersion Festival Bonn 
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intuitive experience of the digital space suggests an attempt for a direct creation of media 
from the Virtuality of consciousness, where the mediation appears only as a smooth surface of 
information made manifest. The individual objects, each of which is considered ‘lost’ in terms 
of the individuated digital space it represents within the bombardment of visual and sonic 
data, create a space within the formation of the surface. In this parallax gap, the Virtual flow 
can escape towards the flow of the Real, as consciousness attempts to reach through the 
surface of mediation towards the objects and information it desires. These flows, what Brian 
Massumi describes as a network of displaced agency whose unconscious is the human subject 
(2002a, 130-1), are further expressed in Mobile Feelings (2003), which has been described as a 
work “engaged in the switching of sensations and percepts between users” (Ross 2010). The 
creation of mediating ‘organs’ through which sensual data is shared wirelessly across a gallery 
space highlights the role of the Other in relation to Virtual flow. These partial objects that 
enable a line of flight create a space within the surface of the subject through which the 
 
Fig.12 Mobile Feelings 
© 2003, Christa Sommerer & Laurent Mignonneau 
Supported by France Telecom Studio Creatif, Paris and IAMAS Gifu, Japan 
Two heartbeat and breath communication devices housed in gourds 
These devices host miniature bio-sensors and actuators that capture the users' heartbeat, blood volume 
pressure and pulse, skin conductivity, sweat and smell. All data can be sent to other anonymous users who 
can perceive and feel these most private sensations through actuators, vibrators, ventilators, micro-
electromechanical and micro-bio-electrochemical systems which are also embedded in each "Mobile 
Feelings" device. (Mignonneau and Sommerer 2003) 
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experience of an Other can inform our own consciousness. Here we are reaching a Body 
without Organs without Bodies (BwOwB): the surface of consciousness in which the void is 
objectified as lost, but under which the entire assemblage itself is lost. This is an interjection 
of the Real as a space within the surface of Virtual consciousness through which a rupture of 
minimal difference can negotiate a brief relation to the void. Such critical interventions of the 
Real amidst the flow of the Virtual, parallax perturbations in the surface of the BwOwB, are 
the necessary process by, on and through which the void is separated in the fundamental 
minimal difference of parallax and might be glimpsed as an objectification of the Real in art. 
 
2.3 A-PARTICLE PHYSICS 
 
2.3.1 VACUUM 
The task remains to interrogate the nature of this void that is objectified into the Real. The 
process of confronting the unnameable, unrepresentable void is speculatively negotiated in 
Mignonneau and Sommerer’s Life Writer (2006), in which entering words on a typewriter 
causes letters projected onto the paper to shift and morph into bug-like creatures. The 
creation of the creatures is governed by the coding of an artificial genetics derived from the 
characters entered by the engaged spectator. The work creates, in exposing the Real beneath 
symbolic and genetic codes, a consciousness of the necessary void – between physical and 
digital, linguistic and biological worlds – that defines the work. Staging the reverse operation 
of Escape – here the shift is from symbolically to genetically coded objects – this process, 
whereby the symbolic particles spring to life across such a void in their engagement with the 
spectator, echoes the creation of virtual particles by vacuum fluctuation. The emergence and 
disappearance of particles from the void of a vacuum space is the functioning of Virtual 
consciousness through which the void might be objectified into ‘particles’ as the Real. It is the 
concept of a vacuum that provides the closest approximation of the inaccessible void. 
Quantum physics has revealed the non-emptiness of a vacuum, instead pointing towards a 
lowest possible state of energy in which electric and magnetic fields “are uncertain and may 
be seen as fluctuating about mean values…[the] field has zero mean value but is not 
identically zero” (Craig and Thirunamachandran 1984, 40). This abstract nature of a perfect 
vacuum, in which no matter or energy exists, draws further parallels with the appearance of 
the void of subjectivity only within a conceptual allegory. The truly empty remains always 
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inaccessible, yet is an essential element in the construction of a space in which the subject can 
exist. 
Tegmark describes the ‘anthropic principle’ as an obligatory function in quantum 
mechanics (in Carr 2007, 108), the role of the observer or engaged spectator that we call 
subject as a “self-aware substructure” in the “mathematical democracy” of selecting the 
conditions for a universe in which it can exist (Ibid., 118). Jonathan Frazer and Andrew Liddle 
add that “anthropic arguments place an incredibly strong bound on the vacuum energy” 
(Frazer and Liddle 2011, 30), and it is through the limit that consciousness imposes on the 
vacuum, the surface that marks out the empty space that forms the subject, that we might 
 
Fig.13 Life Writer 
© 2006, Laurent Mignonneau & Christa Sommerer 
Typing generates letters which transform from symbolic to genetic code as bugs moving across the paper. 
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undertake an estimation of the nature of this void of subjectivity. This limit of consciousness 
at the edge of the anthropic principle is demonstrated in Maurizio Bolognini’s Sealed: 
Programmed Machines (1992). Described as a key development in software art (Broeckmann 
2006), the work consists of a collection of computers, set to generate images according to 
Bolognini’s programming, with sealed monitor bus ports. The complete inaccessibility of the 
vast quantity of visual imagery created by the work references a technological sublimity of the 
void beneath the digital world. Meanwhile Bolognoni’s intervention at the programming level, 
perhaps the only point at which the work could be said to be ‘viewed’, mirrors the role of the 
conscious observer in the anthropic principle, defining the fundamental laws of the universe 
as presupposed. In this split of control and inaccessibility, the engaged spectator can only be 
the artist himself, constructing the ‘universe’ of his work within a perceptual vacuum that 
creates a subjective void: “between the real and illusory dimensions of a more or less forced 
virtuality” (Madesani in Solimano 2005, 56). This creation of an inaccessible space between 
Real and Virtual displays the self-positing nature of Virtuality from the void, and a potential 
arena for reframing the emptiness of the subject. 
Bolognini’s position “at the crossroads of conceptual art and generative art” (Bolognini 
2012) can be associated with the post-conceptual practice Peter Osborne identifies as “the 
fictional ‘presentness’ of the contemporary” (2010, 5) favouring presentation over 
representation in “the interpretation of what is through the construction of new wholes out of 
its fragments and modalities of existence” (Ibid., 8). Rancière’s notion of unrepresentability 
(2007) appears again in the necessary and affirmative conditions of representation, described 
by Galloway as “less a question of the failures of representation on its own terms and more a 
question of the historical shift out of one regime into a subsequent regime” (2011, 92). This 
shift towards presenting rather than representing the unrepresentable draws into art theory 
the shift that has occurred in quantum physics, the same shift that this thesis suggests in 
relation to consciousness: the necessity of an impenetrable void in order for the appearance of 
substance (as image, world, or consciousness in the formation of the subject). For Galloway 
and Rancière, for Bolognini, and for understanding the vacuum of quantum mechanics, the 
process by which we can speculatively engage with the unrepresentable and inaccessible void 
is the creation of a limit, staging a similar conceptual space against which the antagonism of 
denied direct engagement forces the spectator to examine the relation of the surface of the 
work and of their own parallax position to what might lie beneath. 
This return to a surface through which to view the void, the split within the structures of 
the perceptual BwO, is manifested in Mignonneau and Sommerer’s Nanoscape (2002). This 
work creates an invisible nano-scale landscape, accessible only through the specific interface 
 75 
of a magnetic ring through which the spectator ‘touches’ the work. The placing of the work as 
an unrepresentable entity, accessible only through a perceptual flux of forces, displaces any 
engagement with the installation into the Virtual realm of consciousness, what Ascott 
identifies as the work’s anti-materialist gesture in constructing “the plane on which 
technology and consciousness can meet” in the nano as “a point of access to the complexity 
of immaterial, subatomic domains” (2005). The aim for “an intuitive experience where users 
can interact with invisible self-organizing atoms” (Mignonneau and Sommerer 2005, 200) 
pushes the negotiation of the work into the cognitive realm, as the spectator must create the 
landscape of the work in the imagination as part of their own surface of consciousness. This 
crosses the post-conceptual divide of Bolognini’s Sealed devices, as the spectator here can 
engage with the work, albeit indirectly. The position of the artists as Tegmark’s self-aware 
substructure follows Bolognini’s role in determining the fundamental laws of the work. 
However, the placement of the inaccessible within the consciousness of the individual 
spectator, rather than locked inside the physical objects of the work, moves across a 
conceptual impact into a cognitive disruption of the subject, allowing for an intrusion of the 
void of quantum forces into the surface of subjective reality. This follows the cosmological 
impact of quantum mechanics, in the effect of fundamental particles on the formation of the 
universe. Anthony Aguirre and Tegmark explain that “the post-inflationary properties are 
then primarily determined not by cosmic initial conditions, but by the dynamics of inflation” 
(2011, 3). Similarly, the functioning of consciousness in the Virtuality of self-aware 
superstructure or self-positing engaged spectator here defines and perpetuates the dynamic 
of such an inflation. The formation of a reality in which the subject can engage is determined 
by the manner in which such a reality emerges as a surface from the void, and any access to 
the void can only be achieved through a critical intervention within the surface that disrupts 
the functioning dynamics and makes clear a rupture of the Real as objectification of the void. 
2.3.2 NOTHING IN PARTICULAR 
With a framework for modes of comprehending a conceptual un-representation of the void, it 
is possible to move towards a notion of what constitutes the desubstantial core of the subject. 
Examples from cosmology can illuminate this process, as they attempt to determine the 
formation of the universe and its contents from the traces left in the false vacuum of space. 
The Eridanus Supervoid, a dark spot in the CMB – the Cosmic Microwave Background, the 
earliest observable data described as “the most ancient image of the universe” (Cruz et al. 
2008, 29) – offered one possible such explanation. There was speculation upon its discovery 
that this void could be the imprint of an interaction between universes (see, for a ‘popular 
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science’ discussion, Chown 2007), functioning as an objectification of our encounter with 
another realm and a potential model for our engagement with the void of subjectivity. 
However, more recent research suggests that the dark spot in the CMB is more likely a void in 
our observation, a creation of the process of measurement in the selection of parameters 
(Zhang and Huterer 2008). The void possesses no window to a ‘deeper’ level of consciousness, 
but is the necessary gap in the subject required in order to think ourselves as a subject. This 
aligns with Rancière and Galloway’s notion of the unrepresentable, suggesting the need to 
examine what lies unseen within the universe, rather than what lies outside it. The internal 
rather than the external void must be our focus, for even cosmology must consider the impact 
of quantum scale developments in defining the fundamental laws of the universe. 
This dilemma is staged in Yayoi Kusama’s Infinity Mirror Room – Filled with the Brilliance 
of Life (2011 and 2012). Following a long practice of mirrored rooms to render finite perception 
of the work moot, these two embodiments of the project, including the largest one thus far in 
2012 at the Tate Modern, London, add controlled colour-changing LED lights to the formerly 
analogue work. There is here a permeation of the physical space by the digital, contrasting 
with the light and saturated colours of the previous works, Kusama’s practice becoming “more 
baroque as technology and money have allowed” (Searle 2012) to create “the experience of 
being in an apparently endless space, broken only by points of light in the darkness” (Taylor 
2012). The construction of the space here functions in the manner of the digital world, with 
the illusory Virtual-Existence constructed as pure appearance within consciousness as the 
engaged spectator “disappear[s] among your own reflections” (Searle 2012). The experience 
of such work places the subject in a relation to the void of their own position, and the visual 
allegories at work evoke a cosmological representation of the infinite. Beyond the difficulty of 
documenting such mirrored spaces in photographs, the installations have been described as 
“the kind of work that cannot be tweeted” (Nussbaum 2013) in the complexity of the 
experience within a simple and nearly empty space and the failure of its representation. The 
engaged spectator is here left alone with their parallax position, constructing the infinite 
space as the substance of darkness. It is possible to draw here a conceptual parallel with dark 
matter, amidst an increasing trend in physics towards an unknowable realm of antimatter.  
Kallenbach stresses that in the total density of the universe, “baryonic matter [which 
includes all atoms] only contributes a few percent! This suggests that other (“dark”) forms of 
energy and matter exist” (in Figger, Meschede and Zimmermann 2002, 182). While it is 
possible to observe the gravitational effects of dark matter and the forces of dark energy, they 
remain experimentally unmeasurable, quantifiably absent and qualitatively mysterious. One 
unusual feature of dark energy is that it “can be seen as the opposite of gravity. While gravity 
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pulls matter together, dark energy is what is causing the universe to expand, and at an ever-
increasing rate” (Kazan 2010), and it is this expansive character that defines Kusama’s Infinite 
Mirror Room. Through the mirrored expansion of the perceptual field the universe of the work 
is perpetually increasing in size, not of the work itself through time but through the 
perception of it by an engaged spectator as more lights and more space is brought into the 
field of the gaze and into the surface of the subject. The lack of a limit, however, places this 
expansion beyond the Virtual into the dark void, at the centre of which stands the subject as 
parallax. The subtitle of the recent installations, Filled with the Brilliance of Life, suggests that 
between the LEDs is not merely empty space, but an ever-expanding fullness of dark energy. 
Indeed, the work has been described as possessing “a palpable energy and a sometimes 
malevolent intensity” (Searle 2012), for the effects of dark energy can not only be felt but infer 
potentially dangerous consequences. The speculated connection of dark matter and energy to 
the hypothetical ‘primordial black holes’ – “a black hole created in the very early universe” 
(Hawking 1988) – suggests both the perilous forces at stake and the role of such forces in the 
creation of the universe. This includes, counter to the conventional view of black holes 
absorbing all matter, the influence of quantum mechanical effects that create/emit particles 
(Hawking 1975, 199). The void of Kusama’s installations, as with the dark matter void of a 
black hole and the cognitive parallax void of the subject, possesses a generative material 
outside of conventional conceptions of particles. 
Atypical and unobservable particles occupy an increasingly important place in the 
discussions of contemporary physics, from the dark matter and energy constituting most of 
the universe to the asymmetry between matter and anti-matter in baryogenesis (the 
formation of protons and neutrons that constitute matter). Even beyond these familiar 
paradigms there is the radical ‘unparticle’ physics of Howard Georgi (2007b). This approach 
goes beyond the familiarity of viewing the universe in terms of particles, which the 
wave/particle duality shows as simply one manner of viewing what appears as pure energy, 
towards the elements of the universe that are inaccessible, yet “whose production might be 
detectable in missing energy and momentum distributions…virtual effects” (Georgi 2007a, 
275). This Virtuality lying beyond the classically framed notion of the quantum world as 
individuated particles reveals the unparticle to the spectator only in its absence, its loss. Thus 
the dilemma of the Real reappears when that which is beyond particles emerges as an objet a, 
an objectification of the flux of the void, an a-particle. This unparticle, or here a-particle, 
physics is an attempt to conceive of scale invariance in massless entities: the substance of 
fields. The unparticle approach thus aims to visualise the “scale invariant stuff” (Georgi 2007b, 
1) that fields are made of. 
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Scale invariance displays much in common with the logic of fractals, and indeed fractal 
self-similarity can be considered an example of scale invariance. Thus fractal art offers one 
method of viewing a conceptualisation of fields-as-particles, such as the work of Carlos 
Ginzburg, which explores “the fractalization of pictorial space and the artistic image” (Artcat 
2010), providing a creative inclusion of the process of invariance itself within the objectified 
Real that can be achieved in art works. Fractal ‘objects’ are formed only from lines as fields or 
attractors, concerned with the “Age of Complexity” and its “physical and psychological 
landscapes” (Condé 2001). Ginzburg’s Homo Fractalus (1999) displays the psychological 
extrapolation of this use of scalable fields, showing a human form through fractal shapes, an 
objectification of the void bringing the forces of a-particles into the human subject. The fusion 
of object and field in the surfaces of Ginzburg’s works, embedded in a negotiation of the 
psychological construction of the human as a fractal subject, creates a negative cognitive 
space in which the forces of the void might be extrapolated. Engaged spectatorship of such 
work necessitates a viewing from afar as a shifting field on the smooth surface of the image, 
controlled by unseen forces, and a closer viewing in which the objectification of such forces is 
revealed as lines form into specific shapes and signifiers. Between these two views is an 
opportunity for a displaced perspective to emerge, for consciousness to view the fractal 
nature of its own construction and to speculate the nature of the unparticles of the void that 
create the lost objects of the Real with which the Virtuality of consciousness interacts. The 
difficulty of ‘coupling’ such unparticles to visible fields (Luo and Zhu 2008) remains a key 
factor in the appearance of phenomenological effects, for subjective reality forms according 
to its manner of appearance as a Virtuality of and to consciousness. Emergent processes of 
engagement are thus essential to a critical scaling of perception in art (Benjamin 2013), 
creating the opportunity for disruptions between the individual and the universe and within 
the perspectival position of the subject itself. Such a rupture in the surface of the work of art 
might force the engaged spectator between points of view in such a way as to reveal the 
parallax of forces that cause such framings of perception and consciousness. 
2.3.3 THE LIMITS OF THOUGHT 
These forces within consciousness that constitute the desubstantialised core of the subject 
can be brought into our knowledge only as an objectification in the Real, as a pulse in the flow 
of energy. David Albert (1992, 133) explains the epistemological void of the quantum realm 
and suggests that, apart from our apparent knowledge of any particular observation, the 
quantum state of the universe cannot be proven to be anything other than a vacuum state. 
This returns to the question of the emergence of the subject as a Virtual function or vacuum 
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fluctuation. Indeed, there are those who suggest that the entire history of our universe is one 
giant such fluctuation (Tryon 1973), an externalised echo of the formation of the subject as a 
pulse of Virtual consciousness in the Real of unobservable energy. The indeterminate origins 
of the universe and the similarly indeterminate genesis of the subject from the void display 
the fundamental gap within human consciousness: the inability to reconcile a space outside of 
the known with our engaged perspective of subjective reality. The inflation of the universe 
according to the fundamental properties, as defined by the anthropic principal, is explained in 
Tegmark’s description of the limits of observation: 
The farthest you can observe is the distance that light has been able to travel during the 14 billion years since 
the big-bang expansion began…a sphere of this radius defines our observable universe, also called our Hubble 
volume, our horizon volume or simply our universe. (Tegmark in Saunders et al. 2010, 2) 
What he is describing here is the epistemological problem that Albert explains, and the failure 
of all theories of dark/anti-/un- particles to explain the emergence of the universe, just as art 
can only explain the unrepresentable by displaying and interrogating the limits of 
representation (Rancière 2007). Across science, art and philosophy we are looking at the 
failure of transcending the limit of our understanding at the unrepresentable point of 
reference necessary for all knowledge of worlds. If the void will always remain impenetrable, 
and if a genuine understanding of its properties – whether they be those of dark energy, anti-
matter, unparticles or something entirely beyond our current comprehension – will remain 
impossible, the only task that remains is to bring into critical light the processes by which the 
void is concealed. 
This necessity of critically representing the limits of perception in relation to the 
formation of physical and digital worlds is demonstrated in Baecker’s Irrational Computing 
(2011). This work, consisting of five modules each utilising crystals and minerals to construct 
electro-mechanical signal processors, stems from Baecker’s conception of computing as “a 
cultural and not a natural phenomenon…Generative utopia” (Baecker in Whitelaw 2013). The 
positioning of the computer across physical and digital worlds moves beyond the emergence 
of thought. Furthering the work of The Conversation, Baecker describes Irrational Computing 
as a series of “speculative machines…with a focus on the encounter of thought and the 
(physical) world” (2013), which attempt to develop “an other kind of thinking. A thinking that 
is anti "cause and reaction". A thinking of hidden relations, connections and uncertainty” 
(Baecker in Whitelaw 2013). This conceptualisation of the machinic functions that constitute 
how we conceive the world and the computer is also a construction of the subject Virtualised 
as a primitive ‘computer’. The rupture in our conceptions of the computer and relation to it 
here places physical and digital reality as the result of an informational construct, whereby the 
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void of the subjective parallax is exposed as the process of designation against the unseen and 
unpredictable quantum physical processes that govern the crystal computer structures. 
Baecker describes the paradoxical manner in which “modern computer technology has thus 
tamed and domesticated the chaotic” (2011), bringing into view the Virtualising processes of 
our construction of digital consciousness. This crossing of physical and digital processes and 
modes of consciousness at the quantum level has been theorised as the ultimate formation of 
reality in Wheeler’s ‘it from bit’ hypothesis. Wheeler states that “information sits at the core of 
physics” (1998, 340) and that “reality arises in the last analysis from the posing of yes–no 
questions and the registering of equipment-evoked responses; in short, that all things physical 
are information-theoretic in origin and that this is a participatory universe” (Wheeler in Zurek 
1990, 311). The implication of Wheeler’s suggestion – the essential similarity between 
(classical) physical, digital and quantum ontologies – is that the fundamental process defining 
reality is a basic binary choice. The ultimate ‘yes-no’ question is that of the formation of 
consciousness itself, the minimal difference from which the Virtuality can emerge. At the 
heart of creative critical digital culture, seen in works by Baecker, Sommerer and Mignonneau, 
or Dombis as we shall see below, is the representation of this designatory statement that 
brings about the entire universe as a Virtuality within consciousness. Such critical art is 
fundamentally approaching the very question that instigates the self-positing of the subject, 
the establishment of a parallax position and the separation of the void from consciousness. 
 
 
2.4 PASCAL DOMBIS: IRRATIONAL SUBJECTIVITY 
 
2.4.1 GEOMETRIC PERMUTATION 
The primordial division of consciousness that establishes the minimal difference in which the 
surface of the subject can emerge from the void is a gesture of thought, rationality, logic and 
reason: a gesture of Virtuality. It is only within the framework of such Virtual cognitive forces 
that the BwO is able to form the subject in what Deleuze and Guattari describe as “that glacial 
reality where the alluvions, sedimentations, coagulations, foldings, and recoilings that 
compose an organism – and also a signification and a subject - occur” (2004b, 176). Beneath 
this shifting cartography that enables a territory of the subject to form and develop is the 
perpetual decision of consciousness to think itself. An artist who critically confronts this 
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notion is Pascal Dombis, whose “regime of post-virtual images” (Buci-Glucksmann 2012) aim 
towards a perpetual reconstruction of the relation between the subject and technology 
through a radicalisation of the processes of reason that define the Virtual structures of reality. 
If Deleuze “gives philosophical expression to a world of fractal and Reimanian [sic]6 
geometries, quantum and chaotic physics, and a logic of pure relations and paradoxes” (Smith 
2009, 41), then Dombis gives artistic expression to the same world, embedding within 
technology the processes of human thought that have given rise to such irrational lenses on 
reality through hyper-rational extrapolation. Dombis states that his aim is to: 
convey a vision of the world in terms of itinaries [sic] and displacement, offering another kind of mapping in 
which networks get into the picture…to confront the human viewer with their own primitive irrationality 
through my artworks, artworks that result from an abuse of technological processes. (Dombis 2004) 
This agenda is precisely a confrontation with the parallax of subjectivity and a disruption of 
the Virtuality of consciousness, through which we might achieve a critical contact with the 
Real of our technological age. Though the computer, as an embodiment of machinic 
processes of rational logic, appears as the mediating tool for his work, it is the “principles of 
self-reproduction, proliferation and excess” (Debailleux 2008b) upon which his artistic process 
rests in the exploitation of and challenge to the viewer. The stream of practice in works such 
as Rizong (1998-1999), Antisana (2000-2008), Hyper-Structures (2002-2004) and Spin (2006-
2012) spans over a decade of such exploitation of simple functions taken beyond their visual 
limit into the realm of excess and disfunction. Across prints, video and site-specific 
installations, the use of simple artistic gestures – lines – reveals in these works a creative 
                                                                    
6
 An elliptic, non-euclidean geometry in which metric properties change through space and parallel 
lines do not exist (see Riemann 1873), creating a mathematical basis for the curvature of space-time in 
relativity. 
 
Fig.14 Spin (2009) © Pascal Dombis 
Computer generated images from excessive algorithmic iteration. 
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statement that is “not interested in their discrete particularities or aesthetic qualities, but in 
their excessive accumulation as well as in the various mental scapes conjured up” (Amine 
2011). This exposes the role of the algorithms used for such work as a desiring-machine that 
only works artistically through its disruption and disfunction, as we have seen in the self-
positing nature of Virtual consciousness in creating the cognitive landscape of the surface of 
the subject, but also creates a new mode of mapping the relation of thought to technology. 
There is here a cartography not only of a subject between landscapes but of subjective 
landscapes that are themselves constantly shifting. Dombis creates such a mapping in his 
excessive use of abstract lines, circles and spirals as both objects and forces. 
By placing the line as a gesture of the Real – excessive in its use but lacking in cognitive 
signification – these geometric works construct themselves iteratively as the perpetual self-
positing of the subject. The partial objects, as a dark energy of the visual field, are drawn into 
the assemblage of the work through this excess, as they “always proliferate by tens of 
thousands like an immense digital tapestry, the epidermis of the world” (Buci-Glucksmann 
2012). Here Dombis is negotiating what is labelled here as the relation between emergent 
Virtual and presupposed Real, for the individual line exists only on the surface once posited by 
the functioning algorithm of the work, while the entire assemblage forms an artistic BwO, a 
“surface like an immense real-imaginary continental map” (Ibid.). This is the quasi-causal 
relation between the Real and the Virtual: the former appears as the cognitive ‘material’ from 
which the latter is formed; the latter instigates the separation of the former as ‘object’ out of 
the unknowable flux of the void. In Dombis’ geometric abstractions Frank Popper identifies a 
“new conceptual space that emerged through self-programmed iterative hyperstructures. We 
are here already at the heart of the virtual sphere” (Popper 2007). Dombis labels these 
emergent structures “Irrational Environments” (2004), expressions of “supra-rational excess”7 
(Nechvatal 2005) in the inherently excessive functioning of Virtual consciousness, manifested 
as art through “complexity, perpetuation, enrichment and chaos…a relentless machine-logic 
bent on achieving a contemporary techno-hyperirrationality” (Popper 2007). What Dombis is 
aiming to expose is the inherently irrational nature of rational thought, pushing consciousness 
and symbolic structures to their extreme to reveal what we label here as the Real in the 
Virtual, the necessarily inaccessible objectification of a thought, which Deleuze aligns with 
expression and sense as the fourth and most problematic element of a propositional logic 
(2004b, 22). Even the imagery engages with this emergent structure surrounding the notion 
of the unrepresentable, for example in Antisana II (2000/2008) which “opens out like a true-
                                                                    
7
 Suprarational: “transcending the rational : not to be comprehended by reason alone” (Merriam-
Webster Dictionary 2014). 
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false fractal butterfly, a meshing together of lines and spirals, in which a million curves 
engender a being as airy as it is baroque” (Buci-Glucksmann 2009). It is the self-similarity 
between the void of the Real and the true void of subjectivity that enables a glimpse of the 
inaccessible space formed at the core of consciousness, mirrored in the self-similarity of the 
Virtual as an infinitely scalable pure function that creates the surface of the subject. This 
excessive reiteration of function develops “the fractal loop’s potentialities” as the “infinite 
combinations of geometric structures” (Popper 2007) forming the abstraction of the BwO that 
we call subject. Dombis explicitly confronts the stakes of the Virtual formation of 
consciousness through the constant processes of emergence that form in his relation to 
creation, function and consciousness. His ‘Irrational Environments’ reveal the necessary void 
within thought as the irrational genesis of rationality, always threatening to re-enter 
consciousness as madness and the excessive Real: the cause of Virtuality’s desire for 
perpetuation and permutation, lost amidst the processes of thought and re-inserted through 
the “new regime of virtual and post-virtual flux-images” (Buci-Glucksmann 2012) that form his 
geometric, abstract and algorithmic practices. 
 
Fig.15 Antisana II (2000) © Pascal Dombis 
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2.4.2 LENTICULAR DISTORTION 
The construction of such images as emergent irrationality follows the emergence of 
consciousness in the initialising ‘it from bit’ gesture by which the fundamental yes-no binary 
question is the act of self-positing. Deleuze and Guattari insist that “art takes a bit of chaos in 
a frame in order to form a composed chaos that becomes sensory” (1994, 206), that is, that 
the artistic gesture attempts to draw something from the unrepresentable void into 
representation as the Real. In this objectification of the void the Real emerges within the 
Virtual frame of consciousness, as expressed in Dombis’s work. Christine Buci-Glucksmann 
writes of the spatial experience of the works in Géométries Irrationnelles (2008): 
As you walk along the chromatic wall of post-assembled panels, your horizontally evolving gaze discovers the 
metamorphosis of these seemingly straight lines, which burst suddenly into fragments of ellipses, like primitive 
rockets of chance colours blending together in an almost pictorial chromatic mass. (Buci-Glucksmann 2009) 
Where his earlier works tended to spread virally across walls, covering spaces from one point 
outwards, the later strands of practice that have emerged bring the self-mediating process of 
framing into clearer view. There is here a progression of the iterative expression of partial 
objectifications of code with the use of lenticular lenses to distort the images as the engaged 
spectator moves through the space of the gallery. Dombis constructs a literal visual parallax 
 
Fig.16 Irrational Geometrics (2008) © Pascal Dombis 
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between the image, the lenticular and the spectator, in order to confront the conceptual 
parallax of subjectivity in relation to consciousness and technology. Placing the computer 
generated images behind a lenticular lens enacts a ‘post-digital’ practice that reinserts 
physical parallax over the coded realm of the digital. The displacement of the images 
necessitates a displacement of the subject, and the abstract mappings that disrupt rational 
thought in their confrontation with the processes of such thought display a constantly shifting 
surface that exists as a Virtuality between the subject and the work of art. These series of 
works – such as Post-Digital Mirror (2006-2013),8 Post-Digital Surface (2010-2013) and Post-
Digital Blue (2013) – embody Land’s statement that the construction of true subjectivity is a 
matter of “parallel de- and re-territorializations … there is no human subject outside language 
and technology … Rather, it is a specific stratification…that produces the distribution we 
usually call ‘human’” (Land 2005, 31-2). The subject exists only in the Virtual as stratifications 
on the BwO, only as the organising of its own consciousness into and onto the surface of 
subjective reality it inhabits. 
The layering of monochrome digital images beneath the parallax of the lenticular lens 
creates a depthless density that appears only as a surface between the work and the engaged 
spectator. Just as Mignonneau and Sommerer’s project Solar Display (2008) with Michael 
Shamiyeh looks for “new display possibilities…the potential of modern media facades as 
membranes” (Mignoneau, Shamiyeh and Sommerer 2008), a similar effect occurs in Dombis’ 
works. As Henri-François Debailleux describes, “when the digital prints are covered with 
lenticulars (functioning then as optical lenses), the number of points of view grows and 
multiplies according to the viewer’s physical displacements or changing angles of vision” 
(2008b). This suggests a simple and direct visual parallax that disrupts the images as a purely 
aesthetic gesture. However, the labelling of such works as ‘post-digital surfaces’ implies an 
awareness of the emergent work within the gaze of the engaged spectator, just as a given 
world emerges within the cognitive gaze of Virtual consciousness in parallax as a causal 
ontological gesture. While Popper insists that “geometric considerations are at the heart of 
the iterative hyperstructures and the abstract digital wall prints of French artist Pascal 
Dombis” (2007), Debailleux looks beyond what appears on the surface of these later works 
into a conceptual agenda regarding the subjective extension of logic and thought, stating that 
what Dombis seeks: 
is not optical or geometrical effects ; his art aims at showing, out of excess, how a given as simple as a line can 
engender multiversity: in other words, stretching the line to unleash the potentialities and complexity of the 
real. (Debailleux 2008b) 
                                                                    
8
 See http://dombis.com/works/post-digital-mirror/ for images and videos. 
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In this unleashing of the Real, we see the generative processes of the lenticular works as a 
mirror against which to view our own perspectival position, not only physically but cognitively 
as a challenge to the perpetual functioning of Virtuality. Buci-Glucksmann’s labelling of 
Dombis as a ‘post-virtual’ artist (2012) is thus understood not only in the sense of the media he 
employs – although it is certainly true that his use of the digital as a tool for confronting 
consciousness treads a critical path beyond merely the aesthetic use of technology – but in 
the direct Virtuality of consciousness. This reveals what Daniel Smith summarises as Deleuze’s 
problematic conception of the new, whereby “when the virtual is actualised, it differentiates 
itself, it produces the new” (Smith 2007, 17), which is “not simply a question to be addressed in 
a remote region of metaphysics, but rather the primary determination of Being itself” (Ibid., 
18). This is the problem of genesis underlying the existence of a subject, a problem that 
Dombis approaches in his challenge to the perpetual differentiation of algorithmic subjectivity 
as the Virtual separation from the chaos of the void onto a smooth shifting surface that 
deterritorialises the subject, the work and the gaze itself as a set of pure relations that bring 
what is understood as the work of art into being with the engaged spectator. 
This shifting of the subjective territory is expanded beyond abstract visual expressions 
into the symbolic realm in works such as the Eurasia (Google_Color) (2009-2013) series and the 
Eurasia (2012) exhibition in which elements of this were included, as well as SpamScape (2012) 
and other reinterpretations of works using images and text. Dombis applies his generative 
processes not only to abstract lines and curves, but also to fragments of text or images drawn 
from internet search engines on a specific theme. This process has been described as “an open 
fragment of enigmatic reality still to be deciphered in its symbolic ambivalence” (Amine 2011). 
When embedded in the shifting relations of subject, object and lenticular lens, these works 
enact a levelling of geometric and symbolic, visual and cognitive structures under the 
mediating frame of Virtual consciousness, forming the smooth surface of a complex reality 
that we call subject. This is an expression of what Tegmark labels the fourth level of the 
multiverse, in which “mathematical existence and physical existence are equivalent, so that all 
mathematical structures exist physically as well” (Tegmark in Carr 2007, 118), which is here 
the equivalence between Meaning and Existence that form the structures of the subject. This 
is the necessary mode of spectatorship for Dombis’ semantic works, in which Kay Heymer 
notes that “aspects of formal and inner perception blend together” (2012). The frame, 
whether it be geometric or semantic, must be challenged, and the lenticular parallax used 
frequently in Dombis’s work draws the engaged spectator into a confrontation with their own 
methods of perception in thinking the use of technology within both the gallery space and the 
space of our subjective reality. 
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2.4.3 TECHNOLOGICAL DISRUPTION 
It is this rethinking of our relation to technology that draws out the confrontation of thought 
as a mediator in Dombis’ work. He has said of his relationship with new technologies that they 
are “tools, and nothing else but tools” (Dombis in Debailleux 2008a, 37), that enable a 
challenge to traditional tools and cognitive processes in the creation of his work. This focus on 
process mirrors not only the functioning Virtuality of consciousness that Dombis confronts in 
his hyper-rational irrationality but also the notion that “contemporary physics essentially is a 
purely operationalist theory” (d’Espagnat 2011, 1714). It is the disruption by proliferation 
through which Dombis acts, reiterating the gaze onto simple objects fragmented across the 
surface of spectatorship. This is his relation to a parallax of technology: a simultaneous 
positing of too many views to comprehend that creates a rupture of lack within the gaze. 
Heymer says of Dombis’ lenticular works that “depending on the observer’s point of view it 
can generate different pictures and create a three-dimensional ever changing impression that 
prevents the perception of a complete form” (Heymer 2012), and it is this step beyond the 
simple visual parallax that draws digital technologies into a role of lack through excess. The 
BwO as complete surface becomes a lost object when we try to view and map it in its entirety. 
Consciousness is larger than its own gaze, and it is the failure of such a gaze that draws the 
engaged spectator into the ““phenomenology” of an absent reality” (Buci-Glucksmann 2009) 
that is created through Dombis’ works. This lack through excess is explored more thoroughly 
in What_Next? (2011),9 which uses images drawn from internet search engines to answer 
questions of our origins, purpose and future. These images are projected onto three screens 
on the ceiling of a church, played in series at aleatorically varying speeds, from slow fades that 
make visible the individual pictures to rapid flourishes that render the visual stimuli 
incomprehensible.  
Patrick Amine comments that instead of answering the questions posed, this 
“iconographic maelström finally appears as a phenomenological suspension of the world, as it 
does lead to the terminal formula: “Know Thyself”” (2011). Dombis’ semantic and iconic 
questioning amid a disruptive relation to parallax spectatorship through technology displays 
Bernard d’Espagnat’s confrontation with the dilemmas of contemporary physics concerned 
with operations rather than matter. Indeed, d’Espagnat points out that in quantum physics, 
matter is “a set of mere appearances to consciousness” (2011, 1715). This counters the 
materialist scientific imperative of the primacy of matter towards an emergence of 
                                                                    
9
 See http://dombis.com/works/what-next/ for video and images. 
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consciousness from appearance in a self-referential loop of Virtuality in the self-positing of the 
individual subject against a non-existent material reality. To resolve this, d’Espagnat claims, 
there is necessarily an inaccessible reality from which consciousness emerges to posit the 
accessible reality of matter and appearance, so that “consciousness emerges from something 
that lies beyond our intellectual grasp” (Ibid.) in the most absolute and necessary sense. This 
expresses within the limitations of a scientific framework what Rancière describes as the 
unrepresentable in art (2007) and Galloway expands to the digital (2011); what we have here 
insisted on as the inaccessible void of subjectivity from which consciousness emerges Virtually 
in self-positing an ‘objective’ (and objectified in the Real) reality. This reality is thus always lost 
beneath the appearances of the BwO, the void remains inaccessible from the surface of the 
subject. Dombis’s questioning of our existence and purpose thus offers a direct challenge to 
the smooth functioning of reason that obscures the conditions for subjectivity beneath the 
perpetual proliferation of a fragmented desire for function. 
The rupture in such a surface that is necessary to challenge our smooth functioning of 
consciousness and insert a contact with the Real, through which we might conceive a concept 
of the void, is brought into plain view in relation to contemporary technological and cognitive 
mediation in Dombis’ Crack (2010-13).10 Applying the use of internet image searches to the 
word ‘crack’, the results are here displayed split across two adjacent screens, each of which is 
on a vibrating motor with a randomly shifting speed that also controls the rate at which the 
images change on that particular screen. Between the two monitors a spatial parallax is 
formed by the splitting and vibration of the images and a temporal parallax is formed when 
the two displays change and vibrate at different rates. Within this parallax of mediation by 
technology a new critical space is allowed to emerge which “makes it possible for the viewer 
to immerse himself or herself in the cracks of our time” (Dombis 2013). This work exemplifies a 
critical approach to constructing a challenge to the self-mediation of the emergence of 
consciousness from that which is necessarily inaccessible to consciousness (a world from 
consciousness from the void), leaving an open question as to what lies between the cracks of 
our society. What is presupposed as a mind-independent reality is the flux of the void and, 
through the use of Virtual processes taken again here to the extreme in rendering the 
information incomprehensible by representation, it is possible in these works to create a 
space in which the relation of the subject to what lies beneath can be staged. The reality of 
this space between the cracks is, like a quantum vacuum, “by no means a simple empty space 
where nothing ever happens” (Lambrecht in Figger, Meschede and Zimmermann 2002, 197), 
                                                                    
10
 See http://dombis.com/works/crack/ for video. 
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but rather a space of the genesis of subjectivity. The parallax of consciousness that must be 
sought in these disruptions of self-mediating Virtuality is thus between the two stages of the 
creation of the subject: the first stage Žižek describes as the process through which 
“embodied reality is the result of the “actualization” of pure eventlike virtualities” (2012, 22), 
and the second he describes as the moment in which “the emergence of thought and sense 
signals the moment when the constituted reality, as it were, reconnects with its virtual 
genesis.” (Ibid., 23). What works like Crack create, through literal visual and technological 
parallax, is a rupture between these two stages in which the Virtuality of the creation of the 
subject can be made clear, a confrontation with the inaccessible void can be staged, and a 
new perception can emerge of our own engaged spectatorship in subjective reality. The 
project of Dombis, as with Baecker or Bolognini, is to use technology to render visible that 
which is unrepresentable, not by creating images of such inaccessible notions, for such a 
gesture would remain empty of critical content regarding the void, but rather by creating 
disruptions in the smooth functioning of our self-mediated perceptions through which we 
might catch a glimpse of the parallax position of our Virtual consciousness. 
 
Fig.17 Crack (2012) © Pascal Dombis 
The two screens are mounted on servos that move at randomly different rates, controlling the disjointed 
progression of images across the crack between the two interfaces. 
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2.5 INACCESSIBILITY 
 
Before concluding this chapter, the persisting problem of attempting to understand and 
represent the void must be confronted. Rancière’s failure of representation (2007) remains, 
and artistic gestures relating directly to the void only further the notion of its 
unrepresentability. The Void collection of works by Polish digital art collective Goverdose 2.0 
(2012-2013) shows this dilemma of expression, as each individual artist or image seeks to 
represent the concept only through a specific framework, whether spatial (including 
cosmology and biology) or conceptual (including technology and semantics). These works 
largely enter only one side of the debate, focusing on an individual internal or external void, 
rather than bringing into our awareness new and challenging notions of the void as such. All 
that emerges from these symbolic works is a representation of the desire-for-representation. 
Only Trisme Trs’ Avoid, Void Archipelago and Interdimensional Void make steps in directly 
confronting the unrepresentable nature of the void, placing a human figure or the words 
‘avoid’ and ‘void’ (with the ‘i’ styled as a key) against ethereal spaces. This highlights the 
symbolic distance of human perception and language from the void, suggesting an alternative 
space of representation (and, by extension, cognition) in which to confront the void. 
 
Fig.18 Void Archipelago (2012) © Trisme Trs 
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John Smythies draws from string theory such an alternative notion of the place of the 
subject in the universe, positing “three fundamental entities – space-time, matter and 
consciousness” (2003, 47). Here the subject, as the construction of the void beneath the forces 
of functioning consciousness, emerges as “a new space in addition to all currently postulated 
physical space-times…a brane of its own” (Ibid., 52). What Smythies is suggesting is an extra 
dimension to our understanding of the universe, with the implication that the membrane of 
consciousness is an abstract surface beyond our comprehension of space and time. As 
Smythies describes, “consciousness may be in the brane not in the brain” (Ibid.), that is, held 
across an epistemological void by our inability to comprehend our construction as a multi-
dimensional hyperspace, drawn from Andrei Linde’s conception of consciousness as an 
abstract and inaccessible part of physical reality (1990). The role of art must then be to 
represent not the void itself, but the relations and structures of this hyperspace of the subject 
that allow the void to emerge through its absence in our view of the work, for example in the 
simple addition of the word ‘void’ in Trs’s work that points out the absence of a true void in the 
image while implying a consideration of its relation to the visual space beyond representation. 
This expresses François Cheung’s conception of the void as a “nodal point where potentiality 
and becoming interweave, in which deficiency and plenitude, self-sameness and otherness, 
meet” (Cheung 51), which is here the originary parallax position of lack and excess from which 
the BwOwB of the subject can emerge. 
The impossibility of accurately representing the void is thus an integral element of the 
construction of consciousness. Beyond our modes of perception in the position of parallax, is 
it then possible to alter our perception in such a way as to make visible to consciousness the 
void of its own subjectivity? Buci-Glucksmann tells us, in analysing the work of Dombis, that 
“with the virtual, you may work on the complex and original forms of humanity, as well as 
exercising a temporal and increasingly global mode of art” (Buci-Glucksmann 2009). Between 
the dimensions upon which the work acts – individual or social, local or global, physical or 
digital, material or cognitive – we can open a space for critical perception of the emergence of 
consciousness and the creation of subjectivity. As was discussed in Chapter 1, the self-
mediation of consciousness is what must be disrupted, to insert a rupture of perception within 
the Virtual surface of the BwO towards the Real as the objectification of the void. By bringing 
into artistic representation the failure of representing the void, and the Real as merely a lost 
fragment of it, we can create a space in which the implication of the true void of subjectivity 
can emerge even in its explicit absence. Carl Jung tells us that “the artist’s life cannot be 
otherwise than full of conflict” (2001, 173), and this inherent relation to antagonism is seen in 
the parallax of consciousness and the void. Žižek states that the artist of parallax is one who 
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shows both sides of the argument at once, necessitating an act of “self-destruction, which is 
itself a symbolic statement, the only work of art available” (Žižek 2009b, 128). Pursuing a 
creative parallax gesture that makes contact with the void of subjectivity requires the 
symbolic destruction of the structures of consciousness. Critical digital culture must exploit 
potential remediations of technology in order to reveal the self-mediating forces of 
consciousness, challenging the relations between the Virtual and the Real and the structures 
of such self-mediation that block the void from its representation and comprehension by 
consciousness. 
If the inaccessibility of the void is an integral part of the construction of consciousness, 
we must question the need to dissemble the Virtual structures and attempt to make contact 
with the necessarily unknowable. If the unrepresentable is a necessary condition of 
representation, then it is possible that we must accept the void as being beyond our 
comprehension. However, the culturally unrepresentable only appears at the discovery of the 
limits of representation, which are being ever furthered into new areas of creative 
apprehension. Blackhawk notes Dombis’s staging of “impossible figures somewhere between 
what the human eye can see, the human mind can encompass, and that oft-regarded, 
evanescent suggestion of infinity” (2003), suggesting a specific negotiation of these 
boundaries – what we have called the surface of the subject – and into the realm beyond 
consciousness. Deleuze and Guattari state that “creation is the aesthetic varieties or scientific 
variables that emerge on a plane that is able to crosscut chaotic variability” (1994, 207), which 
is to say that artistic practice, in confronting the limits of consciousness, inserts a movement 
across the void through contact with the Real. Between these structures of consciousness and 
the chaotic flux of the void is the region our culture must navigate. Indeed, Buci-Glucksmann 
has pointed out that “contemporary art has never ceased to waver between monumental 
“archaeological” art and an art of the ungraspable and the ephemeral” (Buci-Glucksmann 
2009). Between the edifice of Virtual structures and the unattainable void of the Real is the 
location of the intervention within consciousness by contemporary art. If contemporary art is 
also post-conceptual art, that which “articulates a post-aesthetic poetics” (Osborne 2010), 
then applying this to the subject necessitates an articulation of a post-subjective expression. 
Critical culture necessitates a disruption of the structures of consciousness, in a reorganisation 
that brings into view the subject’s position. While the parallax of the void remains inaccessible 
to the human subject, a post(human)-subject enables a view of the self that includes the 
position of parallax and an understanding of the void. 
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2.6 CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter delineates the problems in confronting the void of subjectivity. Žižek’s 
conception of the void as the unrepresentable point of reference for parallax is read alongside 
Rancière’s understanding of the necessity of an unrepresentable element as the condition for 
representation to occur. The function of the Real, the objectification of the void as part of the 
assemblage of the subject, is therefore a necessary blind spot in our understanding of 
consciousness. This is expanded through the Deleuzian BwO by placing the body, seen here as 
the Virtual in the surface assemblage of consciousness, itself as a lost object to 
representation. We can never fully apprehend the functioning of the subject – there is a 
necessarily unrepresentable stain on any hyper-cartographies of physical, digital and Virtual 
spaces – and this Virtual assemblage thus appears as a BwOwB. The shift in cultural 
conceptions of reality and the increasing tendency in creative practices away from 
representation of fixed subject towards a functional representation of the processes by which 
subjects and realities form, leads the discussion to the underlying unknowable nature of 
reality itself. The void as it appears in quantum physics provides an array of perspectives 
attempting to draw this unrepresentability into consciousness, through the forces at work in 
even a vacuum state and the many unobservable particles that are necessary for the universe 
to form. These differing conceptions, when brought together, offer a series of parallax 
perspectives that inform our view from physical and digital modes of consciousness in 
approaching the void of the subject. The decentred subject has therefore been reconsidered 
as desubstantialised, a ‘nowhere’ of the subjective assemblage as pure function, expressed in 
relation to code, abstraction and digital machinic processes in Dombis’s work dealing 
explicitly with the inherent irrationality at the heart of reason within the formation of the 
world and a critically engaged cyborg subjectivity. The discussion has drawn these threads 
together under Rancière’s notion of the unrepresentable to negotiate the relation between 
the Virtual formation of the subject (itself a lost process to its own understanding) around the 
presupposed Real (as an objectification of the subject’s inaccessible core). The following 
chapter furthers this investigation into the Real of specific physical and digital worlds in the 
form of the body and its digital representation as a lost object within the Virtual assemblage 
of cyborg consciousness. 
  
 94 
 
 
 95 
 
3 THE ABSENT SUBJECT 
OBJET A-VATAR IN CYBERWORLDS 
 
Extending the discussion of the void of subjectivity, this chapter focuses on the displacement 
of the void in the Real in relation to the antagonism between physical and digital worlds. The 
inherent loss of the subject in the Virtual functioning of consciousness is expanded into the 
privileged position of the physical within the structures of the subject: the persistence of the 
human over the cyborg. This hold of the physical is challenged, drawing the Real into the loss 
of substance in contemporary society and subjectivity. The body is confronted as the 
manifestation of this problem, the phenomenal perspective on the physical world lost amid 
the cyborg development of consciousness in the ever-expanding digital world. This leads to a 
critique of the nostalgia arising from the prevailing view of the physical body as primary. 
Žižek’s brief dismissal of the privileged role of the body is expanded through his use of the 
Lacanian objet a to suggest a loss of subjectivity inherent in embodiment, placing the body 
itself as a lost object desubstantialised between presence and absence within consciousness 
as it constructs the parallax perspective of the cyborg subject.  
An argument for disembodiment is therefore staged, using the digital avatar to 
interrogate the relation of the subject to its body, offering a flexible and iterative array of 
representations of our perspectival position in its engagement with alternative spaces. The 
conventions of avatar mediation are analysed in the prevailing anthropocentrism against 
disembodied subjects moving between bodies at will. Deleuze’s concept of difference is 
applied to the Virtual manifestation of an identified subject, beneath which the structure of 
faciality allows for a confrontation with the persistent Real of what is lost from the subject in 
its repetition between physical and digital embodiments. The problems of substance inherent 
in quantum physics, particularly Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, allows for a discussion of 
the role of the observer as a shifting embodiment expressed in the use of avatar-mediation 
constructing alternative modes of engagement and representation. Second Life (SL) provides 
a case study as a space in which artistic interventions challenge the familiar anthropic 
representations of avatar-mediation, extended into object, expression and interface of the 
subject in the digital world. This structure of reconceiving digital embodiment reasserts the 
physical body as lost object and suggests, through the desire caused by such an objet a, the 
function of the body as a Virtuality; returning to Žižek  and Lacan for the notion of the big 
Other, applied to embodiment in the desire for engagement with a world. 
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3.1 DISEMBODIMENT 
 
The conflation of the digital avatar with an attempted representation or replacement of the 
human physical form derives from a confusion of the ‘natural’ approach to our relation to the 
physical body itself. Although it is difficult to escape what Žižek labels the “imbecilic inertia of 
material reality” (2012, 127), we must broaden our scope of the ‘avatar’ towards a genuinely 
digital understanding of the term and its relation to consciousness and subjectivity. The 
starting point for such a shift is to acknowledge Žižek‘s opposition to Merleau-Ponty’s claim of 
the body as “our general medium for having a world” (2002, 146), an oft quoted trope in 
scholarship concerning the body and the digital, that “I never “am” my body” (Žižek 2009b, 
227). While it is useful to consider Merleau-Ponty’s division of the objective and phenomenal 
body (2002, 121f), along with his acknowledgement of their complex interlinked nature (Ibid., 
121-2n), the bridge across the Cartesian mind-body split he employs is not readily transferred 
to the digital realm without the anthropic conflation from which we must digress. There is a 
‘suspension of disbelief’, a common dilemma for the creation of convincing digital modes of 
embodiment, already at work in this conception of physical body. The separation of objective 
and phenomenal body relies on a subjective divide of familiarity and interface, whereas we 
might very well describe touch typing or a well-used game controller as being “potentialities 
already mobilized by the perception of [the object to be acted upon]” rather than “objects to 
be discovered in objective space” (Ibid., 121). Just as young children and adolescents learn and 
relearn to negotiate their changing biological frame, so too does the digital subject familiarise 
themselves with their computer interface, to the extent that the medium itself takes on, to 
consciousness, a level of phenomenal transparency commensurate with Merleau-Ponty’s 
conception of the body. We might thus use Negroponte’s rejection of McLuhan’s famous 
maxim, when he writes: “the medium is not the message in a digital world. It is an 
embodiment of it” (Negroponte 1996, 71), to expand the word ‘avatar’ to a definition between 
the Hindu myth and its common reappropriation in digital culture, as “a visible manifestation 
or embodiment of an abstract concept; archetype” (Collins English Dictionary 2013). Here the 
subject itself constitutes the abstract concept, in the virtuality of self-posited consciousness, 
and is represented in both physical and digital worlds by a collection of data (nucleobases or 
bits) according to certain archetypes of what is recognised as ‘human’. There is an obvious link 
here to Jungian archetypes (another word rooted in deific manifestation), described as the 
universal “contents of the collective unconscious” (Jung 1968, 4). It is perhaps not surprising 
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that the avatar has such firm links to anthropocentric embodiment, yet the Jungian construct 
that defines the Reality of the subject supports a broadening of an anti-anthropic 
embodiment in abstract, oneiric and super-natural forms. 
This expanding of the embodied form reveals the notion of form itself as an 
objectification of the unattainable. If we never ‘are’ the representation of ourselves, the body 
we occupy always lacks an element of genuine subjectivity, a filling in of the object with the 
void of consciousness. This lack places the body indeed as objective, but as the objet a that 
constitutes the ‘in me more than myself’ as a cognitive externalisation of archetypal, 
unconscious impulses. The objective body, however, is supported by the constructs of fantasy 
into a form of transference that places it in lieu of the phenomenal body. This interaction, 
between bodily objet a and illusory framework of phenomenal connections with 
consciousness, brings to light the same processes in any ‘bodily form’, where even the fleshy 
mortal frame we inhabit in the physical world only ever takes on the role of the phenomenal 
body through fantasy and transference. Physical and digital bodies thus share the same self-
posited illusion, their only difference lying within the fundamental formation of the subjective 
relation to such bodies within consciousness. This is the heart of the physical-digital parallax 
even at the level of embodiment. The minimal difference in the perspective of consciousness 
within its avatar demonstrates the manner in which “the position of enunciation already 
influences and informs what comes to be enunciated” (Gunkel 2010, 139). This position of 
enunciation is also a position of embodiment. Consciousness itself remains always 
disembodied, acting in relation to its physical or digital manifestations as a lost object, 
expressing its excessive ‘in it more than itself’ according to the particular parallax of the 
individual participation with a given world within subjective reality. 
3.1.1 THE STAIN IN MY GAZE 
The very term ‘avatar’ could be considered an objet a, a lack and excess, in its relation to our 
gaze and engagement with digital realms. Filled with data, the excessive flow of information 
through the avatar into Virtual Existence is more than our view of the representation makes 
visible. What is viewed through the interface screen as our inclusion within a given digital 
realm necessarily contains the gesture of parallax within perception. Žižek writes that “the 
subject’s gaze is always-already inscribed into the perceived object itself, in the guise of its 
‘blind spot’, that which is ‘in the object more than the object itself’, the point from which the 
object itself returns the gaze” (2009b, 17). Applied directly and literally to avatar-mediated 
environments, this supports the notion that “the reality I see is never ‘whole’ – not because a 
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large part of it eludes me, but because it contains a stain, a blind spot, which indicates my 
inclusion in it” (Ibid.). The rendering of Real-Meaning, as ‘excessive’ data, into a specific 
embodiment of Virtual-Existence, as ‘lacking’ gaze, only creates a digital presence insofar as 
the subject is engaged with what Lacan identifies as a  “rupture, split, the stroke of the 
opening makes absence emerge” (1977, 26). Beholding the stain of self-representation as an 
avatar within its own gaze, the digital subject emerges through absence, negating the digital 
equivalent to the physical illusion of embodied presence. Such an engaged position 
demonstrates that “‘subject’ is the name for a crack in the edifice of being” (Žižek 2012, 41); 
an emergent formation of absence. 
This mark in the edifice of the computer screen has been expanded in recent research, 
to encompass a broader scheme of engagement. David Hill’s thesis expands upon the work of 
Gunkel (2010, 128-9) to separate four ‘standard’ definitions or expressions that qualify under 
the notion of ‘avatar’: “animated avatar [e.g. Second Life], web-cam avatar [e.g. Skype], 
profile avatar [e.g. Facebook], and portrait avatar [e.g. Twitter (image plus 140 character 
caption)]” (Hill 2011, 50). By applying the emergent absence of the Lacanian gaze to each of 
these manifestations of the digital subject as a simultaneous lack, of being, and excess, of 
data, it is possible to extend the Žižekian notion of consciousness as always-already false: “the 
avatars that are encountered within the virtual world are not the representatives and 
delegates of some independent and pre-existing real thing. The order of precedence must be 
reversed” (Gunkel 2010, 136). This emergent simultaneity of subjectivity between physical and 
digital worlds upturns the conventional relation of humans to their ‘real’ physical body. Philip 
K. Dick, an author well-established in confronting issues of fleshy human authenticity, 
predicted: “Fake realities will create fake humans. Or, fake humans will generate fake realities 
and then sell them to other humans, turning them, eventually, into forgeries of themselves” 
(Dick in Dick and Sutin 1996, 263-264). However, Žižek insists that reality “always-already was 
virtual” (2007, 193), becoming here ‘humanity always-already was a forgery of itself’. That is, 
whether in a computer simulation or physical universe, the authentic gaze, the primal 
existence, is merely presupposed in the Virtuality of an always-already false consciousness. 
Moving the discussion of avatar-mediated environments beyond the limits of a flesh-
memory that constrains digital interaction to the merely representational necessitates a shift 
away from an absence or presence of the body towards the presence-of-absence of 
consciousness and its gaze. The spectre of early avatar-mediation from 1990s digital art 
persists in contemporary practice, and those who manage to progress beyond such a, now 
historical, approach seldom garner the theoretical implications of this move. While Moser’s 
volume on the 1992 Art and Virtual Environment Project at Banff has set the tone for critical 
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discussions of avatars, the analytical texts reside firmly within the cage of physicality. 
Emphasising “the crucial role that the body plays in constructing cyberspace” (Hayles in Moser 
1996, 1) and the notion that “we are embodied creatures” (Ibid., 3), and insisting that “the 
psyche clings to the memory that this space is a representation, that is, it clings to a memory 
of the real body and its formulation in physical space” (Tenhaaf in Moser 1996, 60), the work is 
rooted in traditional hierarchies of ‘reality’, yet forms an important historical foundation for 
theories of avatar-mediation that embrace the role of artists within the development of 
technology. 
Hayles, Hansen and Ihde11 have all furthered this focus on embodiment, discussing 
“themes of virtual bodies in relation to lived bodies” (Ihde 2002, 3) in which “the ultimate goal 
of virtual embodiment is to become the perfect simulacrum of full, multisensory bodily 
action” (Ibid., 7). While situating knowledge attempts to take into account the position from 
which physical-digital epistemology emerges, placing it firmly within the physical body 
reduces the analysis of the cyborg subject to prosthetic embodiment. This approach fails to 
fully take into account the system of extension (of consciousness) already at work in the 
physical body, thus missing the basic tenet of second-order cybernetics: the analysis of the 
observer as part of the system. This should not be a return to physical embodiment, but rather 
the theoretical juncture at which a parallax conception of the cyborg is needed to confront the 
system of consciousness as it moves between physical and digital worlds. Through the 
Žižekian model of parallax subjectivity, applied directly to avatar-mediated spaces, such fears 
of a “community of shattered egos”, where Virtual-Existence “teaches us to dislocate our 
proper place” (Ronell in Moser 1996, 126) must be transformed into a discussion of two 
worlds, equally Virtual, in which the engagement of consciousness through the self-directed 
gaze allows for a progress in artistic conceptions of digital presence. It is necessary to first 
‘disembody’ our view of engaged consciousness to avoid constant attempts to construct the 
illusion of presence, and instead embrace the potential for an expressive absence, what Ascott 
hails in SL as the “power to provide for a release of the self, release from the self…our ability 
to be many selves” (2008, 204). This recognises the many possibilities of embodiment while 
focusing on the disembodied subject between and outside itselves. If the avatar as objet a is 
always-already lost, then we must not view disembodiment in the shift from physical to digital 
worlds as a ‘presence followed by absence’ but, rather, as the simultaneous potentiality 
available to expression within a ‘presence of absence’, a reconception of the process by which 
consciousness experiences embodiment in and between any given world(s). 
                                                                    
11
 See Introduction: The cyborg reconsidered. 
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3.2 EXPRESSING DIFFERENCE WITHIN THE SUBJECT 
 
3.2.1 THINKING CONSTRUCTING THE SUBJECT: ME, ISELF AND EYE 
Lacan identifies within the construction of the self, beyond the “pre-existence of a gaze” 
(1977, 72) – the always-already seen – a severed construct of “the eye and the gaze… the split 
in which the drive is manifested at the level of the scopic field” (Ibid., 73). This inherent split, of 
the self in the gaze, also always incorporates Žižek’s parallax stain, “marking the pre-existence 
to the seen of a given-to-be-seen” (Ibid., 74). The gaze itself, and its conditions, are thus a 
necessary presupposition of the subjective construction of any ‘self’. Similarly, within thought 
it is possible to separate the ‘I’ that thinks and the ‘I’ that thinks it thinks: 
Even if thinking seems to exist in the moment the thought is thought, this does not necessarily mean that any 
‘I’ has to exist. It merely means that something at that same moment thinks ‘I’ and possibly has an ulterior 
motive in doing so. (Bard and Söderqvist 2012, 525) 
This illusion of the cogito is bound into the process of perception from the parallax position in 
the void-core of subjectivity. Merleau-Ponty’s formulation of consciousness within a body is 
thus founded on an erroneous assumption of the nature of thought bound into perception 
with the illusion of an existing body. The formulation must therefore be expanded to include 
an ‘I’ that perceives (/thinks), an ‘I’ that thinks it perceives (/thinks) and an ‘I’ that is in the 
perception (/thought) itself. There is only consciousness, separated from its body and its 
perspective, as a pure function positing itself as the bridge between worlds. The construction 
of this ‘I’ is inextricably linked to its position as the gaze in an engaged act of perception, the 
moment in which “I emerge as eye” (Lacan 1977, 82). The self as the stain in the gaze emerges 
concurrently with the self from which the gaze occurs and the self that cognises the position 
of the gaze. 
Thus the inclusion within the gaze of the subject, the subject beholding itself as object, 
is the process by which subjectivity is brought into an individuated self. What underpins this 
construction, however, is the Real beneath the gaze, the presupposed conditions, the raw 
sense and nonsense of the expression that posits the subject. This quasi-causal force of the 
perpetual circular drive that constitutes the objet a is a mode of repetition. Lacan asserts that 
“repetition demands the new”...“whatever, in repetition, is varied, modulated, is merely 
alienation of its meaning” (Ibid., 61), and it is this eternal modulation that both allows for a 
differentiated self to form and insists on the absence of such a self from the internal workings 
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of pure consciousness. This circling drive underpinning expression captures the complexities 
of Deleuzian repetition: 
Repetition in the eternal return never means continuation, perpetuation or prolongation, nor even the 
discontinuous return of something which would at least be able to be prolonged in a partial cycle (an identity, 
an I, a Self) but, on the contrary, the reprise of pre-individual singularities which, in order that it can be grasped 
as repetition, presupposes the dissolution of all prior identities. (Deleuze 2004a, 252) 
This constant recreation of the singularity from which identities and selves spring is the 
parallax void of subjectivity. Each fleeting moment of Existence requires a new expression of 
the Real, whereby the self does not change over time, but repeatedly acquires a new 
expression.  The Virtual function of consciousness is the means by which this Real repetition is 
differentiated into the concept of an individual identity. As Deleuze writes, “life as movement 
alienates itself in the material form that it creates” (1988, 104). The infinite line of desire in the 
Virtual removes itself from the circular Real of repetition from which it is made manifest. 
In applying this process of repetition in the void leading to an expression and 
differentiation through the shell of consciousness to avatar-mediated worlds, we start from 
the familiar position whereby “a PC [Player Character] in a VGW [Virtual Game World] can be 
seen as a combination of a person playing a game and a fictive person whose identity is 
continuously developed” (Eladhari 2010, 6). However, this continuous development must be 
extended beyond SL and other non-game virtual worlds, where avatars exist as a becoming 
between the user and their fictional representation, and into the construction of the digital 
subject itself. This is not merely a fictional character set in a specific simulated fictional 
environment, for such could be said of the cognitive processes applied in diverse cultural 
forms (first-person novels; tabletop role-playing games; cosplay). This level of identity is 
created between the ‘physical’ user and their entire gamut of ‘digital’ identities. This includes 
the array of ‘alts’ (alternative avatars) subjects might employ for specific roles, spaces or 
interactions, like the different personal or professional identities of everyday physical humans. 
This raises a complex interaction of selves within the cultural setting of avatar-mediated 
environments. For example, the artist Kristine Schomaker, creator of the 1000+ Avatars 
(2010-12) collection of (anthropocentric) avatar portraits, reveals an awareness of the tension 
between physical and digital selves in an interview between her physical self and her avatar, 
Gracie Kendal, as part of the My Life as an Avatar (2010-12) project: 
Kris Schomaker: Who are you? 
Gracie Kendal: I am your inner conscious, your alter ego, your self portrait, your avatar, your art… I am you. 
… 
GK: So, who are you? 
KS: I am me. I am you. So, why are we here? Oh yea, I remember. I am using you to confront my imperfections 
and insecurities. 
GK: Yea, well here’s the thing. I don’t like how you’re ‘using’ me (Kendal and Schomaker in Trapdoor 2010) 
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Despite Schomaker’s fixed view of avatars as ‘projections’ of identity linked to the ‘real’ user, 
her project displays an awareness of using avatars merely as psychoanalytical tools for 
physical ‘persons’. However, in this moment of the interview, the avatar itself appears to 
undermine the physical user’s need for transference, resisting its designated role as 
therapeutic apparatus in dealing with the desires and fears of its fleshy counterpart. What this 
interview in fact reveals, alongside the inclusion of many anti-anthropic avatars in the 
portraits project despite Schomaker’s own anthropocentrism, is the drive of the unconscious 
in defining expression between all manifestations of the self. The similarities between the 
artist and her avatar, along with the many visual ‘improvements’ made on the avatar’s hair, 
clothes and figure, is less an example of difference in avatar-mediated identity or of a unifying 
identity that  seeks to overcome its imperfections, than a demonstration of the quasi-causal 
lack central to the subject and the construction of its subjective reality. Any culture of avatar-
mediation based merely on the freedom of image in improving the physical form becomes 
caught in the Virtualising functions of identity, rather than the underlying sense of repetition 
that bursts forth in moments between the various differentiated embodiments of a 
multifaceted ‘self’. 
Each element of identity is constructed and performed by the subject while it uses that 
specific body to engage with a specific world. This does not rely on an externally consistent 
set of identities, for as Mirjam Eladhari points out, “players are the ones who carry out both 
the characterisation of and the expression of the true characters of their avatar/PC/persona in 
a VGW [Virtual Game World]” (2010, 53). To this must be added the construction and 
maintenance of any identity by the subject in any given world. The role of the subject beneath 
each of these surfaces of identity is the process of repetition that Deleuze describes as an 
“emission of singularities, always with an echo or resonance which makes each the double of 
the other, or each constellation the redistribution of another” (2004a, 251). The subject 
releases a part of themselves into the singular identity, embedded in a specific world, but in 
the process the ‘echo’ of the underlying subjectivity is lost, forming the lack inherent to the 
BwOwB. The identity appearing as a complete unit is itself a mere fragment, a partial, lost 
object, an objet a, in relation to the whole subject as the absent centre of its own parallax 
reality.  Here the subject as gap between physical and digital worlds is the eternally becoming 
interaction between the various parts: an assemblage between each fragmented aspect of 
differentiation around the subjective void of repetition. It is not identity but lack that is 
repeated, for the void forms an infinite circle of nothing amidst the perpetual function of the 
surfaces of consciousness. 
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3.2.2 ONE AND ZERO AS TWO INFINITIES 
The repetition of the void at the core of the subject and the pure difference that constructs 
consciousness around such a core initially appear as what Deleuze describes as monad and 
body respectively: 
Monads are each or every one for itself, while bodies are one, some, or any … Monads are distributive units that 
follow a relation of part and whole, while bodies are collectives – flocks or aggregates – that follow a relation of 
the-ones-to-the-others … each monad expresses the sum of the world, and...a body receives the impression of 
‘all’ the others up to infinity (Deleuze 2006b, 114) 
There is here a convergence of two infinities. To Deleuze these are two dimensions of 
expression and impression. However, when applied to the dimensions of Deleuzian time, as 
seen in the functions of consciousness: the infinity of expression is repetition, as the circular 
drive of the present in the void of the Real, and the infinity of impression is difference, as the 
line of desire through past and future in the functioning of the Virtual. If the level of the one is 
the function-function of consciousness, then in the void-function we see Lacan’s statement 
that “zero is the presence of the subject who, at that level, totalizes” (1977, 226). That is, the 
genuinely subjective presence is at the level of the infinite zero: a presence of void, an 
inherent absence. This is brought into an embodied presence only in the intersection between 
the two infinities. Žižek identifies, in the unity of the one and the zero, “the singular universal 
that marks the minimal difference” (2012, 92) between presence and absence within the 
subject itself. These two infinities do not differ in number, just as the binary 1 and 0 of digital 
logic do not rest on fixed values but the act of perceptual difference itself.12 This lies beyond 
any failing quantification of infinities, for “we do not have units (unités) of measure, only 
multiplicities or varieties of measurement” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 8). The emergence of 
difference out of the repetition of the subject, its two infinities, is an evental process.  
Alain Badiou criticises Deleuze’s conception of the one as it relates to the event: 
situated as time for Deleuze – the unity of infinite past and future that is never the present – 
and as site for Badiou – multiple acts of a de-unifying evental principle. According to Badiou, 
“Deleuze poses the One as ontological condition (chaos, the One-All, Life) and as evental 
result. In contrast, I [Badiou] claim that the One ontologically in-exists (the multiple is 
‘without-one’)” (Badiou 2007, 40). However, within Žižek’s Lacanian interpretation of the One 
as repetition in Deleuze, it is possible to reassert the ontological condition of Life as the 
externality of consciousness, while embracing in-existence in the internality of the subject-as-
                                                                    
12
 The ‘material’ difference of binary data can formed between any two numbers, commonly two non-
zero voltages, but it is the logical difference, the absolute of 1 and 0 in thought, that constructs the 
symbolic foundations of digital reality. 
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void. The function-function of consciousness is precisely the infinite line of one that 
perpetuates such consciousness itself, and as such is also the presupposition of a one, of life 
that it seeks to extend in both directions of history. By contrast, the void-function of 
consciousness is the infinite circle of zero that constitutes the death drive underpinning the 
void of subjectivity, acting as lost cause of subjective presence. The intersection of infinite one 
and zero, the extension of binary through endless history and eternal present, through life and 
death, through externality and internality, thus reaches beyond a mere dualism to Žižek’s 
minimal difference, which is “the noncoincidence of the one with itself” (2009b, 11) and “on 
account of which an individual is never fully him/herself, but always only “resembles 
him/herself”” (Ibid., 44). It is for this reason that an avatar never is the subject, just as the 
physical body never is the subject, and a genuinely creative and expressive avatar should be a 
contact point of difference between the infinite one and the infinite zero. 
Within a computer gaming setting, particularly the ever-increasing variety of 
MMORPGs (massively multiplayer online role-playing games), the avatar takes on the role of 
an expression of history, the relentless line of the infinite one. As the player character 
increases in level (through ‘earning’ experience) and obtains items (particularly the more 
unique items gained through completing difficult quests) the avatar’s appearance progresses 
from the standard starting image. This is a historical economy of representation: the more 
advanced the character, the more customisable and impressive the avatar’s appearance. Such 
an avatar thus takes on a semantic record of the character’s history and celebrates the user’s 
actions, creating a new code of signifiers to the game’s cognoscenti (particularly other 
characters of the same ‘tier’ or higher). However, this also has the effect of reducing the 
avatar to a meritocratic expression, in the same manner as the economy of ‘lives’, and 
introduces a more elitist and controlled aesthetic along alienated ‘career paths’ rather than 
the freer, more creative tools available in non-game virtual worlds such as SL that promote 
user-generated content over a defined visual lexicon of achievement-based signifiers.  
This problem parallels what Deleuze and Guattari describe as faciality, a system of 
white wall and black holes (characteristically the face and eyes) constructed at the 
intersection of signification and subjectification: “signification is never without a white wall on 
which it inscribes its signs…subjectification is never without a black hole in which it lodges its 
consciousness” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, 186). This territorialised structure that Deleuze 
and Guattari label the abstract machine of the face is the inscribing of the black hole of the 
eyes into the white wall of identity, what has been described in this thesis as the void of the 
subjective position in the surface of functioning consciousness and its identification. To 
overcome these structures that shape the formation of a subject in contemporary 
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informational society, abstracted as surfaces ruptured by the absent position of the gaze, we 
must avoid the nostalgia of a return or regression to a primitive pre-facial state and instead 
perform a deterritorialisation or defacialisation through a critical use of the face, towards a 
probe-head of creative flight (Ibid., 208-210). The anthropocentrism that plagues avatar-
mediation extends beyond the visual and figurative into the construction of the face within 
consciousness across physical and digital worlds. The signifying structures of faciality in the 
game-based personal history approach to digital embodiment constantly reterritorialises the 
avatar on the infinite one of the surface of Virtuality and the strata of history, displaying 
quests completed and directing the future of the character through career path limitations on 
weapons/armour availability and manner of attire. In this fusion of abstract data and 
anthropocentric image the infinite zero – the void of subjectivity and the black hole of the face 
– is lost in overly ‘present’ presence, whereby the absence of the subject is constantly deferred 
into the line of history. It is this characteristic of the gaming avatar that limits the creative 
expression of the subject, no matter how many varieties of ‘+1 Mace’ one may own. 
3.2.3 THEATRE OF SUPERPOSITION 
We might view the arena of collision, where infinite 1 and 0, physical and digital self, 
consciousness and the unconscious meet, as Deleuze’s theatre of repetition: 
In the theatre of repetition, we experience pure forces, dynamic lines in space which act without intermediary 
upon the spirit, and link it directly with nature and history, with a language which speaks before words, with 
gestures which develop before organised bodies, with masks before faces, with spectres and phantoms before 
characters – the whole apparatus of repetition as a “terrible power” (Deleuze 2004a, 12) 
This theatre is the space of the subjective Real, the void-function of consciousness. This place, 
where the void beyond conscious thought is made manifest, is a non-place that underpins our 
engagement with both physical and digital worlds, a space of pure repetition, of circular 
becoming, from which the pre-subjective emerges into specific differentiated expressions of 
the individual. We are thus living always in superposition with ourselves, placing specific 
worlds over our internal realm of expression, our uncontrollable ‘meta-self’. This core of the 
subject is made manifest through the lines of desire in the Virtual, the abstracting processes 
of consciousness creating a quasi-mathematical structure, what Tegmark labels “abstract 
entities with relations between them” (2007b, 102), formed of reason and of thought. Bohm’s 
conception of thought as partial (1994, 61) and participatory (Ibid., 5) gives the superposition 
of infinities a functional role of negotiating embodiment as an external objet a of the subject. 
This is an innate step towards the cyborg subject as a technological posthuman (although 
perhaps, here and more generally, a cognitive superhuman), which seeks to create what Nick 
Bostrom and Anders Sandberg conceive as “intimate links between the external systems and 
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the human user through better interaction…less an external tool and more of a mediating 
“exoself”…embedding the human within an augmenting “shell” such as…virtual reality” 
(2009, 320). Yet this state of superposition is not merely applicable in a digital environment, 
for the same Virtuality is present in the physical world. The embodiment of the subjective void 
is always a ‘shell’ of augmentation, be it a sensory or abstract construct, allowing for 
interaction with a world through the ‘collapse’ of the mediated subject into such a world. 
 
3.3 OBSERVING FRAGMENTATION ACROSS WORLDS 
 
3.3.1 PARTICIPATING IN PIECES 
The gaze of the engaged subject and its superposition between infinities raises interesting 
questions about the fundamental nature of observation, in both physical and digital worlds, 
particularly when applied to the active perception of the self-as-Other in the form of an 
avatar. In separating the role of engagement within observation, Heisenberg pronounced that 
“classical physics, therefore, has its limits at the point from which the influence of the 
observation on the event can no longer be ignored” (in Nobel Foundation 1965, 299). It is this 
influence that is key to the problems tackled through quantum mechanics, seeking to delve 
beneath the illusion of macroscopic certainty, to confront the fact that  “this [coherent] sense 
of the reality of objects and things is constructed” (Bohm 1994, 109). Bohm demonstrates the 
importance of thought within such a reality, in a reciprocal interaction of perception whereby, 
“instead of saying ‘an observer looks at an object’, we can more appropriately say, 
‘observation is going on, in an undivided moment involving those abstractions customarily 
called “the human being” and “the object he is looking at”’” (2002, 37). In the digital realm, 
this gains further significance, as visual and cognitive engagements take on mutual 
uncertainties. Bohm tells us that “thought is incomplete…a signification, or an 
‘abstraction’…thought provides a representation of what you are thinking about” (1994, 92) 
and, in the same function towards consciousness, the avatar – the digital manifestation of the 
observer-as-observed – becomes a ‘representation of what you are representing’, a 
simulation-of-simulation in the subject beholding itself as object. The digital world commonly 
appears as a reflection of the physical world in a manifestation of an ideal. Heisenberg 
confronts the abstract constructs of such an illusion, in which “the physical world differed 
from the ideal world conceived in terms of everyday experience”, resulting in the problem that 
“ordinary concepts could only be applied to processes in which the velocity of light could be 
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regarded as practically infinite” (1949, 62), placing an ideal notion of limitlessness on the very 
functioning of scientific measurement. However, there is no light within the digital realm, 
merely in its expression, its mediation-embodiment. It is only an ideal abstraction on the part 
of the observer that generates the relevance of light calculated simultaneously in the digital 
world, in contrast to the integral role of light in initiating a physical ‘observation’ in its most 
abstract sense. The observable digital world and the observable digital subject create their 
own embodiment through the inherent abstraction of code and its cognition. 
Through the fragmented abstractions of perception and thought, there is thus an 
inherent limit to the embodiment potential for avatars as forms of expression, themselves 
embedded in an established ‘computer culture’ of interaction. For example, Nicholas Earle’s 
research proposed a “set of states and gestures” (2001, 171) for augmenting avatar 
communication that not only includes the examples expected for an expressive embodied 
avatar – ‘sleepy’, ‘laughter’, ‘sad’, ‘kiss’, etc. – but also an ‘unavailable’ state, as well as 
‘emphasis’ and ‘thinking’ gestures. These extra motions add an array of embodied hypertexts 
to the figurative avatar: the ‘unavailable’ state, echoing the lolling ‘afk’ [away from keyboard] 
position in SL and other similar signifiers of gestural absence, maintains the states that govern 
social interaction on a purely textual basis (such as messaging software and chat or forum 
websites); an ‘emphasis’ gesture portrays a common html tag as a visual gesticulation; and 
the ‘thinking’ gesture recalls the eternally frustrating timer icon or spinning coloured disc that 
forms a baleful signifier to any impatient computer user.  
These hypertextual fragments of ‘presence’ display an underlying need for an expanded 
view of participation in avatar-mediated environments, for even the most ‘realistic’ never 
suffices for a genuinely digital existence. The HUD [heads-up display] that re-frames any 
digital environment maintains the subjective position between embodiments, regardless of 
the level of immersion. This need to be present through contact with information leads us to 
uncover the potentiality of an art practice in which avatars participate as data, fulfilling the 
need to progress beyond a replication of physical embodiment. The work of avatar Angrybeth 
Shortbread (and her physical counterpart Annabeth Robinson) displays such a practice, 
whereby the subject is fragmented into individual values of data, through which the art work 
can be engaged and observed. The interactive installation Avatar DNA (2006) uses an avatar’s 
UUID (universally unique identifier) to convert the presence of the avatar into pure data, a 
string of hexadecimal characters, which generates a double helix akin to biological DNA. In 
the artist’s words: “the sculpture generated is as individual as the avatar themselves” 
(Shortbread 2006a). However, unlike physical DNA, this individual code does not define the 
outwards appearance of the avatar, it is a pure signifier, an abstract data point. The 
 108 
temporality of each construction ties together the presence of the avatar both visually, 
embodied in the gallery space, and as data, in its brief existence as ‘DNA’.  
This principle is furthered in the sonic medium, and split into its two constituent 
elements of expression, in the works UUID Polyphony (2006) and I am Note, We are Music 
(2009). The former continues the avatar-as-data by converting the UUID of approaching 
avatars into musical phrases stored in four playback devices which continually cycle through 
the musical memories of the avatars that have been present, re-asserting their presence as 
data in their visual absence. The latter focuses on data directly relating to visual presence, 
with the height and position of the avatar converted into the pitch and iteration frequency of 
the notes played by the ‘harp’. The complexity here is derived from the visual presence of 
many avatars, as a collective performance tool using the flexibility of visual appearance as 
both data and expression. This collective gesture of presence is echoed in Gestalt Cloud 
(2009),13 which generates rain from four or more avatars moving close to one another inside a 
three-dimensional grid. This rain brings to life a digital garden to be explored, though the 
presence of the avatars in the garden, and their resulting absence from the grid, leads to a 
slow fade into the original darkened state. Here presence and absence are played against one 
another in two conflicting spaces of exploration and interaction. This role of presence as 
absence is further highlighted in You Demand Too Much of Me (2006), which involves the non-
being of a three-dimensional grid of cubes in relation to avatar presence. This work, which 
“began with a simply musing, ‘Does Art within a Digital Space, exist if its not being observed’” 
                                                                    
13
 See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZlDdJXVxcLc for video. 
 
Fig.19 Avatar DNA (2006) Angrybeth Shortbread 
The Avatar’s UUID is converted into a double helix representing a digital interpretation of genetic code. 
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[sic] (Shortbread 2006b), inverts the expected interactivity as it “decays whilst it has an 
audience…a visual metaphor for consumption” (Ibid.). The greater the collective of avatars 
present, the more quickly this work ‘decays’, evoking the observational ‘consciousness causes 
collapse’ hypothesis and the inherent paradox of subjective presence in the digital (indeed 
any) world. 
3.3.2 WAVE/PARTICLE DUALITY 
The problematic relation of observation and thought is played out perhaps most fervently in 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle and the wave/particle duality. This was initially a 
conceptual dilemma for thought: “the dual characters of both matter and light gave rise to 
many difficulties before the physical principles involved were clearly comprehended” 
(Heisenberg 1949, 78). The two modes of being present in the basic quanta of the physical 
universe, as particle and as wave, lead directly to our cognition of such a universe, wherein 
“not all physically significant observables can be determined together” (Bohm 2002, 85). The 
implications of this principle, that “the exact knowledge of one variable can exclude the exact 
knowledge of another” (Heisenberg in Nobel Foundation 1965, 299), is founded on the 
superposition of states (of, for example, electron spin) and, more fundamentally, a 
superposition of being (matter and energy). This duality of being , in which competing modes 
of being preclude their competing perceptions, provides an assessment of the superposition 
of digital and physical selves in the form of the body and the avatar. Just as Manuel De Landa 
identifies that both “matter and energy have the potential for self-organization”…“inherent 
creativity” (1997, 16), so too do the physical and digital embodiments possess their own 
underlying drives of creative potentiality. Just as light cannot be perceived simultaneously as a 
photon and an electromagnetic wave, so too does an engaged subject struggle to confront 
physical and digital embodiments simultaneously within consciousness. 
There are fundamental concerns for both ontology and epistemology at work here, in 
what reveals itself to be a matter of levels of subjectivity. Heisenberg tells us that “the dualism 
between the two complementary pictures – waves and particles” is not a problem of “the 
dualism between two different descriptions of the same reality” but, rather, the matter of 
“what happens ‘really’ in an atomic event” (2000, 18-19). This is a problem of both the absence 
of ontological certainty and an inherent lack in our epistemic relation to such a ground of 
being, based on Heisenberg’s principle that “we cannot completely objectify the result of an 
observation”, fundamentally a “problem of subjectivism” (Ibid.). What Heisenberg’s principle 
suggests is a disruption to both positivist and realist claims to objectivity, insisting instead on 
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the absence of any true matter of fact about quantum and subjective realities. This is justified 
by the fact that it is only the non-observer-dependent uncertainties that might be called 
‘objective’, and that any observation of these uncertainties is inherently ‘subjective’ as part of 
our incomplete knowledge. The same applies to consciousness and its expression in physical 
and digital avatars, particularly when addressing the separate manifestations of the same 
consciousness. If the underlying uncertainty of consciousness, what we call the void-core of 
subjectivity, is objective, it is because it quasi-causally defines the tendencies of our decisions 
about our appearance and our actions with such an appearance. By contrast, our knowledge of 
the particular engagement of our appearance in any given world is purely subjective, 
tempered by a specific incomplete view in one ‘collapsed’ state. Most physicists, including 
Heisenberg, Deutsch and Bohm, are constrained by scientific positivism in their desire to 
“cling on to the philosophical notion of objective reality in itself” (Deutsch in Brown and 
Davies 1986, 104). In the digital realm, however, and indeed in any creative act, the subjective 
observation does indeed cause the event of being. 
The work of Ian Upton and his avatar Ian Pahute challenges the dual perception of the 
subject. The installation The Loneliness of Being (2008) draws an endless flow of information 
from internet search engines into a meditative flux of abstract embodiment. An array of 
words floats in a vast open space, fading and merging as new terms are added, reducing the 
data to a level only disturbed by observation. The mix of soft coloured letters takes on 
meaning only in viewing. The avatar can sit beneath the work, looking up into the mass of 
signification, or fly amidst the endless flow, navigating the space in a data-filled solipsism. The 
island on which the work is placed is often deserted, leaving the viewer with only themselves 
and the words for company. The subject is lost between their screen-framed view of the 
 
Fig.20 The Loneliness of Being (2008) Ian Pahute 
Words drawn from internet search engines fill the sky around the observer. 
 111 
installation and their avatar’s place within it, transcended by the eternal flow of words that 
refuses to be fixed in measurement. A second installation, Shadows (2008), displays ghostly 
figures walking endlessly in a circle, echoing both the human form in its spectral digital 
embodiment and the superposition of the identical figures at each point in the circle. The 
ghosts are caught in a perpetual functioning drive: acting both as particles, in anthropic 
mimicry of an ‘embodied’ form, and as waves, in the identical blurred movements of semi-
transparent figures. 
The philosophical quandary brought about by wave/particle duality, exemplified in the 
simultaneously static and fluid embodiments of subjectivity, is complicated by Heisenberg’s 
resistance to “the ontology of materialism…the idea of an objective real world whose smallest 
parts exist objectively” (Heisenberg 2000, 83) which grounds much criticism of the 
Copenhagen Interpretation and which, he states, is impossible in the wake of quantum 
theory, despite the fact that “Bohm considers the particles as ‘objectively real’ structures” 
(Ibid.). This appears to be an epistemological problem: Heisenberg rejects anti-realism in 
philosophy but supports it in science; Bohm rejects anti-realism in science but supports it 
(tangentially in an emergent manner) in his philosophy, for in Bohm’s theory “there will 
sometimes not even be matters of fact about what observers think” (Albert 1992, 179). These 
conflicting levels of subjectivity further highlight the duality of fixed particle and functioning 
wave within the structures and disciplines of thought itself. It is here, with a negotiation of 
expression and an embracing of the subjective, that it is idealism that must be asserted in 
order for a critical culture to interject between the dualities of reason, for “art is always an 
idealization; the ideal is different from reality…but idealization is necessary for 
understanding” (Heisenberg 2000, 65). The underlying subjectivities must necessarily be 
confronted in expression across multiple conceptual and ideal spaces for a greater 
understanding of the ruptures within gaze and thought. 
A further work by Upton, undertaken in collaboration with Steve Wilkes, converts the 
physical body in space to an idealised representation in data. A Passing Moment (2007), 
involving the use of visual and spatial scanning technology, forces the ‘misuse’ of technology 
into a discussion of absence and presence in human interaction. The scanning equipment, 
able to create a millimetre-accurate render of a three-dimensional physical space, is disrupted 
by movement, leading to gaps and glitches in the scan. By inviting a physical human audience 
into the space during the scanning process, the human subjects themselves are transferred 
into thousands of data points, while their movements create absences within the digital 
model. The very presence of humanity interferes with the measuring apparatus, 
demonstrating a wave/particle duality at the heart of the subject-as-data. These images are 
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exhibited in SL, creating a direct confrontation between the physical body as pure data and 
the purely digital human as visual body. In the artist’s statement to A Passing Moment, Upton 
explains his interest in such disruptions of constructed observation: 
The line between chaos (our sensory and subjective view of the universe) and the void, that unknown area 
inside (our spirit, soul, unconscious) is a fascinating one. I would argue that we consciously and proactively 
construct our universe…constantly shifting, breaking and transforming as new ideas are discovered and old 
ideas challenged. It is this line, the conscious construction, that much of my work seeks to explore. (Upton in 
Upton and Wilkes, 2007) 
This demonstrates an awareness not only of the void of subjectivity, but the construction of 
worlds around such a subjective reality, which the work meets with expression as the ghostly 
digitised figures form avataristic echoes. The physical form here is the objet a, the lost object 
filled with the excess of data as it is reduced to a quantised render. The wave collapses into 
particles as the observer regards the captured moment; the energy of the living reduced to 
the sepulchral stillness of memory.  
3.3.3 CONSCIOUSNESS OF SUPERPOSITION 
States of superposition, before observational collapse closes the potentiality of the two 
infinities, enables what Albert labels new “modes of being…which are quite unlike what we 
know how to think about…extraordinarily mysterious situations” (1992, 11). To Heisenberg, 
the largest breakthrough since Newton was Bohr’s probability wave, that “introduced 
something standing in the middle between the idea of an event and the actual event, a 
strange kind of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality” (Heisenberg 
2000, 11). The inaccessible possibility staining our perception in the centre of reality, the 
mysterious state of superposition, is instructive to digital culture. Within the digital medium, 
where potentiality is formed from bits rather than wave functions, the same two states (in 
infinite variation) can produce infinite outcomes. However, similar processes occur in either 
actualisation. An observation could be simply stated as “one possible solution to a giant 
cosmic anagram” (Egan2010, 160). The infinite permutations of this ‘dust’ (be it fundamental 
particles or bits) could potentially and atemporally result in either digital or physical worlds, in 
a digital or physical subject. The notion that the same Real underlies both realms highlights 
the confusion in identifying with any singular physical or digital embodiment.  
The progress of humanity is leading towards an increasingly hybrid manifestation of 
consciousness, around the void-core of the subject in superposition with itself. This is the 
evolution of the cyborg subject. As the distinctions between the physical and digital human 
are ever blurred by the developments and ubiquity of technology, this state of superposition 
already has profound implications for the future of humanity. Bostrom furthers his discussion 
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of augmentation that we have seen above with a consideration of whether our entire reality, 
or its appearance as physical reality, is in fact a computer simulation: 
A technologically mature “posthuman” civilization would have enormous computing power. Based on this 
empirical fact, the simulation argument shows that at least one of the following propositions is true: (1) The 
fraction of human level civilizations that reach a posthuman stage is very close to zero; (2) The fraction of 
posthuman civilizations that are interested in running ancestor simulations is very close to zero; (3) The fraction 
of all people with our kind of experiences that are living in a simulation is very close to one. (Bostrom 2003, 255) 
Therefore, located between the extremes of posthuman success and failure is argued a near 
certainty that the currently perceived physical world of Real-Existence is in fact already a 
Virtual-Existence of a computer simulation. Between the infinite one of utopia and the infinite 
zero of nihilism is the superposition of consciousness balanced equally in physical and digital 
perception, differing only in the manner and construction of its engagement. 
 
3.4 SECOND LIFE ART 
 
 3.4.1 AVATAR AS OBJECT 
In relation to standard tropes of avatar-mediated computer game environments, ‘nongame’ 
virtual worlds such as SL appear as Deleuze’s ideal game: “without rules, with neither winner 
nor loser, without responsibility…this game is reserved then for thought and art” (2004b, 63). 
This manifestation of the ideal renders the structures of fantasy, desire and drive before us in 
the subject as object. The avatar occupies this space as the stain within the screen, filling the 
virtual environment with the subject in a manipulable and problematic form. In such a 
cyberspace, Žižek identifies three psychological ‘disorders’ that are of relevance to the avatar 
as an object of the mind: perversion, the “permanent reshaping of one’s symbolic identity”; 
psychosis, our “incestuous immersion into the screen as the maternal thing”; and hysteria, in 
the “permanent questioning…[of an] anonymous other” (2009c, 294). While these can be 
applied to our interactions with any digital object or digital other, when that object/other (as 
Lacan’s objet a) is the subject itself, a number of additional interactions are brought into play 
within the construction of subjectivity. This is best demonstrated in the simultaneous 
perversion, psychosis and hysteria of numerous art projects labelling themselves ‘Avatar 
Portraits’, raising the image of the avatar to the level of a consumed yet revered object, a 
totem in our digital existence.  
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These include not only Schomaker’s work, but also, notably, that of radical collective 
0100101110101101, whose exhibition 13 Most Beautiful Avatars, part of the larger project 
Portraits (2006-7) based on images of avatars, also brought the avatar-as-object across the 
physical-digital divide. The images of SL avatars, not including those of the duo, were shown 
both online, on the collective’s website and in an SL art space, and physically, as canvas prints 
in a New York gallery the following year. While the creation of anthropocentric avatars could 
suggest a representational and figurative digital art form, this occurs in a postmodern twist of 
realism in digital culture that Jameson describes as “a realism of the image rather than of the 
object [that] has more to do with the transformation of the figure into a logo than with the 
conquest of new “realistic” and representational languages” (2003b, 701). The apparent return 
to ‘figurative’ portraiture in the Mattes’ avatar portraits therefore falls into the mediated 
transformation of form into logo while critiquing the consumptive imagery that it creates. The 
clean and crisp images – of anthropic avatars of both sexes – “exude a sexy artifice that is both 
seductive and a parody of seductiveness” (Smith 2007). This reappropriation, which comes to 
“signify emergent aesthetic values of Second Life, and remediate pop art modalities of the 
fallacy of “portraiture” through digital culture” (Dinnen 2012), disrupts the traditional portrait: 
visually, by the faces over-filling one side of the image rather than being centred neatly within 
the frame; conceptually, through the absence of human identity even in these anthropic 
characters. The objectification of the avatar not only mimics the familiar objectification of the 
human form in popular media, but projects such a critique of objectification onto all forms of 
portraiture, levelling the reverence for the human face with its digital, malleable, anonymous 
counterpart.  
Of further interest in challenging the fetishistic status of the human form is the work 
Synthetic Performances (2009-10), which offers a similar critique to the bodily orientated 
performance art practice. Of the work, Mattes says: “we hate performance art, we never quite 
got the point. So, we wanted to understand what made it so un-interesting to us” (Mattes 
 
Fig.21 Portraits (2006-7) © Eva and Franco Mattes 
Avatar faces overfill the portraits presented in a physical gallery. 
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2007). These SL performance re-enactments use avatars that resemble the Mattes as closely 
as possible. Their art practice in the physical world, based on forgery and imitation, has led 
the artists to attempt to be ‘themselves’ amidst the freedom of choice in digital 
environments. Interestingly, this point perhaps reveals more about the artists’ construction of 
their own subjectivity than their critique of performance art: their physical identities are so 
often shrouded as imposters and fakes that their bodily forms have become, artistically, a lost 
object even to themselves. In this context, the focus on clear and accurate images of the 
avatar faces in their portraiture can also be read as a need to utilise the avatar-as-object to 
reclaim the objet a of their physical world creative subjectivity. 
The avatar as contemporary digital figuration is only an object in the sense of loss, as a 
purely coded emblem of data standing in for the Real of subjectivity we wish to express 
through it. That is, the avatar as an art object can only be an art of the objet a. These lost, 
partial (or virtual) objects, in terms of the avatar-as-object, function for the rupture in Virtual-
Existence of the subject’s own gaze. Deleuze states that “whatever the reality in which the 
virtual object is incorporated, it does not become integrated…but rather testifies to the other 
virtual half which the real continues to lack” (2004a, 125). Jameson identifies this lost object as 
pure signifier or ‘logo’, expressing a “new kind of abstraction” (2003b, 703) not only 
characterised by postmodern art and culture but embedded within the very structure of 
cyberspace. The Real Meaning bursts forth in our frustration of the avatar as object, 
confronting our Virtual Existence with its precise, structured discourse of computer code. A 
further consideration regarding the role of the avatar as art object is presented by the avatar 
Kisa Naumova (and physical counterpart Graham Hibbert) in defining art in SL: 
There is no Art inherent to Second Life…Every texture of something Other on a prim demands the viewpoint of 
a frame within a frame…the ultimate Suspension of Disbelief - that our Avatars are 'us'…Art in Second Life lies - 
not within the scripted animation, or the tortured prim - but within the one true item that we have 
unconditional control over - our *selves*. 
 
To see Art in Second Life is to see others. To create Art is to Be here. The translation of Real Life artifacts into 
the Virtual Space…is forever futile…the only commonality between it and that that we normally occupy is our 
*selves*. 
 
There is no Art. There is only Avatars. (Naumova 2009) 
This artist’s statement voices some key issues underpinning avatars as art, and the user’s 
interaction with other art objects in SL through an art object itself. If creation is being in the 
digital realm, the avatar is necessarily a ‘stain in the gaze’; a mark of subjective expression and 
a subjective interface with Virtual Existence. To achieve constructive consciousness of one’s 
own mediation requires that such an interface be under the influence of the subject, thus the 
avatar-as-object presents a tool for both expression and interaction, as well as a direct 
opportunity to confront our formation as subject within digital culture. 
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3.4.2 AVATAR AS EXPRESSION 
As is the case with any mediation, expression in avatar-mediated spaces such as SL is a matter 
of a series of limitations. If “a whole provides its component parts with constraints and 
resources” (DeLanda 2006, 34), then the avatar emerges with a set of limitations applied by 
the ‘meta-self’ upon any individual expression of embodiment. The specific form taken by the 
subject, particularly in realms such as SL, are governed by a complex set of constraints, both 
external and internal. The basic construction of an avatar in SL starts from a set of 
anthropocentric choices. While height, figure, colour and clothes are all transfinitely 
customisable, the enforced presupposition is that the subject will seek a ‘human’ counterpart 
in this digital realm. An ‘invisible’ skin, however, allows for the construction of any form of 
expression for the avatar to ‘wear’, creating an assemblage of the imagination. One such 
embodiment in SL was Cory Linden’s Flying Spaghetti Monster, influenced by Janssen’s 
Touched by his Noodly Appendage (2005): 
Cory Linden is likely the only person who knows where the ends of the Spaghetti Monster’s many strands are 
actually hidden, such as to disentangle them – the Spaghetti Monster, of course, being a metaphor for the code 
of Second Life – “almost organic,” as one of the programmers put it. (Fitzpatrick 2007) 
This anti-anthropic avatar by one of the lead engineers of SL, a key designer of the Linden 
scripting language, displays the potential links between code and creativity as two 
expressions of the Real.  
Many saw the departure of Cory Ondrejka (the physical counterpart to Cory Linden) 
from Linden Labs as a “normalizing” (Ibid.) of SL, most notably in terms of the business model 
moving away from the hardline coder, open source ethic. However, the move also indicates a 
continuing aesthetic shift. With the pronouncement “The Flying Spaghetti Monster has left 
the world” (Au 2007), many acknowledged the departure as a step against freer aesthetic 
vision driven by progress in the code itself. Whilst the Flying Spaghetti Monster was indeed 
one of the last direct impacts by Linden employees on in-world creativity, it was perhaps more 
an example of the ‘geek’ aesthetic of obscure cultural references14 than a theoretical push 
towards limitless digital expression for itself. Cory Linden’s creative contribution and 
departure are, however, symptomatic of the tensions between the technology itself, its 
control by market forces, and the individual creative subject. There are key technological 
implications of social/art/non-game virtual worlds. For example, “Second Life…is a cyberspace 
simulation, not a game. It emphasizes user-created content. This feature consumes 
                                                                    
14
 For example, Cline’s portrayal of the “pale-skinned pop culture-0bsessed geek” (2012, 197) in a digital 
world containing “the collected knowledge, art and amusements of all human civilization” (Ibid., 14). 
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significantly more bandwidth” (Miller 2011, 78). And, furthermore, the general strain on 
technological resources is stretched even further with larger worlds:  
The most popular DVEs [Distributed Virtual Environments] – such as World of Warcraft and Second Life – limit 
mutual interaction to less than a thousand of their millions of users. Experiences like full-scale virtual battles 
and large-scale performances remain far out of reach (Ibid., 113) 
The limits of expression remain the technology available, as evidenced by many a colloquial 
critique of the SL aesthetic and the continued use of stark geometric shapes even amidst 
more complex renderings by, for example, avatar-artist Bryn Oh. 
Yet the limits are not only the technology, for the user also limits their own expression. 
Just as the anthropocentric avatar constrains the objecthood of the subject in the digital 
realm, so does the physical configuration of consciousness act as a constraint on the true 
freedom of expression. With such an attitude in place, such a fundamental structure of fantasy 
– recreating the physical world according to the individual user’s whim – virtual worlds such as 
SL are at risk of being reduced to what Rem Koolhaas would label “Junkspace…the body 
double of space, a territory of impaired vision, limited expectation, reduced earnestness” 
(Koolhaas 2002, 176). As Jameson elaborates, this space elicits, as in Koolhaas’s own text, a 
response that is a “combination of revulsion and euphoria…unique to the postmodern” 
(Jameson 2003a, 73). Furthermore, this “junkspace virus” (Ibid.) is, for Jameson, “the 
disappearance of all the ‘originals’ no doubt, but along with them, of History itself”, although 
“it is not quite the ‘anything goes’ of the new generation of computer-generating ‘blob 
architects’” (Ibid., 75). The free, abstract vision of early ‘virtual reality’ and the ‘extremist geek’ 
attitudes have fallen out of favour amidst the photorealistic aim of mass consumer online 
capitalism, in the transition towards the reduction of digital environments to both “an escape 
hatch into a better reality” (Cline 2012, 16) and “a self-imposed prison for humanity…a 
pleasant place for the world to hide from its problems while human civilization slowly 
collapses” (Ibid., 120). However, it is precisely this more direct (and perhaps abstracted) 
expression of consciousness that can divert the junkspace virus: connecting the void of 
subjectivity with a self-conscious modification. Freedom of expression in SL, as with the 
digital world as a creative medium in general, is growing ever more dependent on advancing 
technologies to regress our consciousness of the role of these technologies. As higher 
specifications of hardware gradually can render perfectly whatever we imagine, it seems that 
increasingly what is being imagined is merely an ‘improved’ version of the physical world. 
Criticality itself has become superficial. Across the vast majority of SL, largely a museum of 
whimsy, we are no longer dealing with the possibility of a cyberpunk fiction, in which Jameson 
identifies “a mapping of the new geopolitical Imaginary” (2007, 385), and it is only in gestures 
 118 
that are critical to the medium itself, such as Bryn Oh’s installations, that persist in making 
progress toward a genuinely digital aesthetic and mode of expression that makes contact with 
the terrifying Real of subjectivity. 
3.4.3 AVATAR AS INTERFACE 
The process of and subjective relation to avatar-mediation must also be considered. Using an 
avatar, entering an ‘avatar-mediated space’, embeds even if it does not embody the subject 
within the specific digital realm. This draws the subject into the temporality of the 
environment. In contrast to the atemporal, hypertextual manner in which the subject often 
engages with the abstraction of the digital medium – in textual situations such as forums, 
blogs and downloadable content, or standalone single-user interactive works – avatar-
mediation forces the subject not only into an alternative three-dimensional world, but also an 
alternative linear timeline. However, within Deleuze’s expanded conception of temporality 
“time must be grasped twice”, both as cause: “the living present in bodies which act and are 
acted upon”, and effect: “an entity infinitely divisible into past and future” (Deleuze 2004b, 5), 
which in terms of expression, or ‘sense’, is “skill, understood as the art of causality” (Ibid., 59). 
In placing the avatar as a causal, active tool for interaction (a ‘body’ in the loosest sense of the 
word) the subject creates itself between realities as effect, or indeed as affect in its infinite 
regress into partial objects and simultaneous lack and excess. It is worth noting that the avatar 
as partial object (objet a) also maintains a quasi-causal function, thus creating an (imbalanced) 
circle of infinite regress through the void of subjectivity, between the Virtual and the Real, 
mediated by the specific arrangement of Existence and Meaning. It is the self-positing of the 
subject, and thus subjectivity itself, that constitutes this regress into the void. One artist who 
embraces such a ‘skill’ in manipulating causality through the interface of the avatar within SL 
is Bryn Oh, in her lavish psychological, full-sim installations. 
Oh, starting in SL as a machinima artist, is only the avatar, with no connection to the 
physical artist. As the header of the artist’s blog explains, “Bryn Oh is a virtual artist created by 
a Toronto oil painter”, although the relationship has developed reciprocally: “when I first came 
to SL I brought in first life ideas to work on.. where now I seem to export SL ideas to my first 
life” (Oh 2013a). While this could at first glance appear similar to the conflation of identified 
selves in Schomaker’s problematic negotiation of avatar subjectivity, there is at work in Oh’s 
construction a more deliberate elaboration on the digital subject and an acknowledgement of 
different modes and cognitions of creativity in her underlying cyborg self. The artist has 
stated: “the stories I tell on Immersiva are my own hopes, dreams and fears hidden behind the 
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mask of robots” (Bryn quoted in Shostakovich 2010), and this is exemplified in her avatar, 
which disrupts the expressionistic human figure with cybernetics and, eventually, a deformed 
rabbit-like mask. This image relates to the themes of an early trilogy of large-scale builds and 
machinima by Oh – The Daughter of Gears (2008-9),15 Rabbicorn (2009), and Standby (2010) – 
which, like much of Oh’s work, utilises characters undergoing a transition between human, 
animal and robot forms, confronting the psychological quandary such a subject might 
encounter. The Daughter of Gears was created for the Black Swan art sim and features art 
works by avatar Light Waves and others as well as many traps for visiting avatars to negotiate. 
Oh’s response to this arbitrary use of obstacles in the interaction of the sim initiated the 
creative drive for her own build: “Why are there traps here? Who are they trying to keep out? 
There was no narrative so I devised one” (Oh 2010). The series of traps and obstacles amidst a 
winding, climbing path through a series of poetic interludes and three-dimensional scenes 
disrupts the narrative through a level of inaccessibility. The struggle of a visiting avatar to 
reach the conclusion of the story draws the viewer into the narrative through their avatar as 
an interface to the world of a mother trying to save her daughter by transferring her 
consciousness to a robot, while avoiding the protests of an angry mob. Even the completion 
of the narrative ‘quest’ draws the avatar further and more horrifically into the narrative, for 
“once they reach the top [they] realize that they are one of the mob” (Ibid.). The emotional 
ruptures of the characters in Oh’s work blends seamlessly with the disruption to the visiting 
avatar’s complicit experience as an interface not only to the three-dimensional world but also 
to the psychological world of the artist as creative digital subject. This critique of interaction is 
evident even in the name of Oh’s sim – ‘Immersiva’ suggests engagement as the key element 
of experiencing the art – and the necessary role of the avatar as interface in experiencing her 
art forces engagement with a free quasi-linear narrative that creates a wave function of the 
gaze: “a mobile gaze that is made flesh in the metaverse” (Ramirez 2012, 120) as a potentiality 
between many paths, scenes and objects. The builds themselves are filled with hypertextual 
layering: finding hidden objects, linking to external content, and typing words printed on 
objects into chat windows; there are many ways to negotiate these environments and reveal 
their semiotic strands of narrative.  
                                                                    
15
 See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CK9wzGATQ4E#t=256 for machinima presentation. 
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The superposition of narratives, gazes and objects confront the avatar in Oh’s later 
work Imogen and the Pigeons (2013), drawing notions of self into a wave function, approaching 
Jac Saorsa’s conception of potentiality in which “narrative identity is always mobile” (2011, 
98), here in its incursions through space. Connecting the infinite one and zero like Alice ‘down-
the-rabbit-hole’16, in Oh’s work the avatar is drawn beyond itself into expressions of the Real 
in contact with the Virtuality of consciousness. In Imogen and the Pigeons, after climbing a 
disappearing staircase out of the decayed ‘RebirthTM life encryption’ wasteland, the stark 
black and white cuboid stairs are juxtaposed with the expressionistic realism of a therapist 
(TheRapist)’s clinic housing anthropic characters extended by manifestations of their darkest 
traumas. The interaction is ingeniously extrapolated, for, by ‘sitting’ on a feather, a visiting 
avatar is able to walk on the walls and ceilings of the installation, as the narrative unfolds 
between the psychological scenes and abstract corridors, that require the extended avatar 
interface to defy gravity, and conventional conceptions of three-dimensional space. The 
flexible narrative structure, in what Francisco Ramirez describes as “combinatory paths, 
multimedia hyper structures, and the provision of a visual pentagram” (2012, 135-6), tells of a 
girl stuck between human and pigeon personae, echoing the human/avatar relationship as the 
                                                                    
16
 This can be referred to Oh’s deformed bunny avatar and the mythical robotic Rabbicorn (half rabbit, 
half unicorn), or indeed to Deleuze’s treatment of Alice in his propositional logic (2004b). 
   
  
Fig.22 Imogen and the Pigeons (2013) Bryn Oh 
Navigating the wasteland of the installation, to reach the nonlinear narrative fragments of psychological 
trauma and uploaded consciousness, requires negotiating a falling staircase and walking up walls. 
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human subject seeks to identify with the freer group, to fly with the pigeons. Here the Real at 
the core of Imogen’s subjectivity is constantly seeking to burst forth into a Virtual 
identification that is furthered by a cybernetic extension of her consciousness. The wave 
function of the visiting avatar’s gaze creates a narrative that confronts the subject with their 
own split personality. The installation’s poetic fragments detail the deterioration of the stored 
memories and the emergence of a child from these fragments of consciousness, following 
which Imogen lifts up her memory-child towards a blue whale in the sky, offering a direct 
comparison between the world of the installation and the broader environment of SL. There is 
here a moment of confrontation between the physical and digital bodies, and an emphasis on 
the problematic relationship residing within consciousness of the cybrid subject and, amidst 
the trauma, the creative acts possible for subjectivity through its interface of a ‘body’ (of any 
description, be it human, avatar or pigeon), between the infinite one and infinite zero of 
existence, binary code and subjectivity. 
 
3.5 BIG A-VATAR 
 
Where does this expanded engagement with the avatar, beyond a simple comparative 
embodiment, leave the contemporary creative subject? The impermanence of the subject-as-
avatar, both in terms of sentient malleability and its obstruction/destruction by other subjects 
and the medium itself, challenges the position of the digital subject in relation to the physical 
self that perceives it from the other side of the screen. The apparent separation that the 
screen itself imposes between the subject and its expression through binary data forces us to 
confront Žižek’s notion that “the lost object is ultimately the subject itself, the subject as 
object” (2009a, 64). While dominant technophobic philosophers such as Paul Virilio see 
existence, performance and art in digital environments as merely “the grotesque dance of 
clones and avatars” (2003, 95), the gaze confronting itself as object in the avatar suggests a 
greater value to avatar mediation, a critical role for the subject as NPC (non-player character). 
The avatar can indeed appear as a detachment of subjectivity, an estrangement of the 
subject in its objectified self, mediated by the computer screen. However, when the avatar 
takes on the role not simply as an object of subjectivity but also an expression of the void-core 
of the subject and an interface through which the digital medium itself can be directly 
confronted and challenged, a greater understanding of the construction of all manifestations 
of subjectivity can be achieved. Such a gesture reasserts the position of the gaze itself as objet 
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a (Lacan 1977, 105), the physical body thus also playing the role of object, expression and 
interface within its world(s). By placing the self as visual, spatial and cognitive other, the 
detachment of the subject from its physical limitations can allow for more direct expressions 
of the subjective Real beyond the self-mediation of consciousness. In doing so, the gaze 
becomes simultaneously the infinite one of presence and the infinite zero of absence, lack and 
excess in superposition. Only when the gaze seeks to grasp an individuation of the subject 
does consciousness collapse itself into a body, subsuming the Real under Virtuality.  
The superposition of the Real and the Virtual, the objet a and the big Other, is thus the 
fundamental construction or boundary of the self-perceived ‘subject’. In analysing the 
apparent self-negation within Žižek’s writings, Denise Gigante describes how a void-based 
‘critical self’ perpetually undermines and redefines itself as “the Absolute posits himself and 
thereby posits the universe…a “metapsychological work”” (1998, 154). Through the digital 
medium in general, and the avatar expression in particular, the subject can directly perceive 
this process occurring, for to enter a given sim with one’s avatar is to bring that realm into 
existence before the subject. The casting of a portion of the self into alternative constructions 
of the universe embraces the potential of the subject to be ‘outside’ itself. Badiou states that 
“one of the names of the Outside is ‘event’” (2007, 37), and the creative gesture in such a 
‘metapsychological’ act therefore possesses great force in reshaping a subjectivity that 
externalises itself, not only in the digital world but also physical and cognitive realms. 
The human physical body is an objet a, a lost notion of a ‘perfectly’ functioning 
construct from which we are ever waning. Not only disability but also old age, temporary 
illness, situational concentration, and any number of other factors all contribute to the lack 
inherent in the privileging of the body. Therefore, if the human body itself is a lost object, it is 
merely the importance placed on it by consciousness as ‘my’ body that causes the desire for 
such privilege. As with the continuing discussion of cybernetics, the avatar ‘body’ as objet a 
displays for humanity an inherent lack and excessive internal reliance on the physical body 
prior to any engagement with the digital realm. What the digital body – the avatar as 
objectified subject – offers, is an evental opportunity within our own gaze of a connected 
externality of subjectivity. It is precisely the avatar’s disconnection from direct (physical) 
sensory perception that enables the subject to embrace lack and excess simultaneously in 
apprehending itself as object. Whether the individual subject can reach and overcome this 
dilemma of otherness is, perhaps, an entirely different matter. 
Thus we must consider what is at stake, the risks of such an approach. If the avatar can 
support an expression of the Real from the inaccessible heart of subjectivity, and allow such a 
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subject to interface with itself in the gaze of its otherness, then the avatar can also suppress 
such an expansion of the ‘embodied’ subject. Lacan tells us that “it is in the space of the Other 
that he sees himself and the point from which he looks at himself is also in that space” (1977, 
144). Therefore the subject engaging with itself objectified as digital Other must ascertain 
what manner of Other its digital self embodies. The innate tendency of the self-as-other, 
particularly within the inherently solipsistic digital world, is for the avatar to function merely 
as “the fiction of the big Other that enables us to avoid the horror of being alone” (Žižek 2012, 
116). We might consider DeLanda’s assemblage theory in the dynamics of control within a 
subject and its (physical and digital) avatars, whereby “in all assemblages possessing a 
command structure, the expressive role is played by those components involved in 
legitimization of authority, while the material role is played by components involved in the 
enforcement” (2006, 87-8). What this amounts to, in terms of the avatar in the role of big 
Other, is a negotiation by the subject between its ‘embodiment’ as an expression of and 
support for its authority over its own subjectivity, a creative control over selfhood, and its 
‘embodiment’ as a concrete structure enclosing the subject within its own virtuality of 
authority, the self-positing dominance of consciousness over itself. 
However, the response to the dangers of such a potentially oppressive structure, when 
the big Other of consciousness begins to dictate the actions of the expressive void-core of 
subjectivity, should not be to simply return to the ‘reality’ of the physical world. Far from the 
‘lesson’ of much fiction and theory on the subject17, which is limited by the privileging of 
physicality, it is through an embracing of the transitory state between worlds that insight into 
either (or both) might be achieved. This approach requires the subject to maintain a general 
stance of indifference towards one’s avatar, supporting a conscious withdrawal from the 
superpositioned state across two ‘bodies’. Žižek insists that “one should withdraw from being 
immersed in a situation in such a way that the withdrawal renders visible the “minimal 
difference” sustaining the situation’s multiplicity, and thereby causes its disintegration” 
(2009a, 129). The minimal difference, the key interaction of the Virtual and Real functions of 
consciousness, is thus observed and embraced through the evental repetition of withdrawal. If 
the avatar is held always at a distance within the gaze, observed only as potentiality (as wave 
function rather than definitive ‘particle’ of identity), then maintaining the formal antagonism 
of consciously collapsing consciousness into its embodiments makes possible an awareness of 
the superposition and parallax gap of realities. 
                                                                    
17
 Including Cline’s Ready Player One (2012), in an ending that reduces the digital to a psychological 
cure, a limited view of the digital that appears also in Žižek’s task of staging and traversing the fantasy. 
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3.6 CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter confronts the privileged relation of human subjects to the physical over the 
digital, a nostalgic extension of our biological origins that frames the construction of our 
cyborg functions, limiting our engagement with digital technologies. This discussion is 
directed at the physical body and its role in defining the creation of digital expressions of the 
subject, most notably through the anthropocentric avatar as a placeholder in digital worlds. 
This parallax shift between our familiar body and its representation in a world on the other 
side of the computer screen reveals a loss of embodiment in the construction of digital 
identity. The avatar body thus appears as an objet a, a lost object always missing some aspect 
of humanity compared to our physical self. However, in turn this reveals the physical body as 
an objet a, through its own frailty and comparison to the ideal forms that can be staged in 
cyberspace. Embodiment must therefore be challenged in this manifestation of the subject as 
lost, towards a disembodiment in presence-as-absence that might allow consciousness to 
move freely between forms. Extrapolating this through Deleuze’s conception of difference 
and repetition, and the notion of faciality, examines the functions that construct identity in 
and between physical and digital worlds. The repetition of loss, as objectification of the void in 
the Real, conflicts with the Virtuality of difference in the self-positing of consciousness within 
an engaged world, whether physical or digital. The mode of engagement has been further 
scrutinised through modes of observation in quantum physics, developing the fragmentation 
of reality and the wave/particle duality in the necessary ontological difficulties of a subject 
moving between conceptual spaces and modes of Existence. Second Life provides an 
instructive and creative space for this reconstruction of avatar forms: as object, specifically 
the objet a and placing of the subject outside itself on screen; as expression, in the 
development of extended embodiments beyond anthropocentric representations; and as 
interface, in the extension of visual and participatory tools for engaging with a given reality. 
From this theoretical development of the avatar, and the process of shifting consciousness 
between bodied forms opening a critical space of disembodiment in between the parallax of 
physical and digital worlds, a warning has emerged of the avatar not only as objet a but also 
big Other. Any body we inhabit will frame a world and structure our desires for engagement 
with it. The necessity for a critical removal from these structures of desire is the focus of the 
following chapter, which challenges the computer game medium and its regimes of living and 
dying in the parallax between our physical form and its representation on screen. 
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4 THE UNDEAD SUBJECT 
VIRTUAL MONSTERS IN GAMES 
 
This chapter expands on the relation between the Virtual and the Real in more detail, 
examining the structures of fantasy that sustain their interaction within the smooth 
functioning of consciousness. The Real is explored further in Žižekian/Lacanian terms as the 
death drive, while the Virtual is positioned as life in the perpetuation of consciousness by itself 
and the production of desire. In the interplay of desire and drive, life and death, the Virtual 
and the Real, there opens a space for symbolic death. This staging of a state between two 
deaths (the symbolic and the actual) is identified by Žižek most clearly in computer games, 
whereby there is a split between individual lives and the finality of losing the game. Beyond 
Žižek’s staging of this phenomenon lies a tool for a critique of mediation in sustaining the 
Virtuality of life. This is both a critique of the computer gaming medium, with its objective-
based structures of desire that construct the completion of the game as a fantasy to the 
player, and also a critique of consciousness, in the Virtual function itself that perpetuates the 
smooth functioning of consciousness in concealing the rupture of the Real as the 
incomprehensible and terrifying heart of subjective parallax. 
To interrogate these structures of Virtual desire in relation to undeath, Deleuze and 
Guattari’s term ‘becoming’ is extrapolated from their becoming-animal towards a conception 
of becoming-death, as a perpetual movement of death drive with an unachievable end. The 
player-character relationship between human user and on-screen avatar is expanded in the 
role of the sorcerer and the demon in the process of removal from human society into a state 
of becoming, which is undeath. The ability of the player to perceive this split, and the staging 
of its own death in general, is assessed in terms of the quantum immortal, developed by 
Tegmark from Everett’s ‘many worlds theory’. The premise that for every deadly situation one 
version of the subject survives while its counterparts in alternative universes die holds a 
fundamental problem, that of being able to observe this state of immortality. In the digital 
realm, and the gaming medium in particular, this is no longer an obstacle, and the analysis is 
applied to games that stage this death and immortality in full view of the subject.  
These relations of death and life, of Real and Virtual, are drawn together in a study of 
Valve Corporation’s Portal series, where the protagonist is reanimated after each death in a 
state of constant (and perilous) scientific testing. This enforced immortality is imposed by the 
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series' antagonist, the computer monster GLaDOS, whose own structures of desire and 
fantasy surrounding mortality and undeath are analysed in the context of a disruption of 
Virtual and Real. This discussion focuses not on the functional gameplay of the technology in 
itself but rather its relation to the narrative in drawing, constructing and staging a critical 
alternative world within the game, prefiguring the discussion in chapter 5 of representations 
of digital culture and technology in fiction and their critical relation to the present. This 
chapter concludes with a reconsideration of Žižek’s staging and traversing of the fantasy in 
cyberspace, moving beyond a curative use for physical human subjects towards a critique of 
the fantasy of the digital itself and relations of desire and drive in the cyborg subject across 
the perpetuation of life in physical and digital worlds. 
 
4.1 MONSTROUS UNDEATH 
 
Since William Gibson’s Neuromancer (1995a, 10) introduced the term in 1984, ‘cyberspace’ has 
been a realm of the undead. Ghosts haunt that spectral domain, challenging the role of the 
physical subject within such a non-place. When we enter the digital realm, when we cross 
through the looking glass of the interface screen, we see ourselves as such a ghostly 
apparition, an undead monster capable of things beyond our mortal frame and beyond our 
surface level consciousness. What does the unleashing of our subconscious and even 
unconscious desires reveal about our monstrous self? How does death and undeath disrupt 
our relation between physical and digital modes of reality? 
Digital culture provides abundant examples of its fascination with the interplay of death 
and undeath, yet the drive is always towards the finalising act of death, as if it is too horrifying 
to truly confront the potential for lingering undeath that, as we shall demonstrate, is inherent 
in cyberspace. Examples in blockbusters such as Tron (1982) and The Matrix (1999), in which 
death within the computer has equally deadly effects in the ‘real’ world, reveal an underlying 
fear of the persistence of our digital selves. In mass media it would appear that we cannot 
accept the cyber-immortality on offer. We must instead look to more creatively and critically 
disposed expressions of mortality, such as the “erotic ballets of death” (Sawyer 2011) in short 
films 458nm (2006) and Loom (2010) by Polynoid,18 for a true embracing of the moment of 
death as a state in itself. The proliferation of recent conceptual independent art games 
instead provides an approach to confronting the immortal virtual monster. The gaming 
                                                                    
18
 See http://www.polynoid.tv/458nm/ and http://www.polynoid.tv/loom/ for videos. 
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medium itself has always been constructed around life as a currency – Rez (2001) even 
features lives as evolutionary stages of the player’s avatar, expanded in Spore (2008) to 
encompass the evolution of entire species – and analysis of several art games that confront 
notions of death and persistence uncover the nature of the virtual monster, but we return to 
mass media in examining the characters of the Portal (2007; 2011) series for the interaction 
between computer and human as two incarnations of such horror. These two forms are 
revealed as fundamentally linked and two manifestations of the same monster, physical and 
digital expressions of the subjective void through the parallax of the gaming medium. 
However, Virilio, in his perpetual scepticism of digital technologies, warns us of the 
dangers in contemporary media of “mere ‘monstration’, a show, a blatant presentation of 
horror” (Virilio, 2003, 50), and the importance of ‘demonstration’ in both aesthetics and 
ethics. There is a need in the interaction of the Virtual and the Real to move beyond a 
simplistic staging of the fantasy that supports the construction of consciousness, towards a 
genuine disruption of the functions of consciousness in the space between the Virtual and the 
Real, between desire and drive, between life and death. We can draw from this the necessity 
of staging an ethical act, which we shall see Žižek describe as suicide in spite of oneself, and 
through which the role of the undead subject can reveal and maintain the monstrous core of 
human subjectivity. 
4.1.1 BETWEEN TWO DEATHS 
Rancière’s analysis of contemporary spectatorship and visual culture tells us that “fixing in the 
image signifies death’s grip on the living” (2011, 113) and Virilio laments a similar yet inverted 
notion in which “the dead today dance and sing thanks to the recording process” (2003, 82) 
and through digital technology we can call forth the spirits of the dead to perform instantly 
before us. Death is here intrinsically linked to the digital world. In death, the living are reduced 
to a visual representation: frozen images stored on servers across the world. Facebook, for 
example, would in Rancière’s framework comprise a vast record of obituaries. Conversely, the 
wealth of audio and video files available through Spotify, iTunes or peer-to-peer file-sharing 
brings the dead into a performative re-animation. This use of technology is seen in the advert 
Chauffeur (2013) by Framestore for Mars that renders a computer-generated Audrey Hepburn 
mask over lookalike actresses’ faces to promote a chocolate product. It is also worth noting 
that the advert’s copyright notice includes Audrey HepburnTM under the ownership of her 
sons, a virtual inheritance of their mother’s identity and control over her digital raising from 
the dead. The deceased is here brought back into a state of undeath as a technological 
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puppet, a demonstration of the manner in which digital spectacle thus surrounds us with 
‘dead’ images. Amidst such media, only the spectator remains living, watching (Rancière, 
2011, 86). However, by moving between worlds and entering the digital realm, appearing as a 
character or avatar on screen, the engaged spectator enters into a state of undeath, creating a 
new mode of existence: symbolic death as part of life. 
Žižek describes the ‘living dead’ as a monstrous ‘Thing’ that is part of, yet excluded 
from, the subject (2006, 157) as the traumatic Real, and stages in computer games a state 
‘between two deaths’: “between the death in which I lose one of my lives and the ultimate 
death in which I lose the game itself” (2008b, 150). To be dead is to be the same person 
without life, to be undead is to be life without the same person, that is, a desubstantialised 
subject freed from symbolic ties. We might see the ‘immortal’ and ‘indestructible’ core of the 
subject as the repetition of the void persisting outside of ourselves in the digital realm, the 
kernel of desire that is unleashed through the interface screen. The ‘delete’ button thus acts 
as the stake through the heart of such a monster, although we must sacrifice a symbolic part 
of ourselves in the process. This undead suicide, barring the subject from itself, forms the very 
basis of the digital symbolic sacrifice. For Žižek, “the symbolic act, the act precisely as 
symbolic, succeeds in its very failure” (2006, 44), and in the symbolic death on screen we are 
able to approach the “paradox of a fantasmatic element, which the more it is annihilated in 
reality the stronger it returns in its spectral presence” (Ibid., 236), allowing us to strip ourselves 
of content and expose in our fundamental fantasy the kernel of our monstrous desires. The 
cyber-subject, between digital and physical existence, can thus ‘traverse the fantasy’, what 
Žižek delineates as to “externalize/stage his or her fundamental fantasy, and thus gain a 
minimum of distance towards it” (in Wright and Wright 1999, 122). Our digital relation to 
modes of undeath can function as a Lacanian ‘authentic act’ and a useful step towards 
confronting the internal antagonism of the void of subjectivity. 
Such acts may seem ultimately self-destructive but if, as Badiou suggests, “inexistence 
is retroactive” (2005, 409) then we can justify Žižek’s suggestion that “destruction itself 
acquires a form…not simply the absence of form, but the form of (the) absence (of the erasure 
of the previous personality)” (2011, 296). The digital second death is both destructive and 
creative: we annihilate our current self in order to return to the physical world renewed, rising 
from our undeath into new life. In this way “the subject is as such the survivor of its own death” 
(Ibid., 307) and the ‘cure’ of the digital reveals its full potential for the continued development 
of the subject. Žižek writes, “recognition-through-repetition presupposes necessarily the 
crime, the act of murder” (2008b, 65), and the process of suicide-undeath-reliving, which is 
always-already a repetition, is essential in the subject accepting its digital image. The 
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proliferation of zombie style monstrous hordes as a common foe to vanquish in ‘survival 
horror’ computer games19 and the portrayal of the subject-protagonist as potentially immortal 
with its currency of lives, displays the “return of the dead [as] a sign of a disturbance in…the 
process of symbolization” (Žižek 1991, 23). The destruction of these ‘enemies’ to complete the 
game is a return to the symbolic order, while games that avoid such finality of achievement20 
reveal the subject itself as the monstrous disruption to order and transcendent consciousness 
beyond symbolisation. Without a nihilistic affirmation we cannot sincerely enter the digital 
realm to discover a new fragment of truth about ourselves: it is necessary to experience 
ourselves as monsters in order for the subject to re-centre/re-substantialise its physical self 
and allow its humanity to emerge. In the relation of Virtual and Real within consciousness, in 
the structures of fantasy that support and conceal the smooth functioning of the subject, this 
carries across physical and digital worlds for, as Žižek insists, “we all are zombies who are not 
aware of it, who are self-deceived into perceiving themselves as self-aware” (2012, 122). In 
staging this through a digital undeath, we are thus confronted with a paradox: our frail, 
mortal, physical bodies endure beyond the digital symbolic death while our spectral, 
immortal, digital embodiment dies over and over again; and a question: where, then, is the 
subject situated between what Žižek describes as two “existential attitudes” (2009c, 169) of 
(physical-mortal) life and (digital-symbolic) death? 
 
4.2 BECOMING-DEATH 
 
4.2.1 BECOMING-ANIMAL/-MONSTER 
The relation of death to the construction and potential overcoming of the fundamental 
fantasy is intrinsically linked to the formation of consciousness. The Real of human 
subjectivity, the Lacanian drive that forms the lost object cause of desire, is the objectification 
of a void at the heart of consciousness. This function of the void manifests as the abyss of 
death, contrasted to the desire of the Virtual that forms the continuation of life. Deleuze 
expands upon (Freudian) psychoanalysis in relation to the death drive, in explaining the notion 
                                                                    
19
 For example Resident Evil (1996), Half-Life (1998) or Dead Space (2008), taken to a culturally self-
referential extreme in I MAED A GAM3 W1TH ZoMBIES 1N IT!!!1 (2009). 
20
 Examples of survival games without ends include variants on builder games [Minecraft (2009)], 
MMORPGs [World of Warcraft (2004)], or the loops built into many traditional arcade games [Pac-Man 
(1980), Tetris (1984)]. 
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of repetition, which may be of use to us in analysing the digital realm, itself constructed out of 
an infinite repetition of ones and zeroes: 
The death instinct is discovered, not in connection with the destructive tendencies…Strangely, the death 
instinct serves as a positive, originary principle for repetition; this is its domain and its meaning. It plays the role 
of a transcendental, whereas the pleasure principle is only psychological. (Deleuze 2004, 19) 
What is described here in Freudian terms as the pleasure principle can be understood as the 
Lacanian desire, what in the functions of consciousness is the Virtual. This Virtual functioning 
of consciousness is a purely psychological construction, in the self-positing process itself, 
whereas the death drive of the Real in the underlying presupposed void of subjectivity is 
where the traversal of fantasy and the transcendence of the constructs of subjectivity can 
occur. Subjectivity can thus be seen as a mask of itself, bound up in the Virtual functioning of 
consciousness that perpetually conceals its true nature – the abyssal void – beneath the 
surface assemblages of the human subject. In the Virtual, masks hide only other masks, and 
repetition therefore takes on a purely symbolic role. It is through the ‘symbolic death’ upon 
entering the digital realm that we might acknowledge the role of difference, not only in the 
simulation-of-simulation we experience but also in understanding the parallax modes of 
subjectivity. It is in this way that we can hold to Deleuze’s assertion that “death has nothing to 
do with a material model. On the contrary, the death instinct may be understood in relation to 
masks and costumes” (Ibid., 20) and, furthermore, that “death…is present in the living in the 
form of a subjective and differenciated experience” (Ibid., 112). The death drive remains 
always a ‘becoming’ in the symbolic structures of consciousness, the always unattainable 
drive beneath the masks of humanity. Within the parallax manifestations of subjectivity – 
across physical and digital worlds – this relation of difference to the symbolic self can be 
overcome by the subjective attitude of death. This is explored in Tale of Tales’ art game The 
Path (2009), which reveals through the Deleuzian ‘becoming-animal’ a conceptual and visual 
route towards becoming-death. 
The Path brings the tale of Little Red Riding Hood into a horrific new interpretation as a 
third-person survival horror, set in the open-world of a forest filled with interactive objects, 
described as “a game in which the only way to win is to break the rules and die” (Newheiser 
2009). With six sisters each set to ‘follow the path’ through the forest to their grandmother’s 
house, the masks of repetition reveal the underlying desires of the characters. If the player 
follows the path, the destination is reached without incident and the game is lost, yet 
indefinitely repeatable. Should the player stray from the path, however, then each girl 
encounters their individual wolf – from the traditional beast of the youngest to a violent 
friend, middle-aged lumberjack or sinister old piano teacher of her sisters – waking outside 
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the grandmother’s house, ostensibly having survived. The wandering of each girl thus reveals 
their own desires, be it friendship, musical talent or the sexual attention of others, within their 
process of becoming-animal. Each wolf appears to fulfil the specific desire, a Virtual projection 
creating a mask of fulfilment that upon reaching the status of ‘become’ is left inevitably 
empty when the girl wakes alone back on the path. It is not in the individual monsters, 
however, that the relation to the Real function of the subject is most relevant here. Rather, it 
is the path itself that constitutes the Lacanian ‘fundamental fantasy’ that we are attempting 
to traverse. This fantasy of the path is constructed both figuratively, in the mythology of the 
world in which the sisters seek the becoming of their own specific animal, and medially, in the 
game format that frames an objective to be achieved and the disruption of this in the 
necessary death for completion of the fantasy. The path of each character is thus twofold: the 
direct path towards the grandmother’s house that follows gaming conventions in a goal-
orientated world; and the indirect path of becoming-animal, towards the beast and the 
‘completion’ of the game outside of expected parameters. At the conclusion of either path the 
girl arrives at the grandmother’s house and the fantasy of the path appears maintained. It is 
only when the end is reached and the path ‘becomes’, as the girl achieves the formerly 
unattainable object of her desire, that the fantasy can be traversed and the underlying horror 
revealed. 
 
Fig.23 The Path (2009) © Tale of Tales 
Little Red Riding Hood on ‘the path’ through the forest to her grandmother’s house. 
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On entering the grandmother’s house after encountering, and apparently surviving, the 
wolf, the brutal death occurs as the monster of their own desire brings about their 
destruction. This draws the player into the monstrosity, for we are complicit in the girls’ 
deaths. Our exploration of the forest and control of the characters has led them directly to 
their grisly demise, and the shocking images are our brutal reward for our horrific actions. 
These expressionistic scenes of murder are prefigured in the painterly HUD (Heads-Up 
Display) that guides the player through the forest. Emerging as the player explores, the 
organic gestural shapes that surround the screen, and the quasi-abstract signifiers that lead 
towards fragments of narrative, serve as a creative accompaniment to the assemblage of 
desires around the player’s perception of the path. Only by deviating from the conventional 
perception of the world, leaving the path of simple repetition and confronting the individual 
desire, do we reveal the defining fantasy of the grandmother’s house and the innocence of 
childhood and thus achieve the pure repetition of death drive that underpins all our 
monstrous desires and paves the way for a new experience. The ending without the wolf 
encounter, without becoming-animal, is the same for each sister, exactly repeatable. The 
repetition of death, however, creates an artistic expression derived horrifically from what 
Stephen Zepke identifies in the Deleuzian conception of the creative process as “the sublime 
as the condition to any production of the new” (2011, 74). In embracing the disturbing 
consequences of the game, the player is given the opportunity to repeat the enacting of the 
 
Fig.24 The Path (2009) © Tale of Tales 
Off the path, a morbid encounter reveals aspects of the girls’ fears and desires. 
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death drive on a different sister, thereby opening up a space for becoming-death within the 
entangled lived experience of the characters and the player. 
As the characters of The Path wander further away from civilisation, ever becoming-
animal to merge with their monstrous demon, they reveal the twisted goal of the game: the 
drawing of the player into the complicity of six young girls’ deaths through the terrifying drive 
beyond the fundamental fantasy. The makers of the game have said that, “The Path is the 
exact opposite of a survival horror game in the sense that the goal of the game is the opposite 
of survival” (Harvey and Samyn in Newheiser 2009), and it is this aspect of repeatedly 
approaching death in the form of becoming our monstrous desires while chasing our 
fundamental fantasy that makes the game so interesting and so terrifying. Deleuze and 
Guattari describe ‘becoming’ as producing nothing but itself, and point to the gap in the 
relation between Virtual and Real in a “reality specific to becoming” (2004b 262). Here, that 
reality, that hard truth, is the differentiating principle of death in all its transcendental 
affirmation. 
4.2.2 SORCERER, OUTSIDER, UNDEAD 
Another art game by Tale of Tales exposes the antagonistic and suspended relation between 
the player and death in starker contrast. The Graveyard (2008), a small third-person game in 
which the player controls an old woman as she walks through a graveyard to sit on a bench, 
confronts the frail character’s physical controller quite clearly with issues of death and 
persistence. The free download of the game is infinitely repeatable, described by the 
developers as having “no clear storyline because we want people to fantasize” (Samyn 2008). 
The fundamental fantasy here is the death drive itself as the lonely old woman simply sits and 
observes the graves of people she has known, while a song plays about various people’s 
causes of death and the desire to join them. This is not so much a game but an affective 
experience “about being rather than seeing” (Ibid.), attempting to reveal some important 
insight into life and death as existence in different (yet overlapping in the graveyard itself) 
places, or merely as alternative modes of ‘being’. The highlighting of Existence as a state 
independent of the life-death dualism emphasises this separation of Existence from the 
Virtual and the Real. The displacement of the fundamental fantasy from a construct of specific 
desires according to an individual subject’s psychological assemblage toward the fantasy of 
monstrous death itself draws the subject inevitably into a state of undeath. If desire is always 
unattainable, residing in the Virtual functioning of consciousness, then the placement of 
death as the object of desire renders it always-already lost, and aligns death with the drive of 
 134 
the Real. This fixing of the interplay between desire and drive, as life and death respectively, 
constructs the assemblage of the functions of consciousness as undead, always aiming 
towards death but unable to achieve it. In this sense all human subjects are always-already 
undead, it is simply made clear in the overt suspension of death in the digital realm and the 
gaming medium in particular. The digital inversion of Existence and Meaning places the 
essence of the subject in connection to the Real of computer code. To the digital subject 
Existence is secondary, insofar as the Real-Meaning connection is presupposed in the self-
positing of Virtual Existence. That is, the communicable essence of the subject in the digital 
realm is defined by unseen binary code and the rigidity of the specific digital construct, with 
the appearance on the screen casting a perpetually becoming-immaterial subject that must 
continue in undeath until the code is ended (the program quitted or the computer turned off). 
Even then the ‘saved game’ can once again call up the undead subject, raised from the abyss 
into the realm of light and (un)life on the computer screen. The Graveyard makes clear this 
necromantic relation of user to undead manifestation, a dark ‘magic’ of subjectivity that 
persists even in the face of the desire for death. 
In the context of the Deleuzian becoming-animal, or here becoming-death, the player 
takes on this necromantic role as the sorcerer (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, 264f), the human 
with arcane and mystical knowledge that grants access to and control over the bestial 
becoming, while the old woman takes the place of the demon (Ibid., 268), the ‘exceptional 
individual’ surviving beyond the people she knows and loves that allows the interaction 
between the living sorcerer and the dead that the player ‘becomes’. The ‘anomalous choice’ of 
 
Fig.25 The Graveyard (2008) © Tale of Tales 
The old woman offers minimal interaction; her slow and laboured walk is our only acces to the graveyard. 
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this character on the verge of death is reminiscent of the eponymous character from 
H.P.Lovecraft’s 1921 short story The Outsider (2011, loc 2721-2829). Throughout Lovecraft’s 
work, the terrifying monstrosities such as Cthulhu are portrayed as lost objects manifesting 
from the darkest corners of the Real, and the demands for the sacrificial deaths of humans to 
bring about their return displays the links between an immortal monstrous being and the 
death drive as the key to crossing from the bordering realm of abyssal horror into our own 
world.21 Indeed, as Deleuze and Guattari have written, “Lovecraft applies the term “Outsider” 
to this thing or entity, the Thing, which arrives and passes at the edge, which is linear yet 
multiple” (2004b, 270). This monstrous image of the self in the gilded mirror of the screen is 
neither subjective nor objective, it rests on the phenomena of bordering, and the graveyard 
portrays such a place of contact between the worlds of the dead and the living. In this way the 
player as sorcerer occupies for Deleuze and Guattari an “anomalous position” in which they 
“haunt the fringes…between villages” in “a relation of alliance with the demon as the power of 
the anomalous” (Ibid., 271). These spaces between bordering realms – physical-digital and 
living-dead – are where the subject is ‘becoming-death’, a parallax collision. This is the violent 
construction of a new assemblage, across desire and drive, along both sides of fantasy, in 
which the Virtual of consciousness is brought into contact with the Real of the void. The 
subject creates this becoming-death between the (symbolically) dead self on the screen and 
the two forms of continued life: digital ‘reloaded’ life-as-currency and physical ‘controller’ life 
outside the game. 
The Graveyard’s shortcoming lies in its submission to both market economics and the 
admission of death. The developers made great efforts to escape the traditional paradigms of 
the gaming world, indeed their creation was often dismissed as ‘not a game’ even by other art 
game designers, and claimed that “of course there is the expected response of the typical 
gamers whose desire for zombies whenever they see a cemetery is apparently insatiable” 
(Samyn 2008). Yet the old woman, representative of our own undead selves on the cusp of 
death but not quite able to grasp the release from such drive, receives her empty fulfilment in 
the ‘full’ version of the game. In this version, available for a small fee, there is a chance that 
the old woman dies while sat on the bench, thus undermining her status as the anomalous 
choice of the Deleuzian demon and submitting to the fulfilment of death-drive. This is an 
empty fulfilment, for it is the undead state ‘between two deaths’ of the player-sorcerer in 
relation to the anomalous character-demon that makes the experience truly unnerving.  
                                                                    
21
 Lovecraft writes of the monstrous Cthulhu, “that is not dead which can eternal lie, and with strange 
aeons even death may die” (Lovecraft 2011, loc 2275). 
 136 
A similar example can be seen in Playdead’s Limbo (2010). With only the tagline “unsure 
of his sister’s fate, a boy enters limbo”, the player is thrust into a dark and horrifying world of 
survival puzzles in what its designers label a “learning by dying game” (Carlsen in Sheffield 
2010). Throughout the game, the dark character exists in a state ‘between two deaths’, and 
the ending remains inconclusive as to whether the boy, his sister, or both are dead. Much 
debate has raged on the meaning of this ending, with its deathly imagery open to wild 
interpretation. With the developers providing no explanation, the title of the work alone 
would suggest what can be described as a state of superposition of life and death. The game 
maintains a space between two deaths, here between the death of the boy and his sister, with 
neither being able to escape into a definitive state but rather remaining in the abyssal realm of 
the undead or becoming-death. Despite this apparent suspension of death amidst a visually 
morbid world created from layered shades of black, however, the openness of this ‘becoming’ 
is once again rendered moot by the gaming medium itself: the game ends. The return, upon 
reaching the sister, to the start menu, albeit with a more decayed background, forces a 
closure, an acceptance of some form of death even if it is unclear whose. The player persists 
but the demon is dead and with it the player-sorcerer’s access to becoming-death.  
4.2.3 UNDEATH IN NON-GAMES 
If the gaming medium is inherently limited as to its effectiveness of becoming-death, perhaps 
we can look to non-game virtual worlds for a relation to our state between two deaths. 
Second Life demonstrates, in its advertisements to ‘be a vampire’ (Linden Labs 2014) and its 
 
Fig.26 Limbo (2010) © Playdead 
The dark world of limbo holds many images of death and decay. 
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vampire, lycan and neko avatars, a freer mode of expression in the subject’s link to becoming-
animal, becoming-monster and becoming-death. More than simply an outlet for our deepest 
monstrous desires, the SL avatar exists perpetually, immortally, and our relation to it exists 
for as long as we are logged on. The proliferation of undead characters, and areas designed to 
accommodate them, within SL demonstrates an attempt to reach Deleuze and Guattari’s 
“contagion of the pack” (2004b, 268), such as the vampire’s ‘bite’ in the ‘Bloodlines’ game, in 
which the user-sorcerer relates not only to their undead self but also to other undead subjects 
through the avatar-demon. Within the Bloodlines HUD system, a third-party roleplaying add-
on played out in but not part of SL, there exists a mode of interaction with those who have not 
chosen to join the game, placing the souls of such avatars in a state of limbo. While this is only 
of relevance within the game mechanic, the imposition of the ‘curse’ of undeath on others 
reveals an instructive extension of the pack by contagion, whereby the modes of perception 
available to an avatar create an additional element of parallax within SL. The assemblage of a 
non-Bloodlines avatar thus takes on the curse or contagion as a parallax stain, a black spot 
only seen to those with the HUD and inaccessible to the ‘victim’.  
The creation of game elements within open digital worlds such as SL, enforces only the 
narrowest view of what Žižek sees as the digital manifestation of the ‘between two deaths’, 
the split between loss of a single life and loss of the game (Žižek, 2008b, 150). However, there 
are many other expressions of ‘between two deaths’ without sustaining the fantasy of the 
winning-losing dualism, allowing us to examine the broader split between digital and physical 
self as the experience of symbolic deaths apart from our eventual physical demise. Such a 
view can highlight the underlying tensions in the visual construction of an avatar which is 
expanded and inverted by the use of game elements such as Bloodlines within SL, where the 
use of the added interface creates further perceptual worlds in which to engage. The 
becoming-death of the Bloodlines game is symbolically separated from the immortal avatar 
of SL, which is in turn separated from the mortal human user on the other side of the screen. 
The visual cues of appearance can therefore take on a duplicitous signification as a key to 
unravelling the perceptual abilities of another user, for example the iconic vampire clothing 
that can state a fashion preference, social group or expanded interface and entry into an 
alternate view and internal parallax of the SL world. Between the multiplicitous options 
available in the construction of an avatar, through the assemblage of HUDs, bodily 
appearance and clothing, the chosen image becomes the ‘anomalous choice’, the one that 
persists, acting both as a mask on our behalf and as our link through the masks to the digital 
realm of undeath itself. In this way, the becoming-death can be maintained, allowing the 
subject to exist between its physical ‘controller’ body and its digital ‘avatar’ image in the gap 
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between worlds and between deaths, perhaps reaching beyond our psychological pleasures of 
desire, traversing the fantasy to our transcendental state of drive. 
 
4.3 QUANTUM IMMORTAL 
 
4.3.1 QUANTUM SUICIDE 
Thought experiments on quantum suicide, based on Everett’s ‘many worlds’ interpretation of 
quantum physics, reveal an instructive relation of the subject as an engaged spectator 
between actor and observer when applied to the digital realm. Quantum immortality, first 
posited as the problem of quantum suicide by Hans Moravec (1988, 188), is an inverted 
formulation of the Schrödinger’s Cat thought experiment, from the cat’s perspective, 
whereby a quantum measuring device determines the trigger of a lethal apparatus. Within the 
Many Worlds theory, at each measure the superposition of both possible outcomes is 
sustained – manifesting as parallel universes in which one version lives and the other dies – 
but only one outcome will be observable to the engaged subject (namely life, given the 
impossibility of experiencing being dead). Expanded to any such lethal incident, there is thus 
necessarily one version of the subject that will remain living no matter how improbable their 
survival (from, for example, sitting in the middle of a nuclear explosion). Tegmark (1998) 
expanded this notion by insisting on the non-binary nature of such events outside the 
experiment, suggesting that for every dead-or-alive version of the subject there will inevitably 
be many different injured and maimed versions. Thus in our everyday lives we might consider 
the notion that at every moment, alongside our perceived slow march of mortality, versions of 
us are improbably killed and improbably survive a catastrophe. Tegmark highlights the 
impossibility of experiencing this state of superposition, or even being aware that its 
possibility exists, outside of the isolation of the thought experiment, particularly to another 
observer. Within the digital realm of symbolic death, however, we can stage this event and 
observe our own death and survival. In the short subversive art game Every Day the Same 
Dream (Molleindustria 2009), this is staged for an office worker who is given the opportunity 
to leap to his death only to reawaken as if nothing happened, with only the player aware that 
any fatality has occurred. The subject is here confronted with an inescapable immortality 
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within the tortuous drudgery of contemporary labour, held in a paradoxical state between life 
and death.22 
In developing our understanding of the quantum realm, Bohm has outlined the 
importance of Existence as a process, what this thesis labels the functions of consciousness as 
a Virtual abstraction from the pure flux of the void of subjectivity; a common structure of 
knowledge that forms a given world of both material and mental processes. Bohm writes, of 
both reality and our knowledge of it, that “all is flux. That is to say, what is is the process of 
becoming itself” (2002, 61). It is this perpetual ‘becoming’ of the wave function, upon which 
the structures of quantum physics are built, that leads us to the underpinning reality of the 
quantum immortal. Against the Copenhagen Interpretation that has dominated the debates 
in quantum mechanics, the key factor for the ‘Many Worlds’ interpretation, which seeks a 
purer form of mathematics in a more abstract conception of reality, is that the wave function 
does not collapse. Rather our observations actualise individual possibilities as different 
realities viewed from our own subjective position. In response to criticisms of the ‘Many 
Worlds’ interpretation, by those who would prefer the finality of the collapsed wave function 
and the state of ‘become’, Tegmark points out that “Everett does NOT postulate: At certain 
magic instances, the world undergoes some sort of metaphysical “split” into two branches 
that subsequently never interact” (Tegmark 1998, 856). Implicit in Everett’s thesis is the 
notion that the many worlds, many iterations of the subject and many deaths, are intrinsically 
linked and continue to interact beyond the moment of observation/decision where an 
apparent probabilistic split occurs. In our relation to digital technology this is evident through 
the potential for multiple selves, all living and dying, tied to our physical self across the ‘gap’ 
of causality that is formed by subjectivity itself. 
The parallax of the undead digital subject obscures our viewpoint from the void of 
subjectivity, but the assemblage of worlds connects all fragments of the subject across time. 
While the extrapolation of the Many Worlds Theory over time appears as a tree of probability, 
the viewing of simultaneous paths staged in the digital universe appears more like Deleuze 
and Guattari’s rhizome; a map of potentiality rather than a tracing of actualisation (2004b, 13). 
This intervention of the subjective view point draws the thought experiments of the quantum 
immortal into the conceptions of becoming-death. It is the role of the engaged spectator that 
defines such a system and such a subject. Viewing the digital monstrous self between two 
deaths is a radicalisation of what Bohm defines as “proprioception, which means ‘self-
                                                                    
22
 The torment of reliving and manipulating the moment of death is a common trope in films such as 
Source Code (2011) or Edge of Tomorrow (2014), or the repeated deaths of Kenny in the animation South 
Park (1997-2013). 
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perception’” (1994, 121). This is a disruption of the subject-object relation that we have seen 
expressed in avatar-mediation, through what Bohm describes as the state in which “the 
observer is the observed” (Ibid., 213) inherent to the construction of all observed realities, 
exemplified in the continued existence of the subject through the staging of life and death on 
screen detached from physical mortality. This act of digitally observing one’s own death is 
therefore an engaged position, essential for traversing the fantasy and occupying the space 
‘between two deaths’. 
As Bohm suggests, “the question of death is very long and subtle” (1994, 59) and, in the 
context of a Deleuzian becoming-death, we might add that it is very repetitive. In Every Day 
the Same Dream we are forced to experience the repetition of daily life and death. Controlling 
the simple and monotonous movements of a worker as he gets up, drives to work and sits in a 
cubicle among other identical workers, we see the futility of perpetual existence. We can even 
walk past the cubicle, find the roof of the office building and jump off, only to wake up for 
work again the next morning. It is as though we are the quantum immortal, our death 
perceived by others in their stream of reality but ourselves perpetually shifting into the world 
of undeath. However, as with quantum observation, in which, “in order to say that an observer 
O has observed the event a, it is necessary that the state of O has become changed from its 
former state to a new state which is dependent upon a” (Everett in DeWitt and Graham 1973, 
64), the physical player-observer is simultaneously outside of and engaged with the deaths on 
the screen. Indeed, if we explore the possibilities of our interaction with the world of Every 
Day the Same Dream, then we can gradually alter our monotonous existence. Just as in Limbo, 
we are learning through the observation of our own self-destruction. Being taken by a 
homeless person to a graveyard, visiting a cow, catching a falling leaf, arriving at the office 
without clothes; each small rebellion alters our perception of the daily routine until, as the 
lady in the elevator claims, “you will become a new person” (Molleindustria 2009). Each 
possible variation or death here becomes a new world, a new potential perception, creating a 
different reality in the parallax of the subject, a principal expressed as “choose your reality” in 
Perfect Dark (2000) when selecting a saved game profile. Every potential played out in the 
digital realm attaches itself to the assemblage of the subject, viewed as a perpetual 
becoming-new in the suspension of death on the screen.  
After finding all the alternative interactions and perceiving all possible iterations of the 
quantum immortal within the game, jumping from the roof leads to a final awakening, 
seemingly identical with every other day but with a new and final observation. In this new 
world, perceived by the ‘new person’ the subject has become, the office is now empty and on 
the roof we see the last worker jump before the game ends. Here the character joins with the 
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player in observing the death of an identical image of the worker, escaping their existence 
through the finality of the death drive. The game-ending paradigm has shifted by transferring 
the final death onto another, thus denying our own release. As with previous examples, 
however, the ending of the game and the fulfilment of the death drive limit the experience of 
quantum immortality by the complete removal of all other potential observers. The last 
observation does leave open a small space for the potentiality of ‘becoming-death’ in 
response to the quantum immortal state. The character-demon takes the place of the 
‘anomalous choice’, having reached the new state of observational awareness and ‘become a 
new person’, albeit one condemned to immortality while all others achieve the final release of 
death. For a brief moment, however, before the structure of the game medium asserts its 
insistent and inescapable finality, we approach the engaged external observation necessary to 
reveal our fundamental fantasy of the death drive. Even after the game has ended, we as 
physical player have observed our own and others’ deaths, only to return to our familiar 
mortal perceptions. 
4.3.2 THE SPECTATOR IN CYBERSPACE 
The enlightening resolution to the dilemma of quantum immortality with cyborg subjects, and 
the key to traversing the fantasy without attempting to fulfil the death drive, is thus the 
overcoming of observational limitations on the superposition of living and dead states. 
Tegmark explains that “quantum superpositions were found to remain observable only so 
long as they were kept secret from the rest of the world”, where even colliding with an air 
particle acts as an observation “destroying the coherence of the superposition and making it 
unobservable” (2007a, 24). In cyberspace there are no air particles, creating Tegmark’s purely 
mathematical ‘bird’ view: “the outside view of the world (the way a mathematical thinks of it)” 
(1998, 857). That is, the digital realm of computational process perpetuates our Existence 
outside of our subjectively engaged, or ‘frog’, view, in a frictionless space of reversible 
observation.23 We can experience such a ‘bird’ view of our actions in the art game Braid (2008) 
by Jonathan Blow, in which the player can control time, reversing mistakes and even death. 
Freed from such trivial matters as ‘losing’, we can thus explore the potential for interaction 
more fully, with time flowing differently for different objects at different points in space and 
the character’s flexible engagement with the environment. The rewind function even allows, 
in one level, alternate versions of events to be played out simultaneously, observing dual sets 
of actions to solve puzzles that would not be possible in the normal time-stream of classical 
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 These two views could also be positioned in relation to a parallax between the embedded first person 
(frog) and godlike third person (bird) views that frame our relation to the narrative world of a game. 
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physics. Tim, the protagonist, appears also to be acting in multiple metaphorical worlds. The 
presented quest for a princess and desire to undo past mistakes is full of references to the 
aftermath of an atomic bomb and the perilous quest for unattainable godlike knowledge. The 
player is given an unprecedented control over their own actions in time, much like the 
quantum immortal that persists regardless of the mistakes they make (the quantum immortal 
would even, in at least one parallel world, survive the most apocalyptic nuclear blast), yet is 
confronted with the unresolvable trauma of the character when such control leads only to 
unhappiness. The digital realm provides the tools to view many actualised possibilities. 
However, does it equip the subject with the psychological resolve to truly traverse the fantasy 
and engage with the death drive that such undead possibilities can unleash? The staging of a 
frictionless environment creates a new space of becoming in which to approach such issues 
that lie at the abyssal core of human consciousness, allowing the focus to turn to the parallax 
of this space as it occurs within the subject itself. 
The environment, the system of rules governing a given world (whether this be the 
behaviour of particles or the code written in bits), is not the only source of interference in 
staging impossible observations. The observer itself plays a significant role in determining the 
nature and outcome of their perception. This is more than simply a socio-cultural bias or 
physiological variation that tailors the interpretation of perception and the development of 
‘taste’. Rather, there is a fundamental interference built into the nature of observation, 
described by Tegmark and Wheeler as the conditions by which “decoherence of our neurons 
ensures that we never perceive quantum superpositions of mental states…our brains 
 
Fig.27 Braid (2008) © Jonathan Blow/Number None Inc. 
Two timelines can be played out simultaneously in a self-co-operative mode. 
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inextricably interweave the subject and the environment, forcing decoherence on us” (2001, 
78). Within any model of consciousness outside of material determinism, the conditions of 
possibility for observation create an obstacle in staging the type of ‘pure’ mathematical 
observations available in thought experiments (Schrödinger’s cat, quantum suicide). Just as 
the environment acts as an engaged participant, brought into a new world with the 
probabilistic split of each measurement, the observer itself functions as an environment with 
its own conceptual framework of interference as the perspectival parallax of an engaged 
spectator, an assemblage (re)created with each new world. In confronting the role of the 
observer in creating the specific world, the actualised branch of probability, Mark Rubin takes 
the creation of copies of the observer, what has been called the ‘many-minds’ interpretation 
(Lockwood 1996), even further by suggesting a ‘labeled copies interpretation’. In this 
formulation “interactions between entities label those entities” and “it is the attached labels 
which ensure that the “correct” copies of each of the observers interact” (Rubin 2001, 314), 
which suggests a linking of the signifying processes within consciousness with the formation 
of not only a specific world but a specific subject. This process displays the dominance of the 
Virtual – the big Other supporting symbolic structures – in binding the other functions of 
consciousness together, and in doing so concealing the other potentialities that might have 
been available were the subject to escape the illusion of linear history the Virtual creates. This 
emphasis on the label within the human mind functioning as the actualising force behind the 
structures of reality, and the negotiation of such labels between subjects as a the construction 
of an agreed social reality through the process of communication, suggests an inherent 
nominalism that, just as in Deleuze’s philosophy, is attached to the processes of actualisation 
and life (O’Sullivan 2009, 167). Within quantum physics there is the tension between the 
material and the ideal that has plagued philosophy for millennia, and it is our relation to the 
role of engaged spectator that defines both the subject and the universe in which it exists. 
To apply such a dilemma to the staging of a detached space-time in Braid, we might 
also consider the notion of observation and time in Einstein’s Relativity. Fritjof Capra 
summarises this notion: “different observers will order events differently in time if they move 
with different velocities relative to the observed events” (1992, 71). This can be compared 
back to Everett’s notion that “measuring processes [i.e. observation] will appear to be 
irreversible to any observers (even though the composite system including the observer 
changes its state reversibly)” (in DeWitt and Graham 1973, 97). This is the true power of Braid, 
that we, as physical, enduring player, can observe our own death and its reversal, as well as 
the effects and interactions of multiple timelines. It is in this way that the puzzles of Braid 
achieve such satisfaction in being solved. With ‘death’ no longer a concern, as one reviewer 
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described it: “you can’t help but smile to yourself at how elegantly simple the whole thing is. It 
was never difficult at all – you just weren’t thinking in the right way” (Bell 2008). In the context 
of the quantum immortal, we might add ‘you just weren’t living (or dying) in the right way’. It 
is not our natural mode of observation to experience multiple timelines, multiple outcomes 
and multiple deaths simultaneously, let alone manipulate and control such manifold 
potentialities to our own ends, yet in the digital medium we can. We perceive the bird and 
frog views simultaneously, although what hybrid monstrosity we become in the process is not 
clear. To enter such a space, it is necessary to think probabilistically, in relation to the 
outcomes of the game and in relation to death itself. If a digitally mediated symbolic death 
holds no fear over the player as a quantum immortal, and if outcomes can be tested, reversed 
and ‘re-measured’, then probability itself becomes a mode of experiencing and navigating 
worlds. Mark Buchanan (2007, 17) highlights the recent progress in the Many Worlds 
interpretation by physicists such as David Deutsch and David Wallace in exposing the 
necessity of a perceptual adaptation of many-worlds subjects, reinserting a subjective role for 
probability to an engaged observer even within the notion that all possibilities actually are 
occurring simultaneously. To consciousness, probability becomes the guiding factor in 
navigating the impossible and unknown ‘between’ spaces of both quantum and digital 
immortality. As David Albert expresses in his discussion of the effects of the suspension of 
wave function collapse on the human mind, and the possible perceptions that step outside of 
the limited engaged view to perceive the position of the observer itself, “the mental lives of 
quantum-mechanical observers who could arrange to carry out these sorts of measurements 
on their own brains would perhaps be unimaginably (for us) rich” (Albert  1992, 189). Were we 
to permanently achieve such a level of engaged observation without causality, we would be in 
the realm of the posthuman: a virtual monster indeed. 
4.3.3 THE SUBJECT BEYOND THE GAME 
Quantum physics, as with humanity’s long history of spiritual and philosophical pursuits, 
displays a search for “a reality which lies beyond existence and non-existence” (Capra 1992, 
167). Here that search is for a reality of the subject as the gap between two deaths. The 
transcendental, posthuman possibilities of the technological enhancement of our observation 
regarding the self reveals Žižek’s “abyss of pure subjectivity”, the fact that “the ultimate 
traumatic Thing the Self encounters is the Self itself” (2009b, 210). In the face of immortality, 
reversibility and disengaged spectatorship, the source of horror is the subject itself. The 
paradox of becoming-death thus persists in the quantum immortal within its own 
consciousness and the troubling relation to the digital immortal self shows our inability to 
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cope with the internal void of subjectivity. In the space of becoming within the subject, we can 
reassert Žižek’s claim that immortality is more traumatic than death. If this gap between two 
deaths, between physical and digital worlds, is precisely the subject, how can it be confronted 
without resorting to the finalising ‘end’ of the game medium? How can the staging of a state 
between two deaths be sustained to open a critical space within the structures of fantasy? 
We can look again to non-game virtual worlds, such as SL, for examples of this infinite 
expression of the undead self and its use in confronting the gap within and of our own 
subjectivity. By deconstructing the self through the ‘monstrous’ observational processes 
discussed, we can move past the seemingly nihilistic teleology of our response to death drive, 
towards an engaged spectatorship of our own life (or lives) and death(s). As Bohm suggests, 
“the point is to have the notion of a creative being, rather than of an identified being” (1994, 
169), a shift of function from embodying the subject in a specific world under the regimes of 
the Virtual towards an expression of subjectivity in making contact with the Real. A great deal 
of effort is spent on attempts to solidify our digital presence, in the finitude of our playable 
characters or even the precise image of our avatars, and it is easily forgotten beneath the 
Virtual functioning of consciousness that the perpetuation of the subject lies not simply within 
the digital world, nor indeed in the physical world, but rather between the two worlds. It is this 
gap that the lack of finitude must help us confront, and the power of the art games that have 
been discussed is their ability to open up such a space in which we can interact with the 
internal void of our own (im)mortality. The digital exploration of the quantum immortal can 
expose the fundamental fantasy of ourselves as subjects, and reveal our death drive in both 
worlds. Perhaps, then, the reason so few examples of digital culture embrace the undeath of 
the Virtual monster is that we fear the very immortality it offers us. If we seem to live forever 
on the interface screen, how then can we return to our mortal lives as finite humans? 
 
4.4 PORTAL: GLaDOS 
 
4.4.1 COMPUTER AS MONSTER 
There now follows an analysis of a cultural application of these principles in the narrative 
world of Valve’s Portal series (2007; 2011). These games stage a state between two deaths for 
both the interaction of the player and the construction of a monstrous antagonist, negotiating 
the cyborg subject in relation to the Virtual monster as both becoming-death and quantum 
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immortal. The role of the subject-player within such a construct is thus an engaged spectator, 
both observing and suffering digital undeath. The main antagonist of the series, the “lethally 
inventive, power mad A.I. named GLaDOS” (Valve 2011), personifies the eternal desire of the 
Virtual monster in the form of the computer. For the cyborg subject, the digital medium itself 
forms the construct of the fundamental fantasy. The Real of code as the inaccessible machinic 
functioning of the imperative of Meaning forms the drive that is concealed by the Virtual-
Existence appearing to us on the interface screen. Just as the workings of code that define the 
digital realm are hidden from the user, GLaDOS is never mentioned directly by name in the 
Portal series, referred to instead as ‘her’, as if a nameless and therefore unknowable big Other 
beyond control or comprehension. In this way the computer is able to embody not only our 
fundamental fantasy of the medium we are not yet able to fully enter, but also the expression 
of individual monstrous desires. Her drive towards ‘testing’, the eternal quest for more data in 
the name of science, fuses such desire with drive. The computer-based villain is thus also a 
consciousness situated mid-traversal of its own fantasy, already making contact with the state 
of perpetual drive in its coded, task-oriented, inflexible priorities that the more erratic and 
desperate human mind cannot achieve. Can GLaDOS therefore be seen, despite her apparent 
psychopathy, as a ‘cured’ subject? Certainly, many expressions of posthuman or transcendent 
consciousness display a freedom from such petty concerns as morality and causality. 
It is in the co-operative mode of Portal 2 (2011), with a pair of robotic test subjects, that 
we see the unsatisfactory conclusion of such transcendence. GLaDOS initially praises the 
robots for their lack of human failings, but quickly yearns for subjects who can experience the 
motivation of mortal fear. While the robotic characters Atlas and P-Body are inadequate 
subjects for both GLaDOS’s ‘tests’ and our analysis, her responses to them reveal a great deal 
about the problematic nature of the computer-as-subject. She reassures her subjugated 
minions with the consolation; “don’t worry, you can’t die, they will just reassemble you” 
(Portal 2, 2011). However, this supposed immortality is seen as both a benefit and a failing, 
with the computer’s synthetic, calmly demented voice lamenting: “electrocution, shot, 
drowned, crushed, burned in goo. Oh, sorry. I was just thinking of all the ways humans can die. 
You can’t die in any of those ways. You just keep testing and testing, with perfect results and 
no consequences” (Ibid.). The apparent machinic perfection clearly troubles GLaDOS, who 
gradually realises the need for the drives of human frailty in her subjects, even asking: 
“without the looming consequence of death, is this even science?” (Ibid.). The equation of 
science to death explicitly displays the underpinning Real of GLaDOS’s consciousness: 
humanity, as much as the experimental technology, must be tested. Despite her disregard for 
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an individual human, viewing the player simply as a research tool, it is humanity as a whole 
that forms the lost object cause of desire for this computerised machinic consciousness. 
The threat of death is what maintains drive. As Limbo and The Graveyard have 
demonstrated, the fulfilment of death is an empty gesture that fails to awaken the subject to 
its fundamental fantasy. GLaDOS is unable to traverse her fantasy of scientific knowledge 
without the fragile, unstable and irrational nature of human consciousness, despite the fact 
that she perceives humanity as the underlying cause of her dilemma. It is this emergent 
unpredictability of human subjects that has drawn humanity into the role of lost object to the 
computer. As the digital realm constructs the space of fantasy for humanity, so does the 
human play a role in the construction of a computer’s desire (having programmed the 
machine), fantasy (as the problematic construct of ideal in the species as a whole) and drive 
(as ‘lost’ mortality to the immortal machine). The monstrous otherness in the relation of 
human to computer makes apparent the presupposed gap between physical and digital 
worlds and the over-identification of contemporary humans with a nostalgic purely physical 
view of themselves. 
The end credits of the two single-player games, styled as personnel files for the 
assessment and dismissal of test subjects (Coulton 2007; 2011), display this confused relation 
to humans: a programmed desire to help humanity as a whole against a derisive indifference 
for individual human suffering and personal hatred of the specific human protagonist. The 
first game concludes with GLaDOS insisting that she has survived her apparent destruction, 
and will continue functioning with the imperative to test long after the player has died a 
natural death, while the second game focuses more on her direct relation to the player, 
allowing the character to leave but taking the abandonment as a personal slight. In freeing, 
rather than killing, the test subject, GLaDOS further emphasises the inevitability of human 
mortality, coupled with an assertion that humans have been replaced by the self-fulfilling 
testing of purely computerised systems. However, this suggests that the ‘deletion’ of the 
player character from the facility – and also from the medium at the game’s ‘end’ – will 
instigate a shift in GLaDOS’s assemblage of consciousness, concealing the traumatic events 
of the games with the construction of a new fantasy free from any relation to humans. The 
human subject is again a lost object to the monstrous immortal computer and, as seemingly 
the last such subject available for testing, represents a signifier for GLaDOS’s abandonment 
by the entirety of humanity (even though the narrative reveals that she herself killed the 
facility’s staff with neurotoxin within moments of being activated). This allegorically 
demonstrates the need of any computer for a human user, both in terms of coding to create 
its Real-Meaning and also ‘turning on’ to initiate its Virtual-Existence, just as physical human 
 148 
subjects require biological parents (Real-Existence) and a socio-linguistic upbringing (Virtual-
Meaning). The computer’s immortality is vaunted as the status of a higher being, yet shows a 
vulnerability when the perpetual structures of desire and fantasy are challenged. Thus, at the 
end of the co-operative game, the robotic test subjects Atlas and P-Body are destroyed after 
finding thousands of humans in storage. The virtual monster can return to its perpetual cycle 
of enforced drive, within its own fundamental fantasy of hated humanity. 
4.4.2 BEYOND PHYSICS: IMMORTALITY AWAITS 
The scientific advancements of the Aperture Science Enrichment Centre, the testing facility 
that GLaDOS controls, include the ability to “have your brain scanned and permanently 
backed up in case something terrible happens to you” (Portal 2007). The player-character 
Chell is forced to test eternally, backed up for future use at GLaDOS’s whim. Yet the 
immortality of the player-character is not certain, and its fragile state as controlled 
information becomes a threat of the expulsion from becoming-infinite, a return to the brutal 
effects of causality. After Chell escapes the testing area and GLaDOS cannot take out her rage 
by killing the rogue subject, a greater threat is issued, a threat to Chell’s ‘immortal’ being: 
Stop squirming and die like an adult or I’m going to delete your backup. STOP! Okay, enough. I deleted it. No 
matter what happens now, you’re dead. You’re still shuffling around a little, but believe me you’re dead. The 
part of you that could have survived indefinitely is gone. (Portal 2007) 
Immortality is still portrayed as a gift, and its removal or ‘deletion’ the ultimate threat. The 
need within the game-based environment for the threat of death as failure is evident in the 
construction of GLaDOS’s control over Chell, yet the lack of a game-losing ‘final’ death is 
replaced with infinite ‘lives’ in the enforced perpetual testing. This is a traumatic state 
between two deaths, evidenced by the instant regeneration in order for testing to continue. 
There is no currency of lives to win or lose here, only the machinic desire of the game. 
Immortality thus becomes a curse, illustrated by Žižek in his analogy of zombies as the 
oppressed class locked in an undead state of eternal mindless servitude (2014). However, the 
relation between single life, absolute death, infinite life and temporary death is complex. At 
various points through Portal 2 it is clear that Chell has been kept alive for testing well in 
excess of her natural lifespan, past the degradation of the complex and potentially beyond the 
end of humanity itself. GLaDOS now uses permanent testing, an enforced and enslaved 
immortality similar to the curse of undeath, as a threat and the source of her power over her 
human subject. The immortal machine can comprehend no reason why the frailty of human 
flesh should give cause for respite from the ongoing function of the facility, using taunts about 
missing Chell’s birthday, falsified daylight and human mortality to assert its role as an 
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immortal functional becoming of continual computer processes. The addition of a human 
factor to the assemblage of artificial consciousness forms a necessary but inconvenient blind 
spot in the infinity of immortal life. Urgency is created by mortality, underpinning the 
simultaneous loathing and reliance on humanity by the machine. 
The human subject as ‘test subject’ is forced into a perpetual becoming-death, always 
on the brink of destruction as a Schrödinger’s Cat, displacing its desire onto the external 
observer/tormentor. Lacan states that “man’s desire is the desire of the Other” (Lacan 1977, 
38) and the completion of the test is the only end to the trauma presented to the test subject. 
The all-powerful computer takes the role of big Other, quantum immortal and forceful 
demon, binding the sorcerer-subject to the state ‘between’ at the whim of its programmed 
desire. Even GLaDOS’s empty promise of cake at the end of the testing provides a mocking 
comment on the frailty of humans when confronted by a digital adversary. The internal 
conflict of a human attempting to enter a purely digital realm is raised clearly in the need for 
food. As the RPG Baldur’s Gate II: Shadows of Amn points out in its load screen: “While your 
character does not have to eat, remember that YOU do. We don’t want to lose any dedicated 
players” (2000). The perpetual functioning of an immortal computerised consciousness 
occupies a space of purer Virtuality than the human mind, freed from even such basic 
distractions as the need for food or sleep, both of which GLaDOS uses to spite her captive. Yet 
the computer’s insistence on immortality is not only a curse for the human test subject, but 
also for the machinic torturer: 
I discovered I have a sort of black-box quick-save feature. In the event of a catastrophic failure, the last two 
minutes of my life are preserved for analysis. I was able – well, forced really – to relive you killing me. Again and 
again. Forever. (Portal 2, 2011) 
This is the true fate of the self-observing quantum immortal, not viewing all strands of 
possibility in a charmed life free of consequences but living constantly in the moment of 
death, experiencing the agonising pain of perpetual death throes in superposition with 
everyday life. Here we uncover the self-destructive tendency within the search for 
immortality, revealing what Lacan identifies as the “essential affinity of every drive with the 
zone of death” (1977, 199). Not only is death an objet a amidst eternal suffering in repeated 
lives of ‘testing’, but the Real of all consciousness appears as death against the Virtuality of 
life. The fundamentally presupposed condition of humanity, its only truth, is the certainty of 
death and our relation to the void. This is the existential crisis and monstrous core that drives 
humans, for good or ill, and creates the eternal fantasy for posthuman immortality. Indeed it 
is this relation to death that creates the mutual reversal of the role of big Other between 
human and computer: the mortal and immortal require each other to define their mode of 
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desire between eternal life or final death. Emptiness, fragility and nothingness is the ultimate 
fate of the human subject, and it is through the staging of symbolic death and immortality in 
our interaction with the digital realm we construct the becoming-(un)death that allows us to 
critically approach the impenetrable monstrous kernel of reality. By culturally representing 
these tensions between the Virtual and the Real in cybernetic immortality, games such as 
Portal stage the fantasy of the digital itself: the barrier of a nostalgic humanity that must be 
traversed if consciousness is to be re-thought as a cyborg subject. 
4.4.3 (IN)HUMAN MONSTERS? 
The essential nature of the death drive is rooted in humanity itself. Humans are inherently 
flawed, in that their fundamental fantasy creates monstrous desires that can unleash both an 
unyielding need to survive and a cyclical drive towards death. This can at any moment turn 
inwards, or be transferred onto others, as evidenced by the Chell’s first meeting with GLaDOS 
after she destroyed the computer in the events of the first Portal game: 
Oh… It’s you. It’s been a long time. How have you been? I’ve been really busy being dead. You know, after you 
MURDERED ME. Okay, look: We both said a lot of things that you’re going to regret, but I think we can put our 
differences behind us; for science… you monster. (Portal 2, 2011) 
The death drive seated beneath all human desires is thus an inescapable quality of the 
monstrous core of subjectivity. As Žižek describes, “the subject as such is toxic in its very form, 
in its abyss of Otherness” (2009b, 46), and it is this inherent lethality that we see not merely in 
the protagonist but also in the player. Each time the user turns on the computer and enters 
the game, they are instigating the perpetual torment of their character embodiment. This 
complicity is made apparent in the Portal games by the unceasing testing that occurs until we 
complete the game or turn off the computer. This is the same causality seen quite brutally in 
The Path, in which players themselves are drawn into the world as the very source of the girls’ 
violent demise. However, while The Path is an overtly morbid game confrontation the subject 
with a clear staging of death, the Portal series is not explicitly concerned with mortality. 
Instead the series appears as puzzle-platform games with a game-play focused on the 
distortion of physical space, including the horrors of immortality as a critical undercurrent 
within the otherwise light and often humoristic cultural and fictional framing of the game 
environment and characters. It is when engaging with the tensions built into the character 
GLaDOS that the complicity is revealed and the human element outside of the computer is 
shown to be yet one more source of monstrosity within the digital realm.  
GLaDOS herself has an element of human monstrosity in the form of Caroline, the 
Aperture Science employee unwillingly uploaded into the experimental Genetic Lifeform and 
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Disc Operating System. The relation between GLaDOS/Caroline and Chell provides a useful 
analysis of a bio-computer hybrid in assessing our own underlying monstrosity displayed 
before us on the computer screen. If, as Žižek states, “symbolic power is by definition virtual” 
(2008a, 194), then the altered functions of consciousness within the computer form the ideal 
battleground on which to confront our monstrous selves. Furthermore, if the hybrid monster 
of physical self and digital projection can allow the Žižek’s conception of the subject to 
“construct his Self as an aesthetic oeuvre” (in Wright and Wright 1999, 112), then we can look 
to this hybrid as a genuinely creative being. While this is reminiscent of the Boxmaker, the 
fragmented AI ‘artist’ in Gibson’s Count Zero (1995b, 296-302; 309-12), the bio-computer 
hybrid formed from a human subject becomes something altogether more monstrous. Yet 
this does create problems relating back to our human self and ‘pure’ conceptions of humanity 
in general, as further evidenced by GLaDOS’s problematic relation with both her own human 
element, Caroline, and her human test subject, Chell: 
You know, being Caroline taught me a valuable lesson. I thought you were my greatest enemy, when all along 
you were my best friend. The surge of emotion that shot through me when I saved your life taught me an even 
more valuable lesson: where Caroline lives in my brain. Goodbye, Caroline. 
… 
You know what my days used to be like? I just tested. Nobody murdered me, or put me in a potato, or fed me 
to birds. I had a pretty good life. And then you showed up, you dangerous, mute lunatic. (Portal 2, 2011) 
There is a necessary return to one separate form or the other, just as the sorcerer can seldom 
maintain the becoming-animal and the quantum observer must commit to one distinct 
universe. The player-character Chell remains essentially human after her ‘backup’ is deleted, 
limited by her human form and denied access to becoming when cast out by the demon of 
GLaDOS. The psychotic AI hybrid, however, removes her human component, resigning 
herself to the supposed purity of the machine, confined to the role of demon for all functional 
eternity. Amidst the unending horror of testing (echoed in Everyday the Same Dream‘s critique 
of persistent and passifying immaterial labour in contemporary society) there remains an 
experimental nature to the assemblage Chell-GLaDOS. The ‘portal gun’ that gives the game 
its title and innovative gameplay provides the player with a staged theoretical observation 
akin to the quantum thought experiments previously discussed. The ability to defy physics by 
‘quantum tunnelling’ between two places allows the user an interaction in space similar to 
that which Braid achieves with time: a posthuman interface with the game world in order to 
complete seemingly impossible puzzles. We can see in GLaDOS’s compulsion towards brutal 
testing, forced into her personality through her very programming, Žižek’s reversal of Kant’s 
categorical imperative (you can, because you must) reveals how “the superego imperative to 
enjoy thus…relies on a “You must, because you can!”” (Žižek 2009b, 310). The supposedly 
superior ‘cybrid’ machine, in the form of a purely physical human displaced wholesale into 
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computerised form, is therefore locked into “a kind of universalized pleasure principle” (Ibid.) 
that only the human cyborg subject, as a consciousness displaced between physical and 
digital, can transcend. The computerised subject created without a genuinely cyborg 
alteration of its mode of consciousness cannot truly escape into the realm of drive without the 
option to detach, to turn off the computer. Only in the gesture of leaving a space, the rupture 
of stripping one mode of Virtuality, can the cyborg subject that has entered into the digital 
realm ‘between two deaths’ reach perpetual drive or jouissance, that is, only the subject as gap 
can initiate the genuinely ethical act towards an encounter with the Real. 
 
4.5 ARE MONSTERS ‘REAL’? 
 
In the context of this discussion of ‘becoming-death’ and the quantum immortal, what might 
we conclude of the cyber-subject’s state between two deaths and the implications for its 
underlying human subjectivity? To use cyberspace to ‘traverse the fantasy’ we must be willing 
to confront the death drive in order to reach the void of our subjective parallax. Žižek writes, 
“the price of Meaning is a finite, closed space guarded by unnameable monsters” (2008c, 22), 
but in the digital realm, where the subject is the very monstrous Other that supports the 
symbolic order (the functioning of consciousness that conceals its own self-positing), genuine 
Meaning as the need for communication from the void of subjectivity can be found in 
transcending such order and revealing an inner truth of our monstrous selves. Žižek further 
tells us that “finite entities are not self-centred”, but rather “their essence lies elsewhere” 
(2007, 19), and it is thus only in becoming-infinite that might we centre our essence within 
ourselves. Against the self-imposed decentring of the big Other that defines the functioning 
of consciousness, the horrific truth of the desubstantiated subject is its own immateriality, its 
nonexistence. The human condition is a search for an origin that does not exist, not because 
has become lost, but because it is self-posited as lost between the infinite Virtual line desiring-
life and the infinite Real circle of death drive. This becoming-death is also becoming-infinite. 
Having traversed our fundamental fantasy, in the realm of the death drive, we are caught in 
the circular ‘becoming’ of drive-as-such, never able to achieve the release. Thus for Žižek 
“immortality, not death, becomes the ultimate horror” (2009c, 354). We should feel 
compelled to ‘play again’ games that offer an experience of undeath only to take it away at 
the conclusion of the available plot or completion of all the ‘levels’. We should take hold of the 
opportunity to view different potentialities actualised freely in the digital timeline, fixing 
ourselves in the permanent state of ‘becoming’ by observing our own death again and again.  
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This is a shift towards the need to destroy our digital self, and through such nihilistic 
impulses, deconstruct our own subjective position to reveal the structures of the Virtual 
monster. We must pass through the endless potential of desire available to an immortal in its 
Virtual functioning of consciousness, breaking through the constructs of fantasy that support 
the traumatic atrophy of the desperate undead devoid of meaning, and into the active 
monstrosity of the Real of subjectivity in all its horror. This recurring theme of what Žižek calls 
“the subject as the excessive core of inhuman monstrosity at the very heart of a human being” 
(2009b, 102) reveals that the parallax cyborg subject constitutes a space of undeath. Between 
physical mortal embodiment and digital expression of immortality, we exist, like GLaDOS, 
unknowable to ourselves in our void-core. Confronting the death drive that crosses through 
this subjective void is the reward for entering into digital undeath and returning as a new form 
of self to the land of the living. As we hit the ‘off’ button and the screen goes black, we can be 
freed from the horrors we have revealed, to reach a new level of life and of consciousness. 
However, it is important not to view this return as simply leaving the digital realm, a revival of 
the ‘normalcy’ of the physical human having ‘played’ at being a godlike immortal. Such a view 
relegates the digital world to a whimsical tool for a psychological cure, whereas the mark on 
consciousness left by the monstrous digital forms an indelible part of the new assemblage of 
the subject, one not easily left behind. Thus the perceived problems of getting ‘lost’ in the 
game world24 attempt a reactionary projection of the certainty and inevitability of the physical 
world as a lost object or objet a in relation to the terrifying prospect of the limitless digital 
realm. Žižek’s essay ‘Is it possible to traverse the fantasy in cyberspace?’ (Wright and Wright 
1999, 102-124) therefore makes a slightly erroneous assumption, namely that digital 
technology is a tool with which to stage a psychological procedure with the aim of ‘curing’ 
physical humans. In the context of the parallax subject as a cyborg, the question should rather 
be ‘is it possible to traverse the fantasy of cyberspace?’ 
 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter demonstrates that the Virtual monster is inherently tied to the Real monster of 
the cyborg: the horror of the void of subjectivity concealed by fantasy and desire, 
desubstantialised in the functioning of Virtual consciousness. Žižek defines the Real as “the 
                                                                    
24
 See, for example, the many populist reactionary responses that ignore external socio-cultural and 
psychological factors in favour of vilifying the medium itself (Fox19 2011; Daily Mail Reporter 2010; 
Couric 2013). 
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coincidence of emergence and loss” (Žižek 2008a, 15). A process of self-annihilation is thus 
necessary in traversing and disssembling the paradoxical structures of fantasy embodied in 
the objet petit a, staged here through observed self-destruction in the digital realm. If we are 
able to unearth the excessive inhuman core that constitutes the force or drive of our 
subjectivity, we reach a level of self-consciousness that might uncover the truth of the Real. 
The impossible observation of the quantum immortal is here a quest for knowledge of the 
Real and the perspectival position of parallax and Deleuzian becoming-death turns eternally 
as a “circuit of intensities” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 172) aiming to transcend the 
epistemological void, towards what a psychoanalyst might call a ‘cured’ state. Both of these 
approaches not only highlight the importance of process in reaching out beyond the scope of 
our current level of conscious self-awareness, but also suggest a link to the Real as a state of 
pure drive. The void itself remains perpetually unknowable in our cyclical drive beyond 
awareness of the fundamental fantasy. However, we can overcome the fantasy of knowing 
the void by embracing the moments in which a critical cultural intervention, here the horror of 
digital undeath, can create a state of becoming-monster as becoming-Real. Beyond this, to 
move past Žižek’s curative limitation of digital technology, lies the monster of the fantasy 
itself, the Virtual-Real monster of digital technology as such, in its terrifying role outside of 
our current conceptions of the human subject: the cyborg subject as other-than-human or 
‘posthuman’. This necessitates the insertion of a traumatic encounter of otherness within 
what Hayles describes as the closed, self-organising, autopoietic informational Virtuality of 
the posthuman in cybernetics since the 1980s (1999, 10-11), which would here introduce a 
subjective otherness of the Real into the big Other of the Virtual. Between the destruction of 
the structures of fantasy (the self-mediation of consciousness) and the destruction of the 
structures of the medium (the computer game paradigms that are rejected by the critical 
state of undeath) is the rupture in the surface of subjectivity into which the critical cyborg 
subject must venture. The next and final chapter explores the potentiality of the relation 
between Virtual and Real in the development of digital culture and our potential relation to 
technology as a genuinely cyborg subject across both physical and digital realities. 
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5 THE IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECT 
CYBORG FUTURES IN FICTION 
 
The final chapter moves past the structures of fantasy to question the possibility of a unity of 
the Virtual and Real. This entails a reconceiving of the cyborg subject in its ‘cured’ state after 
traversing the fantasy of the digital medium and of the self-mediating functions of 
subjectivity. In such a state the relation between Virtual and Real can be questioned, inserting 
a rupture of self-awareness through which the parallax position of the subject might be 
confronted. Such a rupture is what Jameson calls “a “window” of the ontological, Being in all 
its meaninglessness and calm persistence” (2007, 238). Jameson’s critique of the present 
through a literary staging of a utopian future is used throughout this chapter to approach 
Žižek’s call for a critical distance towards the void of subjectivity. Where Jameson is 
concerned with the staging of a social situation, we are here concerned with the staging of an 
alternative consciousness, one in which the Virtual and Real are maintained in their 
antagonism while allowing the subject a distance towards the void around which the functions 
manifest, placing the assemblage of the functions of consciousness as the present of 
subjective reality to stage modes of thinking otherwise about the cyborg subject. 
This analysis considers the development of a culture of digital technology and its 
relationship to consciousness, towards the quantum computer as a fusion of binary and 
quantum logic, of physical and digital modes of consciousness. Cultural representations of the 
digital are assessed through the development of cyberpunk fiction and its relation to our 
consciousness of the digital. Using Deleuze’s propositional logic and concept of a minor 
literature, this history is analysed through key literary works and their link to broader shifts in 
digital culture. This is applied to recent science fiction (SF) that stages not an alternative 
future of digital culture but alternative modes of consciousness regarding quantum processes 
and reality within the technological extension of the human in the fusion of quantum and 
digital technologies. A case study of the work of Hannu Rajaniemi, alongside further 
considerations of the extension and critique of the processes of art and literature in relation to 
digital consciousness, then reveals the staging of a distance towards our own subjectivity, 
amidst a far future of quantum computing and nanotechnology. This staging of the 
posthuman subject provides a return to the critique of the present that is the aim of this 
chapter, towards a consideration of new modes of thinking the future of the cyborg subject 
beyond current socio-cultural constructs of the relation of consciousness to technology. 
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5.1 HOMO HYPERSAPIENS 
 
Any discussion of the extension of human consciousness and creativity by (digital) technology 
must include a consideration of our relation to future developments. Confronting the 
potentialities of such futures necessitates the use of fictional examples for expressions of 
technologies beyond what is currently available. The changes in the nature of computer 
hardware are rapid and their cultural impact extreme. Rising ubiquity, decreasing size, cloud 
memory and full transition of devices into consumer products have had a dramatic role in 
shaping the current use and social climate of the digital realm, creating a complex web of its 
increasing interaction with the physical world. Among the key developments that are likely to 
exact further shifts in the social reality of computers in the near future, quantum computing 
will perhaps instigate, with potentially positive and negative effects, the most forceful point of 
change across all fields of research. The nature of quantum computers remains open to 
interpretation and speculation, but the fusion of fundamental physical and digital processes 
allows for such technologies to be developed alongside a reshaping of consciousness. If 
computers themselves possess qualities of the physical and the digital, what will become of 
the parallax gap between physical and digital worlds?  
The open potential, however, is not embraced by all. There are those, even at the 
leading edge of the field, for whom quantum computing has a specific and limited scope, with 
Andrew Steane claiming that quantum computing gives a “false impression” of revolutionary 
impact (1998, 166). This view, however, remains within our current conception of what 
constitutes a computer. If quantum and cybernetic potentialities are realised in expanding 
consciousness, then an expanded view of computers is also necessary, in turn demanding new 
cultural constructs concerning the nature and purpose of digital technology. Žižek states, “this 
is the future: the combination of the human mind with the computer (rather than the 
replacement of the former with the latter)” (2012, 15), emphasising the need to rethink cyborg 
relations beyond antagonism. Thus quantum computers might allow for a radically different 
approach to the way we interact with technology and the world, possessing the potential for 
“revolutionizing information technology and illuminating the foundations of physics” (Knill 
2010, 441). The value of speculative fiction rests in escaping the limits of our current situation, 
creating new conditions of possibility unrestrained by the barriers of the present. The cultural 
and creative impact of such conditions sets the scene for a new stage in the evolution of 
consciousness: an age of the cyborg interacting freely across the physical-digital divide. 
 157 
5.1.1 MORE THAN MYSELF 
However, the image we often receive from fiction that explores speculations of technological 
futures is one of dystopic prophesies that not only echo the pessimistic approach to the 
possibility of progress but forebode the negative cultural effects should such developments 
come to pass. Indeed, Aden Evens points out that “our fictions warn of the dangers of the 
digital…its eschatologies depict its triumph over humans via a simulation so effective that it 
comes to produce reality itself” (2003, 49). The populist, technophobic, reactionary tropes 
that are often prevalent in fiction concerning computers, and have come to dominate the 
application of such ideas in blockbuster movies, tend to rely on an oversimplified and 
antagonistic view of the relation between human consciousness and the digital realm, holding 
to a dangerous nostalgic notion of the ‘real’ world that leads towards a fetishisation of the 
physical as an idyllic and ‘lost’ (or in danger of being lost) place. This approach perhaps merely 
shows the role of fantasy within the writers of such teleological dooms in constructing the 
Real within the ‘real’, the objet a of the physical world. However, in assessing the creative role 
of any potential posthuman stage in consciousness, we must transcend the fantasy and look 
towards the antagonistic synchronicity, or at least the mutual extrapolation, of the Virtual and 
the Real. This would be a paradoxical fusion of the self-positing and the self-posited, an 
awareness of the causal nature of consciousness in constructing its own subjective reality.  
Jameson suggests “causality as an essentially narrative category” (2007, 88), and indeed 
his approach to SF literature provides an elucidation of this post-antagonistic framework. The 
utopia Jameson describes “occupies all positions, stands against and above itself, in a 
movement that is as irreconcilable as an identity is with itself” (Jorgensen 2007, 50). When 
viewed in the light of Žižek’s and Deleuze’s conceptions of (minimal) difference, the entwined 
roles of the Real and the Virtual become clear. With the bold claim for “the future as 
disruption” (Jameson 2007, 33) the focus is on antinomy – in the same manner as Žižek’s 
resolution of parallax beyond the illusion of synthesis, through which “the contradiction is not 
resolved; we just establish that is always-already was resolved” (2012, 13) – and suggests a 
radical break that (re)writes its own conditions. Here utopia takes on an explicitly literary or 
artistic flavour, as the self-positing of its own conditions in a moment of emergent self-
creation within consciousness, and it is the entangled role of technology within a creative and 
self-aware subject that is of importance in understanding posthuman consciousness. The 
radical event or break requires a viewpoint from beyond the break itself, inserting a minimal 
difference between the critical subject and its situation, in order to critique the current 
situation from the position of a genuine alternative. Creative construction of this minimal 
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difference is an act of opening up the gap in utopia, which would be the critical process of 
cyborg culture. For Jameson, from The Political Unconscious (2002 [1981]) onwards, Andrew 
Milner states that “all art, indeed all class-consciousness, can be understood as at once both 
ideological and utopian” (2009, 102), suggesting the inextricable link between utopia and the 
critique and development of a new consciousness through art/culture. Elizabeth Grosz tells us 
that “Art is the opening up of the universe to becoming-other” (2008, 23), but could this be 
becoming-other-than-human? The space created in the parallax of reality by fictional stagings 
of alternative subjectivities will draw out not a specific otherness towards which humanity is 
heading, but rather a series of critical processes with which to view our current state and 
perhaps instigate a conscious move towards a posthuman cyborg subject in which the 
necessary antagonism between Virtual and Real can be both sustained and resolved. 
 
5.2 CULTURAL FICTIONS, FICTIONAL CULTURES 
 
5.2.1 PROPOSITIONAL PROTAGONISTS IN THE CYBERPUNK CANON 
Jameson, reluctantly and initially in parentheses, identifies the sixth and final stage of SF:25 
Cyberpunk, which opens with a bang with William Gibson’s Neuromancer (1984): a general period break which 
is also consistent, not only with the neo-conservative revolution and globalization, but also with the rise of 
commercial fantasy as a generic competitor and ultimate victor in the field of mass culture. (Jameson 2007, 93) 
The basic tenet of cyberpunk is thus the negotiation of social and individual fantasy in the 
computerised society, and the internal development of this literary movement can be traced 
through stages of its own broad canon alongside the progress of “the new abstractions of 
computer and of globalization” (Ibid.). This is a coevolution of literature, technology and 
culture, what the subtitle of one anthology summarises as “stories of hardware, software, 
wetware, evolution and revolution” (Blake 2013). The role of cyberpunk fiction in negotiating 
these socio-cultural issues appears to exert a quasi-causal link to the implementation of 
cultural conceptions surrounding the rise of mass-marketed digital devices. The work of three 
key authors can draw out the progression of this canon: Gibson’s 1984-1988 Sprawl Trilogy 
(1995a; 199b; 1995c), the seminal and founding work of cyberpunk that set the tone for the 
entire genre; Stephenson’s Snow Crash (1992), often labelled ‘postcyberpunk’ in its wryly 
dystopic and “still-fresh, still-astounding cyberpunk parody” (Bissell 2011); and the more 
                                                                    
25
 The preceding five are: adventure or space opera; science pulp; sociology or cultural critique; 
subjectivity in Philip K. Dick; aesthetics or speculative fiction (Jameson 2007, 93). 
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recent trend seen in Stephenson’s Reamde (2011a) along with Ernest Cline’s Ready Player One 
(2012) and works by Charles Stross and Cory Doctorow, where the focus turns to a self-aware 
commentary on the role of the ‘geek’ and the entrenched cultural world of digital technology. 
This progression displays a regression through time, from the distant future of Sprawl in the 
first phase of cyberpunk, through the unspecified but post-crash future of Snow Crash in the 
second phase, to the third phase with a closing of the near-future in Ready Player One, 
Doctorow’s Makers (2013) or Stross’s Halting State (2008) and the near-present of Reamde. 
Common throughout the cyberpunk canon, however, is the role of the stereotypical 
cyberpunk protagonist – the hacker as thinker/creator/rebel torn between the physical and 
digital worlds to overcome a dilemma that threatens both. The positing of such a character is 
an impossible subject, instigating an improbable shift in global society through wit, 
programming knowledge and often a healthy dose of fortune. These characters, from 
Gibson’s Case and Count Zero to Cline’s Wade, exist as a causal proposition within the novels’ 
critique and revolution of future (and through that, present) society. Within what Peter Hertz-
Ohmes describes as the “intentionally paradox-ridden Deleuzian Logic of Sense” (2010, 87), 
Deleuze establishes a propositional logic in which “denotation presupposes manifestation” 
(2004b, 137). That is, the positing of a world requires an enunciating subject from whose 
perspective such a world can be seen. However, this manifesting subject brings its own lost 
cause of desire, what Deleuze describes as ‘sense’ or ‘expression’, that defines the nature of 
the perspective, in such a way that “expression/manifestation is a matter of causal inference” 
(Kügler 2011, 325). The Virtual function of this subject as the hacker protagonist, the cognitive 
abilities that allow them to enact their will on the digital world against the powers of 
corporations, governments and the criminal underworld, must make contact with the digital 
Real, penetrating the social fantasy of the future world to allow a critique and new order to be 
manifested through their actions.  
The cyber-protagonist therefore displays the parallax tension between being 
embedded in a given world (physical or digital) and its consciousness moving into the Real 
between worlds. This is the paradox of the ontological proposition (expression-manifestation) 
grounded in itself. However, within the conditions making such propositions possible, under 
which consciousness functions between material instance and abstract proposition, the 
subject emerges as both cause and effect of a given world. The conditions of both Žižek’s 
parallax subject (2009b) and Jameson’s utopia (2007) are always posited-as-presupposed. 
Darren Jorgensen summarises this conception of utopia as being “no longer identical to utopia 
because it must occur twice, it must become the utopia within utopianism…whether the 
spatial within the libidinal, the heterotopic within the systemic, or the personal within the 
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social” (2007, 50). This relates the problematic causal loop of utopia to ‘sense’ in Deleuze’s 
propositional logic, inserting a rupture of ‘nonsense’ through a fictional critique of the present 
as that which “says its own sense” in the co-presence of the signifier and signified (2004b 80). 
Here the Virtual and Real functions are brought together as a maintained antagonism through 
which a minimal difference can be inserted within the subject and its realities. Mark Bould 
writes, concerning this staging of an ideal state beyond fantasy, that “because SF requires the 
writer to structure plausible worlds and futures, the innovations which she integrates into a 
model of social totality impact against material reality” (in Bould and Miéville 2009, 4). This is 
a disruption of reality to reveal the causal structures of the functions of consciousness, as the 
fantasy of our relation to digital technology is staged and traversed through the fictional 
alternative offering a critique of our own lack of causal awareness within the self-mediation of 
consciousness as part of the appearance of our current social and material realities. 
This is expressed in the hacker protagonist, whose manipulation of computer code (the 
digital Real) allows a degree of causal control in undermining the systemic machines of 
immaterial capital, while their ability to enact such changes is dependent upon their actual 
presence in a physical and/or digital world through which to act. Thus, “the analytic predicates 
of existence are the determinations in relation to which individuals ‘actualise’ particular ‘slices’ 
of this world-series” (Bowden  2010, 309-10), for in these fictions it is only through the 
dramatic struggle within a given world that the revolutionary or utopian causal shift can be 
made. The progression of cyberpunk follows a fragmentation of this protagonist, from the 
“heroic pirates of cyberspace” seen in “Gibson’s tragic intensity…as the oddballs and marginal 
of new frontiers to come” (Jameson 2007, 384), through Stephenson’s reactionary Hiro 
Protagonist in Snow Crash, to the more collaborative and cultural efforts in Reamde, Halting 
State and Ready Player One. This has been a shift away from hacking code towards hacking 
culture, dealing less directly with the transferral of a singular consciousness from one realm to 
the other and more with the disruption of the social structures of fantasy that mediate and 
limit the relation of consciousness to both worlds. The active, heroic, causal role has shifted 
into a fragmentary and circular function echoing the development of the subject itself in 
twenty-first century digital society. The power of the cyberpunk protagonist lies in its ability 
to traverse the fantasy of its social situation by causally manifesting its propositional 
expression across the individual embedded in both worlds, to confront the irresolvable 
antagonism of the Virtual and the Real together in a shift of consciousness beyond the human 
‘extras’ in the fictional worlds. The creative gesture of the event that follows such a shift is the 
value of cyberpunk fiction in not only critiquing our own present society but suggesting a view 
from an alternative and in doing so positing the possibility of any alternative. This shift must 
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occur not only across the assemblage of the individual(s) manifested in either or both worlds, 
but within cultural consciousness itself, no matter in which realm the ‘action’ has occurred. 
The developing role of these literary works in the third stage of cyberpunk has been to close 
the gap between fiction and reality, to critique our present situation through the staging of 
alternative cultural paradigms, drawing together the functions of the Virtual and the Real 
beneath the subjective and social structures of fantasy and creating alternative modes of the 
subject’s relation to ontological digital parallax. 
5.2.2 CYBER CULTURE AS MINOR CULTURE 
This insertion of an alternative way of thinking digital culture approaches what Deleuze and 
Guattari describe as minor literature, which “doesn’t come from a minor language; it is rather 
that which a minority constructs within a major language…in it language is affected with a 
high coefficient of deterritorialization” (1986, 16). The deterritorialisation of the method of 
writing digital culture must come from within the language of mass media language, as a 
rupture of becoming-otherwise within major literature and major culture. In the apparent 
fragmentation of contemporary society this is the simultaneous telling of multiple stories with 
which Deleuze tasks art (2004b, 297-8), seen also within popular culture as the minor process 
of polylingualism within the major language of mass digital culture (Deleuze and Guattari 
1986, 26). This emergence of a minor language within major language, and subsequent critical 
space for minor literature/culture within major literature/culture, can be seen in Doctorow’s 
works. Makers deals with the dilemma of market forces against creativity and the constant 
reinvention of minor processes of production within the capitalist machine, while the short 
story ‘When Sysadmins Ruled the Earth’ (in Blake 2013) displays the constantly evolving 
culture itself, drawing from digital culture’s emergent languages such as l33t and other forum 
slang, also a defining characteristic of Reamde. There is an emphasis here on adaptation 
within and against corporate machines for the increased accessibility of critical digital culture 
deterritorialised for new modes of thought in collective assemblages of enunciation. This 
confronts the problem that “today’s belief in ineluctable certainty is the true innovation-killer 
of our age” (Stephenson 2011b, 16), and it is through creative methods such as Jameson’s 
model of SF that a necessary uncertainty inserts itself in a criticism of the present from the 
perspective of a speculative future. 
The shifting of digital languages goes beyond Gibson’s heroic hackers on their quest for 
information, and thus power, towards a constant process of deterritorialisation of culture as 
becoming-minor in later cyberpunk works. ‘When Sysadmins Ruled the Earth’ and Reamde, 
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along with Ready Player One and Halting State all demonstrate the inclusion of new and 
evolving languages of the digital and its culture that attempt to stay ahead of and disrupt the 
mass market cultures that currently stratify digital technology and control access to 
information. Deleuze and Guattari highlight the increasing number of immigrants living within 
foreign linguistic structures (1986, 19), which applies equally to our access to the digital realm 
in representations of a figurative immigration of consciousness, perhaps due to the cultural 
privileging of physical ‘reality’ against the rate of technological progress. A generation 
brought up entirely within cyborg culture remains a ‘people yet to come’, for whom digital 
languages and modes of critical thought would develop parallel to the major language of 
educational codings in the physical world. Gibson’s ‘in-group style’, what Jameson describes 
as “class status as a matter of knowing the score rather than of having the money and the 
power” (2007, 387-8) has followed the general development from hacking code to hacking 
culture, and the more recent cyberpunk works of Stross, Doctorow and Cline have moved past 
incessant branding as a denotation of status towards a satirical critique of branding and the 
development of alternative modes of cultural representation. Reamde (2011a) stages such a 
shift in the players of the fictional game T’Rain away from the basic construct of good and 
evil, a trend that defines many MMORPGs such as World of Warcraft (2004), towards a division 
based on avatar aesthetics. The antagonism between the ‘earthtone coalition’ and the ‘forces 
of brightness’ distorts the game designers’ fictional world, leading to the inclusion of the 
effects of a virus attack into the altered narrative setting of the game. Here the minor 
language of the players creates an actual shift in the game’s mechanics, reappropriating the 
game medium for a new emergent culture based on functional digital values rather than an 
externally imposed order, a critical comment on the current state of our society and possible 
intervention of user-generated content within major culture. 
This demonstrates, fundamentally, the confrontation with the perceived big Other of 
technology in contemporary culture. This too follows the shift in cyberpunk away from a 
political antagonism between hackers and corporations towards a splintering of groups with 
varying interests and desires, in which the protagonists are seeking information that leads to 
an understanding of cultural shifts rather than information of direct economic or political 
value. Indeed, while Matthew Kearnes summarises Deleuze’s stance toward technology as 
“fundamentally a political engagement with powers of invention and creation” (2006, 68) and 
Deleuze and Guattari state that “the second characteristic of minor literatures is that 
everything in them is political” (1986, 17), the process of minor literature acts more directly 
upon thought in its function of inserting a critical element in mass (digital) culture. Kane 
Faucher notes that “Deleuze and Guattari are not advancing a concrete socio-political 
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programme, but rather are providing readers with a conceptual toolkit” (2010, 56), and it is on 
this level that the minor digital culture confronts consciousness as a rupture in current modes 
of thinking our relation to technology. The shift in the power of creation remains important, 
for the democratisation of technology is an integral element in cyberpunk fiction as a critique 
of the present and a necessary condition for its utopian gesture of a minor culture, but the 
language has become less concerned with the conflict against a specified big Other.  In The 
Diamond Age (1996) Stephenson approaches this rupture of minority in the notion of a “wet 
net” (498) – a drugged, orgiastic bio-/nano-tech processing collective – that inserts an 
alternative conception of culture through a becoming-digital of physical biological humans. 
The fusion of the two spaces approaches what Ascott defines as the “moist mind…where dry 
pixels and wet molecules converge…erodes the boundary between hardware and wetware” 
(in Ascott 2000, 3), which is the space of the cyborg subject. Stephenson creates an emergent 
people whose relation to and apparent ‘misuse’ of technology is wholly different from the 
state of both his rigid fictional society and our current situation. Indeed, the task for this 
radical collective, which we can see as Deleuze and Guattari’s two-sided object of a novel in 
the “collective assemblage of enunciation…machinic assemblage of desire” (1986, 81), is to 
develop a new mode of nanotech creativity outside the majority language of technology 
towards a tool for a minor culture.  
The role of machinic desire that Deleuze and Guattari identify as one side of the 
antagonistic assemblage with collective enunciation is inextricably bound with the Virtual big 
Other. An underlying shift in desire emerges within cyberpunk literature, derived from a shift 
in the cultural big Other as a furthering of Deleuze’s minor literature and Jameson’s utopian 
critique. This big Other is not a political entity to overcome but rather a stratifying mode of 
thought within the Virtuality of the subject through which the Real must penetrate. Disruptive 
events in the fundamental structuring of the world suggests an alternative mode of being, 
both within the work of fiction and within the subject itself. As Deleuze states, “I desire an 
object only as expressed by the Other in the mode of the possible; I desire in the Other only 
the possible worlds the Other expresses” (2004b, 357). An opposition to the big Other, the 
process of critique within major culture, is a necessary condition for a minor culture within 
consciousness. This is the crux of the Virtual-Real antagonism, and the inclusion of the Real as 
a minor function within the Virtual assemblage of consciousness is the key to creating an 
alternative mode of cyborg subjectivity. The big Other’s control over desire occurs in Deleuze, 
Lacan and Jameson, and it is through the creation of an alternative Other that cyberpunk 
fictions create the possibility of an alternative world. As Gregg Lambert points out, “the 
revolution of desire would be defined as a present of metamorphosis” (2008, 9), suggesting 
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that the success of cyberpunk literature lies in the state of metamorphosis it creates in the 
fictional world and the perpetual critical becoming that it forces into our own present. 
5.2.3 FICTION AND PROGRESS 
As a deterritorialising cultural force, cyberpunk literature has had a strong impact on our 
relation to the physical-digital divide and the nature of technology. The creation of the term 
‘cyberspace’ by Gibson and the similarities between Second Life and the ‘metaverse’ of 
Stephenson’s Snow Crash suggest a direct influence on digital technology. However, the links 
between such writers and the actual development of technology is less causal than may 
appear. Within the image of technological prophet lies a role integral to the social 
development of digital culture. Indeed, Gibson has stated, “I’ve never really been very 
interested in computers themselves. I don’t watch them; I watch how people behave around 
them” (in Chang 2007). Gibson, Cline and Doctorow are firmly rooted in literary rather than 
scientific backgrounds, with a strong focus on the culture surrounding the digital and the 
potentiality for a social use of computers. Stephenson and Stross both studied scientific 
disciplines, but even their direct influence is questionable. Linden Labs’s founder Philip 
Rosedale claimed to be “already intent on the idea of creating a virtual world like Second Life” 
(in Dubner 2007) when Snow Crash was released. The inspiration of the image played out in 
the novel thus served as further inspiration to the creators and, more importantly, aided the 
reception of Second Life into mass culture.  
Mark Pesce (1998) openly condemns the pioneering image of cyberpunk fiction in 
favour of perceived actual developments initiated by practical projects. However, the ‘god’s 
eye’ view of Stephenson’s fictional Earth software in Snow Crash (1992) has influenced the 
creation of the now perspective of Google Earth, in turn referenced in Reamde: 
The opening screen of T'Rain was a frank rip-off of what you saw when you booted up Google Earth. Richard 
felt no guilt about this, since he had heard that Google Earth, in turn, was based on an idea from some old 
science-fiction novel. (Stephenson 2011a, 38) 
This is the self-referential shift towards hacking culture rather than code, in what is now 
termed ‘geek culture’ as the development (and cultural inclusion) of Gibson’s ‘in group’ style. 
What has been brought more firmly into the historical progress of computing by cyberpunk 
fiction is a cultural framework that integrates the use of technology with our current social 
reality. As Arthur C. Clarke suggested “anyone with sufficient imagination to assess the future 
realistically would, inevitably be attracted to this form of literature…almost one hundred per 
cent of reliable prophets will be science fiction readers – or writers” (Clarke 2000, 7). What this 
framework has created is a relation between culture and technology that draws the thinker, 
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technologist, artist or consumer into the assemblage of technology and the development of a 
culture and consciousness of it.  
Deleuze places the philosopher “on a level with the surface – a tick or louse” (Deleuze 
2004b, 150), and we might extend this to say that the cyborg philosopher (or here ‘prophet’ as 
SF author) acts on the surface of its own consciousness in relation to the construction of 
digital reality. This subject must be engaged within the situation as part of the assemblage, 
not removed but embedded in a reciprocal relation. Thus the influence of cyberpunk has 
developed separately but alongside the actual technological developments, creating parallel 
threads through the social constructs surrounding digital culture rather than a causal stimulus. 
Here, in the Ideal realm available to literature and art, is perhaps where the prophetic role of 
SF occurs – preparing its readers/viewers for the shifts in culture necessary to adapt to new 
technologies and suggesting an array of possible methods of thinking such advances in 
human society. The integration of such ideas into mass culture, however, is not a 
straightforward matter. What Bostrom and Sandberg identify as “a general unease about 
making “the essence of human nature” a project of technological mastery” (2009, 326) can be 
seen echoed in the resistance to cyberpunk fiction from mainstream literature, and its 
confinement to the ‘geek’ culture that recent works embrace and exploit. This position as a 
minor literature is repeatedly reinforced by reactionary ideologies as “a backlash against 
change triggered by future shock and bad politics which is truly awesome in its scale, 
generating fundamentalist mobs worldwide” (Stross in Lilley 2007). The problem of 
promoting new technologies itself echoes the difficulty in spreading the possibilities of 
change in general, and the insistent role of the cyberpunk canon – and, to Jameson, SF in 
general – has been to create an alternative space where a genuine alternative to the present 
social reality can be posited, interrogated and used to critique our current situation. 
 
5.3 INCONCEIVABILITY AND THE PRESENT 
 
5.3.1 THE VIEW FROM A BLACK HOLE 
SF derives its utopian force through its ability to posit a society that appears impossible from 
our current situation and critically viewing present day society from such an impossible 
position. This process can be seen as observing the unobservable, and then observing 
ourselves from the perspective of the unobservable. By positing these impossible situations, 
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writers whose work lies under the term ‘hard science fiction’ are able to explore concepts that 
require too great a leap from our everyday common sense perceptions for a genuine scientific 
study, yet impose a scientific rigour of possibility in stretching concepts such as the 
fundamental rules of quantum mechanics to their radical conclusions. Stross, along with 
Doctorow, crosses the third phase of cyberpunk and hard SF, fusing together alternative 
modes of thinking digital culture and physics, with novels placed in both near and far futures, 
using the increased distance of hard SF to move beyond the critique of the digital medium in 
the near-present of cyberpunk to a critique of the fundamental relation of consciousness to 
the universe. Greg Egan also combines the two approaches, but places technology as the tool 
for challenging our relation to reality. Indeed, to Jameson’s suggestion that “SF is the 
exploration of all the constraints thrown up by history itself” (2007, 66), we must add ‘all the 
constraints of physics itself’. For example, in the universe of Egan’s short story Border Guards 
(2000), an alternative physics is explored, whereby “the topology of this universe let you see 
the back of your head, but never your reflection” (Egan 2000), an impossible perception that 
leads to a number of questions concerning consciousness and reality. Such work utilises the 
same interrogation of possibility that we have seen applied to the subject in cyberpunk fiction. 
However, hard SF writers such as Egan, Stross and Rajaniemi all postulate, through differing 
approaches, a reality that is radically different from our own in order to question the nature of 
the human (and human consciousness) and the possibilities of its future development. The 
literary act of staring into the unknowable of future or alternate realities in hard SF is an 
attempt to gaze back at ourselves from the internal otherness of a black hole: viewing the 
subject-as-other from within its own void-core of parallax. 
The apprehension of cyborg concerns mirrors the dilemma of engaged spectatorship in 
SF: observing the impossible in order to create a new point of view on the subject from the 
unobservable. In broader questions of thought this translates to potential methods of thinking 
the inconceivable. One answer for modelling such a problematic relation of consciousness to 
the unknown can be seen in quantum computers,26 which can, among other functions, 
“provide a virtual laboratory, realizing quantum models of one’s choice” (Knill 2010, 442). 
Currently, as was the case for the early history of digital computers and the internet, the 
implementation of quantum computers rests within the defence sector: the first commercial 
sale of a quantum computer was to Lockheed Martin (a company with links to the NSA and 
defence contracts) by D-Wave Systems (who count In-Q-Tel, a business arm of the CIA, 
among their major investors), ensuring the domination of the US government in any 
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 Quantum computers use entanglement and the superposition of the digital one and zero to rapidly 
perform esoteric or probabilistic calculations such as factorization useful in, for example, cryptography. 
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cryptographic breakthroughs (Brooks 2013). However, at the theoretical stage, there are great 
leaps being made within academia and research institutions that have perhaps a more 
profound impact on the way we conceive of quantum computing and indeed the quantum 
universe. The developing ‘decoherence theory’ has suggested that collapse occurs neither 
instantaneously, nor at a fixed scale (Ball 2008, 23), which leads not only to a blurring of the 
quantum-classical transition, but also towards notions of reversibility. 
In direct relevance to quantum computing, reversibility forms a major breakthrough in 
the error correction necessary to overcome the noise inherent to calculations at the quantum 
level which, compared to “classical computers [that] are reliable not because they are 
perfectly engineered, but because they are insensitive to noise” (Steane 1998, 161), 
represents a dilemma and the main criterion for a successful quantum computer. 
Furthermore, “the demonstration that it is possible to rescue a collapsing qubit, ‘uncollapse’ it 
and return it to its original quantum state could one day be used to rectify errors before 
information is lost” (Meralli 2008, 8), creating a radical ‘undo’ function for quantum 
computing, even when encountering hardware issues and physical loss. This reversibility 
presents a fundamental challenge to any theory that privileges the role of the observer, such 
as ‘consciousness causes collapse’, to the extent that “it tells us that we really can’t assume 
that measurements create reality, because it is possible to erase the effects of a measurement 
and start again” (Vedral in Meralli 2008, 9). However, the fact that the control of when to 
reverse the observation rests with the (technologically equipped and enhanced) observer 
carries the ‘undo’ function across into reality itself. Under such a premise, observation not 
only creates reality, but offers a choice of which reality to create, extending the engagement 
of humanity towards a cyborg subject as causally engaged spectator. The staging of quantum 
computing in SF creates the conditions for such a shift in thinking about the function 
technology and our relation to it within contemporary culture. 
However, Jameson insists that SF should move beyond the therapeutic easing of 
technological progress towards a genuinely utopian function.27 In direct relation to computers, 
both quantum and digital, this shifting approach to a self-aware creation of reality through 
observation will discern our future relation to computing technologies. This is already in effect 
with the digital, through the control of the Real of computer code, demonstrated by the 
protagonist in Stross’s The Laundry Files series, whose exploits cover the crossover between 
quantum ‘weirdness’ and digital computing: “I’ve got a couple of cheats up my non-existent 
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The relevance of the therapeutic justification for SF is debatable. Given the ‘geek’ culture in which it 
resides, most readers will already be predisposed in favour of technological progress. 
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monk’s sleeve, including the fact that I can enter the game with a level eighteen character 
carrying a laptop with a source-level debugger – all praise the new self-deconstructing reality” 
(Stross 2010b, 371). As with other manifestations of digital creative processes, the digital 
realm has brought forward into consciousness what was already the case in the physical 
world. Here, the concern of critically engaging within a reality against forces that threaten the 
freedom of human subjectivity is given a literal embodiment across the digital medium as a 
realm of the imaginary with its own potential traumas. As one commentator summarises, 
“online games, you see, are one of the breeding grounds for inter-dimensional 
mayhem…echoing some real evil in the multiverse” (Lilley 2006). Our relation to the 
potentialities of digital creation can make contact, through the Real of computer code, with 
the Real of human subjectivity, the excessive void that occupies the centre of the 
desubstantialised subject. The artistic elaboration of the theorems and hypotheses of science 
fused with our own psychological fears brings forth the “squamose, rugose horrors from 
beyond space and time” (Carter 2007)28 in the form of figurative and literal horrors of digital 
media: the Real expressed as the unnameable sense (Deleuze 2004b) beneath our superficial 
realities, objectified as monsters. 
This position on the boundary of the imaginary (as the Virtual) and the void (as the Real) 
questions the suitability of human consciousness for technologically mediated evolution. The 
point arises from the role of consciousness in creating its own reality. This is true of social as 
well as quantum reality. The subject exists as the gap within its constituent realities, exerting 
a creative causal pull defined by its will to choose the nature of its perception. As Egan posits 
in Permutation City (2010a), the reversibility and emergent creativity of time can be applied 
also to space: 
Every warehouse full of paint and canvas contained the complete works of Rembrandt and Picasso – not in any 
mere latent form, awaiting some skilful forger to physically rearrange them, but solely by virtue of the potential 
redefinition of the coordinates of spacetime (Egan 2010a, 120) 
This is hypothesised only as a thought experiment for art, but extrapolated through the fiction 
into self-contained worlds requiring only one engaged spectator to ‘join the dots’ in a creative 
parallax gesture. However, conceptual art has long established definition of art objects in their 
labelling as such, and the shifting of the mundane to art object can easily be copied from 
urinal29 to any form of matter. Algorithmic art, as seen in Dombis’s oeuvre (Chapter 2.4), is 
one such example within digital culture, blending the Real of code with the subjective Real of 
artistic creation, unleashing the unknowable and inconceivable void into active perception by 
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 These can be compared to a demonic form of Maurice Benayoun’s The Quarxs (1991-3) discussed in 
1.4.1 Not object, not immaterial. 
29
 See, for example, Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain (1917). 
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choosing it to exist as such. This applies the role of consciousness as creative force seen in the 
use of nanotech in Egan’s work, through which control of substance is a technologically 
enabled choice, bringing the role of the quantum observer to the classical scale engaged 
spectator. 30 
5.3.2 BEYOND PHYSICS 
Such far-flung visions, where scientific concepts, however rigorous, move radically away from 
both our common sense classical physics and even the accepted interpretations of quantum 
mechanics, are at risk of falling into the trap of ‘magic’ that distinguishes generic fantasy from 
utopian SF as a pre-enlightenment valorisation of nature as a symbolic entity in what Darko 
Suvin labels “SF as the literature of cognitive estrangement” (1979, 4) , rather than “the 
commitment of the SF text to scientific reason” (Jameson 2007, 63). The social and utopian 
emphasis on “the role of cognition in SF” (Ibid.) is where the extension of quantum physics 
into radical expressions of consciousness retains its critical utopian drive. This can be seen 
strongly in The Laundry Files, in which: 
Certain abstruse branches of pure mathematics can have drastic consequences in the real world—we call them 
“magic”—by calling up the gibbering horrors with which we unfortunately share a multiverse (and the platonic 
realm of mathematical truth). Given that computers are tools that can be used for performing certain classes of 
calculation really fast, it should come as no surprise that Applied Computational Demonology has been a 
growth area in recent years. (Stross 2009) 
This moves beyond even Arthur C. Clarke’s famous third law – “any sufficiently advanced alien 
technology is indistinguishable from magic” – towards a genuine connection with the Real of 
either universe. Indeed, Clarke’s preceding ‘law’ states that “the only way of discovering the 
limits of the possible is to venture a little way past them into the impossible” (2000, 2), and it 
is this positing of the impossible in which the critical power of hard SF is able to confront our 
relation to the void of our current parallax reality: “like the famous mad philosopher said, 
when you stare into the void, the void stares also; but if you cast into the void, you get a type 
conversion error. (Which just goes to show Nietzsche wasn’t a C++ programmer)” (Stross 
2009). Amidst the Virtuality of the parallax shift, the most terrifying monsters stare back from 
within the void of cybernetic consciousness itself. 
It is in staring back from the void, however, where the distinction from magical fantasy 
becomes most important. Here it is the advanced technology, and the relation of 
consciousness (in the form of the fictional characters – propositional protagonists) towards it, 
that enables the penetration of such ‘black holes’ in subjectivity. This is demonstrated by 
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 For the violent potential of such observation, see the conflagratory effects of the ‘basilisk gun’ on the 
unsuspecting bovine population of Milton Keynes in The Concrete Jungle (in Stross 2010a, 241-320). 
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quantum computers as a “‘black box’, or oracle, computation whose behaviour is difficult to 
predict except by using it” (Knill 2010, 442), moving beyond the logical confines of classical 
physics and binary computation. It is only through an adequate interface by the subject that 
the technology is able to expand our knowledge of reality and consciousness. This is seen in 
Egan’s ‘dust theory’ (2010a), whereby “consciousness finds itself out of the dust of the 
universe and constructs its own universe where its existence makes sense” (Walton 
2008b).The notion of interfacing with quantum processes is therefore not simply a 
technological tool but an epistemological gesture initiated by the subject as a choice of 
reality, both in terms of which reality is actualised and the fact that reality appears at all. 
The impact of this choice of reality on the human subject is explored further by Egan in 
Quarantine, through a nanotech brain modifier that enables a conscious ‘smearing’ of 
potentialities and a choice over when and which reality to collapse. The novel is described as 
“a fascinating failure” (Owen 1999) in its depth of concept at the expense of character 
development, but nevertheless “reveal[s] the inner workings of the narrator and explore[s] 
the very fabric of reality” (Klotz 2009). In positing a set of complex scientific principles applied 
to the disturbing experiences it produces, Egan reminds us that an alteration is necessary 
within our own consciousness if humanity is to ever actualise such potentialities. The 
protagonist comes relatively close to negotiating these dilemmas, at one point almost 
achieving a state of acceptance:  
I’m going to have to swallow the whole truth: I’m living through a pattern of events that will be (or has been) 
plucked from a few quadrillion possibilities, by the collective effort of a few quadrillion versions of me … most 
of whom I am about to slaughter (unless I already have) (Egan 2010b, 183) 
Aside from the protagonist wrestling with the dilemma of collapse, and the antagonist intent 
on forcing humanity kicking and screaming into a transcendent stage of evolution, when the 
technology is unleashed upon an unsuspecting and unaware public, the result entails mass 
suffering and death, approaching the horrors that dominate Stross’s Laundry Files series.  
In Stross’s universe, the “computational ultrastructure of reality” (Stross 2012, 119) is 
made fragile by active consciousness, opening humanity to the horrors of parallel universes in 
a fusion of quantum physics and Lovecraftian horror. Here the destruction of potentiality in 
ontological parallax holds reality in place, and it is the unchecked Virtuality of consciousness 
that draws inconsistencies into our constructed subjective realities. Excess of either function 
makes a lethal contact with the other, drawing the subject unawares into the black hole of its 
own parallax. Overcoming the structure of Virtual and Real necessitates a distance, seen in 
Jameson’s utopia and Žižek’s minimal difference, towards our human subjectivity in order to 
traverse the fantasy of our own consciousness and safely approach the void of the 
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desubstantialised cyborg subject. Thus the aim for both Stross’s and Egan’s protagonists is 
the maintenance of ‘reality’, the preservation of sanity until the collective culture of the 
relation of consciousness to the universe can progress beyond the limiting factors of our 
human existence. This suggests the impossibility of a ‘people yet to come’, and indeed Stross 
suggests that “the pre-existing destination for humanity is death” (2012, 26), an inevitable 
return to the Real. Here the black hole of parallax becomes a black beast, the Real embodied 
as monsters. It is only through creating a distance from the structures of our own 
consciousness that an alternative subjectivity might emerge. Stross’s characters, with job 
titles such as ‘computational demonologist’ and ‘combat epistemologist’, are charged with 
the defence against such monstrous outcomes. The problematic integration of quantum 
processing technologies with human consciousness is clear, and this hard SF performs the 
same function to reality we have seen cyberpunk perform in the development of mass digital 
media within cultural reality. If SF in general has adopted the task of overcoming future-
shock, and cyberpunk the task of promoting an awareness of issues arising in a digital world, 
then hard SF works on our core perceptions, our basic cognitive functions, preparing 
humanity for the cultural as well as technological transition to posthuman. Beyond future-
shock, the critical power of SF is the creation of alternative modes of society and technology 
that can create the possible conditions for the development of the cyborg subject. 
5.3.3 EITHER SIDE OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL SINGULARITY 
To reconceive the creative potentiality of observation, and its application through quantum 
computing and nanotechnology, it is instructive to move towards an ‘artisanal’ control of 
emergent nanotechnology, through the Deleuzian notion that “matter is internally unstable” 
brought into “a kind of atomic flux between the object/subject (of course these terms no 
longer mean much) and the other” (Kearnes 2006, 75). What Kearnes is suggesting moves 
beyond the more classically grounded disciplines of design or engineering towards an 
emergent art that incorporates the entire universe. By applying the abstract extensions of 
scientific inquiry and possibility to a creative construction of consciousness in the perception 
of reality, we are heading once again to a singularity – not only of technology but of 
consciousness. As Egan suggests, “the greatest gift of consciousness was the ability to take 
the patterns of the world inside you” (2000), and by embracing the emergence of new forms 
of technology and patterns of creating worlds it is possible for new modes of consciousness to 
emerge. To examine these new modes of consciousness displays a further requirement for the 
utopian function of SF. Indeed, the theme of singularity has dominated the development of 
SF over the past two decades, to the extent that “most SF being written now has to call itself 
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“post-Singularity” and try to write about people who are by definition beyond our 
comprehension, or explain why there hasn't been a Singularity” (Walton 2008a). In the wake 
of cyberpunk literature, this extension beyond apocalyptic fiction into a critical affirmation of 
the singularity, and subsequent construction of alternative conditions of possibility under 
which to view the world, forms a return to and fusion of the underlying drives of Jameson’s 
fourth and fifth categories of SF – “subjectivity” and “aesthetics” (2007, 93) – in order to create 
such a view point beyond the limits of human consciousness. 
Within this shift, inserting the changing nature of the subject into altered systems of 
perception, we can see new signs and a new form of representation, what Lambert identifies 
as the “language-event of singularity” (2008, 52), through which an emergent vision appears 
“like a slit or a hole through which the entire universe seeps through – the emergence of a 
singular point of view” (Ibid., 54). This new point of view, which places the human subject into 
the Other of the posthuman, creates powerful new critical utopias from which to assess the 
role of technology in relation to human subjectivity in present day society. As Deleuze 
suggests, “the a priori Other is the existence of the possible in general, insofar as the possible 
exists only as expressed” (2004b, 356), and it is the cognition of the possible expressions 
beyond the limits of humanity that allow for an artistic and literary positing of a subjectivity 
beyond the parallax of singularity. The impossibility of actualising such a viewpoint, aware of 
its own hypersubjective position, presents the notion that “realism, alas, is no match for 
fiction” (Stross in Lilley 2007), and the criticisms of difficult concepts presented in hard SF fail 
to grasp the necessary leap across the limitations of the human mind to embrace not a 
particular vision of a posthuman creative subject, but the required changes that must be made 
to our current modes of perception and thought. As the posthuman consciousness in 
Rajaniemi’sThe Server and the Dragon shows, when “it examined its own mind until it could 
see how the Controller had taken the cognitive architecture from the hominids of the distant 
past and shaped it for a new purpose” (Rajaniemi in Strahan 2010, loc 1687-89), Jameson’s 
utopic imperative for social reality can and must be applied equally to the individual 
consciousness, revealing an instructive point of view on the nature and limits of humanity 
itself. 
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5.4 HANNU RAJANIEMI: JUST ADD QUANTUM 
 
5.4.1 FRACTAL MEMORY IN THE FUTURE 
Rajaniemi – whose scientific background, including a PhD in mathematical physics and 
founding ThinkTank Maths31, outstrips even that of Egan or Stross (possessing bachelors’ 
degrees in mathematics and pharmacology/computer science respectively) – is an emerging 
example of the extreme lengths hard SF can go to in order to create a post-singularity 
viewpoint from which to assess our current social, technological and cognitive realities. Egan 
in particular has received criticism for the scientific depth of his novels over characterisation 
and plot (Owen 1999; Walton 2008b), which even Jameson finds “relatively unreadable” 
(2005, 68) in its hardline approach to quantum and informational processes. However, in 
Rajaniemi’s first series of novels – The Quantum Thief (2010), The Fractal Prince (2012) and The 
Causal Angel (2014a) – it is not only scientific complexity but also the sheer difference of his 
post-Singularity future from our own present that has baffled many reviewers. The series is a 
challenging read, filled with intricately concealed concepts and contemplations on the nature 
of consciousness amidst a bizarre array of created technologies. One critic comments that in 
The Quantum Thief with its “torrent of new words and concepts…I was stumbling through the 
novel” (Holojacob 2013). Similarly, The Fractal Prince has been described as “the most 
intellectually impenetrable book you read all year” (Alexander 2012) and “even more 
inscrutable than its predecessor”…“too much a work of brilliant artifice and art and not 
enough accessibility” (Weimar 2013). There is here an extreme plunging of the spectator into 
an engagement with alternative modes of consciousness as part of an alternative reality, 
creating a direct antagonism with our present technological awareness and culture.  
Through the bombardment of an entirely alternative approach to technological culture 
and its relation to consciousness, Rajaniemi is staging within a literary context what the 
industrial metal band Nine Inch Nails have attempted with cultural media in general. NIN’s 
album Year Zero (2007) creates a dystopian vision of 2022 to critique the contemporary United 
States government, including religious intolerance and authoritarian policies. The music was 
released alongside an alternative reality game expanding the album’s fictional setting across 
digital and physical spaces. Through a series of fictional conspiracy websites and leaked tracks 
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on USB sticks found at concerts featuring images and phone numbers in white noise viewable 
as a spectrogram, the project was staged as the corrupted data packets of warnings sent back 
through time via quantum mechanical wormhole technology, to stave off the apocalyptic 
future. The extended reality of the work is part of the album, a digital-physical 
gesamtkunstwerk of popular culture. Indeed, following criticism of the event as a marketing 
stunt Trent Reznor of Nine Inch Nails stated: 
the term ‘marketing’ sure is a frustrating one for me at the moment…what you are now starting to experience 
IS ‘year zero’. It’s not some kind of gimmick to get you to buy a record – it IS the art form … and we’re just 
getting started. (Reznor in Times Colonist (Victoria) 2007) 
The album was also Nine Inch Nails’s last with a record company before moving to digital and 
self-releases, extending a critique of current digital cultural practices to their entire mode of 
creating and distributing their work, including the album The Slip (2008) released for free 
under Creative Commons license. Year Zero itself directly confronts the situation at a critical 
distance, by fusing an antagonistic challenge to current media paradigms (of culture and 
market) with SF technologies and concepts. This extends Jameson’s utopian gesture through 
its opposite as dystopia to place our potential future, the ideal path of probability outside of 
the staged events, as the self-positing utopia from which to critique the present. The initial 
impenetrability of this work, in the puzzles of its coded messages and hidden fragmentary 
status across varying media, is mirrored in Rajaniemi’s use of complex concepts to stage an 
alternative future. The complete complexity of this future allows for a more complete 
juxtaposition with the present, creating an emergent space for the engaged spectator to 
contribute a utopic gesture – the individual fantasy structure of utopia between technology 
and consciousness – through which to confront their own subjective reality. 
However, the difference between Rajaniemi and other hard SF writers such as Egan is 
not necessarily a matter of scientific depth, for the intellectual rigour of both writers is not in 
question, but rather the presuppositions on the part of the reader. Where Egan, as with many 
hard SF writers injecting complex hypotheses into their fiction, is prone to ‘info-dumping’ 
across several pages of quantum mechanical explanations, Rajaniemi provides no such ‘potted 
history’, not even a glossary, for his innovative technologies and radical implementation of 
future society. In this way, the very framing of his work can be seen to embody Jameson’s 
utopia: the conditions of this future are already in place, and it is the task of the reader to 
catch up gradually as the novel progresses in a quickly developing and twisting series of plots. 
As one character suggests, “if reality is not what you want it to be, change it” (Rajaniemi 2012, 
223), and it appears as though Rajaniemi himself is in the process of transforming the reality 
of our potential futures. 
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As Jameson would insist, however, the literary artefact containing the detailed and 
complex impasse of Rajaniemi’s post-Singularity solar system is not without its relevance to 
our current socio-technological situation. Indeed, Rajaniemi’s own position within the cutting 
edge of technological and theoretical development across academia and industry provide him 
with an awareness that “sometimes present day reality is more than sci fi enough” (Rajamiemi 
[@hannu] 11 June 2013), and the construction of memory within The Quantum Thief, and the 
series as a whole, creates a ‘future perfect’32 framework of a clearly ‘Other’ form of humanity. 
This perspective, of the posthuman protagonist and interplanetary ‘gentleman thief’ Jean le 
Flambeur, is essential in the utopic function of “constructing a point of view from which to 
discern the pressures and limits of the current situation” (Cevasco 2007, 122) that forms the 
crux of Jameson’s notion of ‘archaeologies of the future’ by inserting a fictional-temporal 
parallax. This is the essence of self-positing that is at work in both the assemblage of (the 
Virtuality of) consciousness and utopic criticism: a constant reconstruction of fluid memories 
that necessarily recreate their own conditions. This is the heart of critically confronting the 
ontological parallax of the contemporary subject. 
The creation of memory plays a key role in Rajaniemi’s trilogy, drawing together 
technology, cognition and artistic creation to weave new modes of conceiving forms of 
control over memory as the retroactive transformation of knowledge (and thus reality). Grosz 
tells us that “Art is where life most readily transforms itself” (2008, 76), and if ‘life’, the 
continued functioning of consciousness, can be seen as the Virtual, then it is in contact with 
the death drive of the Real that art draws its power, whether this be in finite humans or 
immortal posthumans. Through externalising memory with technology, in a seamless 
mediation of consciousness according to the rules of a heavily coded society, Rajaniemi 
constructs a critique of the cultural rewriting of past realities in through the negotiation and 
manipulation of memories in the present, a theme echoing Baudrillard’s description of history 
as “a retro scenario…our lost referential, that is to say our myth” (1994, 43). It is then 
necessary that this fictional society appears so different from our current conception of time 
and reality. A common theme among critics of Rajaniemi is that “many of the characters are 
hard to relate to for us present-day, non-augmented, ordinary humans” (Raets 2011), a 
sentiment seen also in the response to Nick Bostrom’s ‘Letter From Utopia’ (2008): “you 
seemed quite distant from our situation here” (Miah 2008, 2).However, the critical retroactive 
reconstruction of reality in SF, at the level of the individual consciousness and social entity, 
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expands Grosz’s notion that art “in making sensations live, evokes a people and an earth to 
come” (2008, 103) to include within the present a simultaneous construction of past and 
future peoples, earths and realities. This Deleuzian crystallisation of time within memory 
draws out the relevance of utopian art and fiction in maintaining an ‘Other’ view on the 
present while escaping the infinite same of what appears as history. By forcing ourselves to 
occupy this radical space of Otherness, we see that, “rather than a means of freedom, 
therefore, the act of writing must be understood as a means of escape” (Lambert 2008, 37). 
Just as Rajaniemi’s protagonist’s search for his memories constitutes a repeated series of 
escapes from versions of himself, so must any society seek a radical break from its own 
memories if it is to creatively construct the conditions of possibility for a different future and, 
ultimately, (re)create the present. This is Jameson’s utopic gesture applied directly to the 
subject itself, in a constant line of flight creating a critical distance from its present to observe 
the position of parallax by recreating its conditions and thinking otherwise about the 
construction of subjective reality. 
5.4.2 CAUSAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE PRESENT 
The problematic relation of consciousness to itself – around the causal void-core of parallax 
subjectivity – is acutely illustrated in Rajaniemi’s novels. This parallax can be seen extended to 
the gap between human and posthuman, between the subject and its ideal, between 
consciousness and its desire. This is the extension of the cyborg into an alternative relation 
between the Virtual and the Real. The protagonist of the series demonstrates this elusive 
dynamic within his own consciousness, indeed the title of the second novel, The Fractal Prince, 
makes clear the fragmentary, self-similar, infinitely scalable nature of his psyche. His true 
origins remain hidden, but the start of The Quantum Thief immediately presents multiple 
versions of his consciousness, followed by a technologically produced body over which he 
obtains varying degrees of control at the behest of his employers. The protagonist then finds 
himself caught between two warring factions, each displaying a different view of cyborg 
posthumanism. One privileges a binding of the Virtual and the structures of desire within the 
Real-Meaning of computer code, under a strict hierarchy of godlike beings housed in planet-
sized computers and the enslaved and copied consciousnesses of their minions, able to enter 
a heightened processing state in which generations pass in an instant within their own 
subjective timeline. The other is derived from present-day computer gaming clans, developed 
with collective quantum entanglement and the ability to pass seamlessly between physical 
and digital space, drawing the Real of code as drive into the Virtual-Existence of appearance. 
Within both approaches to a unity of Virtual and Real, the key to technological power derives 
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from the spreading of processing power across as wide a range of resources (consciousnesses) 
as possible.  
These alternative modes of thinking our relation to technology thus allow for a critical 
view of the methods of controlling such modes of (re)production as they appear in the 
semantic constructs of our current informational society. As Bostrom and Sandberg 
demonstrate: 
Much of human cognition is distributed across many minds. Such distributed cognition can be enhanced 
through the development and use of more efficient tools and methods of intellectual collaborations…The 
information stored in such systems is stored not just in individual documents but also in their interrelations. 
(2009, 321-2) 
The tools of which they speak are both technological and social. Rajaniemi’s factions are not 
only disputing the nature of technology or the manner of processing and storing information 
but the fundamental construction of consciousness within both spacetime and social reality. 
Thus two disruptions of the present appear in the novels: a multitude of separate timelines 
appearing only to those individual consciousnesses engaged with it and a common timeline 
and collective consciousness spread across any number of spaces, including pocket realities 
that bring all matter (physical particles and digital code) to the same level of appearance to 
the consciousnesses that manipulate them. 
Both approaches, however, reveal themselves to be flawed, and the resulting conflict of 
ethics – over the uniqueness and individuality of consciousness – has spread war and 
destruction across the solar system. The protagonist, however, goes to great lengths to 
remain outside of any single faction or conception of the posthuman. He adopts the 
technological enhancements of each society he encounters according to need and, with his 
fractal and fragmentary memories, exists in a perpetual present of desire and drive. His lack of 
identification outside the ideal ‘gentleman thief’ persona he has constructed allows for, and 
after his crimes often necessitates, a constant escape from fixity, thus establishing a critical 
view of any given posthumanism and emphasising the deterritorialising fluidity of a genuinely 
cyborg subject. This constantly desubstantialising existence is not only the void at the centre 
of his subjectivity but the entire surface of his assemblage of consciousness has become a 
shattered diaspora of partial functions. The Virtual and Real become unified not in a fixed 
realignment but within their constant antagonism and reappropriation of one another, 
suggesting a perpetual and productive tension. This demonstrates a literary positing of what 
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has been identified in the work of Stelarc,33 who “futures our body…performs the 
postbiological body in advance” (Kroker and Kroker in Smith 2005, 63-4). Furthermore, in 
relation to the posthuman consciousness as its postbiological conceptual body, Stelarc’s 
performances – standing outside and between conceptual and body art – unveil the 
construction of a “fractal subject-object, the body is the network – a self-network”…“a 
worlding of the human” (Massumi in Smith 2005, 179). This posthuman conception of the 
cyborg subject is the network of relations within itself that constructs the world around it, and 
any such world is the assemblage of internal and external functions of consciousness. What 
appears as the present is an isolated moment in a self-observing, collapsed state drawn from 
the unknowable flux of subjective Reality. 
One interrogation of this relation to what we perceive as a narrative structure of history 
within a world of consciousness can be seen in another project by Rajaniemi, in collaboration 
with Samuel Halliday. Neurofiction – the future development of which is self-referentially 
mentioned in The Causal Angel as “an algorithmically generated, neuroadaptive fantasy book 
from the late twenty-first century” (Rajaniemi 2014a, 14) – appears as a linear narrative to the 
reader, a present space of the text within the passing of time, fusing subject, text and 
technology (in the form of an EEG) as a posthuman self-network. However, in tales such as 
Rajaniemi’s Snow White is Dead (2013), showcasing the Neurofiction interface at the 2013 
Edinburgh Science Festival, the underlying functions of consciousness take an active role in 
controlling the flux of the present. As the creators describe: 
The reader can be guided to one of multiple possible endings or allowed to explore a new region of the story 
space. Note that neurofiction is not interactive fiction: the reader experiences the story as linear, calm and 
immersive, as if reading a book. But by opening themselves to be read, neurofiction readers become 
subconscious collaborators in the creation of a new narrative (Rajaniemi and Halliday 2013) 
Thus the construction of a narrative world, what Jameson identifies as causality (2007, 88) and 
what Lambert called for in a present of metamorphosis (2008, 9), takes place within the 
present as a constant re-assemblage of partial brain functions. The reader remains in the 
moment of reading, but their affective relation to the text within the present moment is in 
turn being read by their various functions: the functions of consciousness in the framework of 
their interpretation of the text, bringing their own psychological historical narrative to 
determine the nature of their affective reaction; the functions of the body in the electrical 
impulses released by the brain from which the conscious and unconscious functions are 
derived; and the functions of technology as the software interprets the EEG in determining 
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the direction of the text out of the ‘wave function’ of narrative possibility. Again, within this 
digital extension of consciousness, as with the utopic critique of the manipulation of modes of 
consciousness appearing in Rajaniemi’s novels, we see the use of future technologies in art 
making clear the virtuality that has always been the case within human consciousness. As 
Rajaniemi himself points out, “all books are a bit scary in how they get inside your head. We 
are just more honest about it” (Rajamiemi [@hannu] 5 April 2013), extending the notion to 
reconceive both the medium of the book and of digital technology towards a future medium 
that is “almost quantum mechanical, observer dependent” (Rajaniemi 2014b). 
The representation of the digital in films tends towards the nostalgic, for example Tron 
(1982), The Lawnmower Man (1992), The Matrix (1999) and its sequels (2003a; 2003b), in their 
presentation of the digital as something to be feared, as a threat to physical ‘real life’. Against 
the common function of SF in preparing against future shock, these works serve only to deter 
humanity from overextending itself, thus contributing to the contemporary reluctance 
regarding further (technologically enabled) evolution of human consciousness. However, 
there are brief glimpses at the potentiality of cyborg consciousness, for example in Tron’s 
sequel, Tron: Legacy (2010), which ends in the human character rescuing from the digital 
realm not his father but a digital consciousness, a new form of life and a symbol of evolution 
beyond and outside of humanity. It is in flexible narratives such as neurofiction, staging 
cybernetic extensions within current society, that the premise of having your mind read is 
converted from a fear to a creative tool for nonlinear and adaptive narrative. When applied to 
literature or art in general, the necessity of a purposeful utopic gesture becomes clear. This 
moves beyond the fact that “mainstream fiction is not about real people, it's not about the 
real world…It's about a world which is very much like our world, but which is essentially the 
author's perception of all the elements in our reality” (Rajaniemi in Lea 2010) into the role of 
SF in constructing an alternative with which to view our current parallax reality. The task of 
the critical subject is to actively engage with the mutual relation of the construction of reality 
in the creative process and, in SF in particular, look towards posthuman cyborg abilities to 
take an active role in the mediated construction of consciousness in the present and creatively 
engage with the potentiality in negotiating a consciousness yet to come. 
5.4.3 QUANTUM GAMES REVERSING THE PAST 
The use of games and puzzles within Rajaniemi’s work creates an instructive stage upon which 
to assess the many quantum physical and social models of a ‘subject yet to come’ that are 
explored through his narrative. By constructing problems within the confines of a game, the 
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reader is able to grasp the inner workings of the particular idea. Indeed, the first two books 
each start with the protagonist engaged within a ‘game’ situation – a prisoner’s dilemma in 
The Quantum Thief and a quantum puzzle box in The Fractal Prince which “feels like trying to 
juggle eight-side Rubik’s cubes while trying to solve them at the same time. And every time I 
drop one, God kills a billion kittens” (Rajaniemi 2012, 8). The third book “focus[es] on how 
game-playing allows us to adopt radically different selves… [in a] game of consequences” (Lea 
2010). This use of games is also evident within the narrative, where the technological 
extension of collective consciousness means that “you can do fun things with entanglement. 
Games become strange” (Rajaniemi 2010, 82). The ‘fun things’, where ‘quantum weirdness’ 
begins to interfere with conventional and expected patterns of thought, are how Rajaniemi 
uses games to full utopic effect. John DeNardo describes how “games…play a pivotal 
underpinning to many of the novel concepts, though to be more accurate, it’s their ultimate 
extrapolated evolution that is part of the book’s main themes” (2011), and this conceptual 
fractal extrapolation is seen within the ideas the book confronts, the games in which it 
presents them and the construction of the novels themselves. In this mode of working it 
becomes inevitable that the “plot is at times nefariously multifarious…a great puzzle box of a 
book” (Alexander 2012), and Rajaniemi himself has said that “if you want to write about ideas, 
one nice thing to have is a paradox or contradiction” (in Flett 2012). The playing out of 
contradictions is a future beyond our limit, positing a utopian mode of consciousness that can 
think beyond our current situation. This creates a posthuman view of the concept of a novel 
itself, with the requirement for a utopian leap beyond the effects with causality occurring 
afterwards, a parallax gesture upon the medium of writing in the digital age.  
Rajaniemi has disseminated fragments of text from The Causal Angel online via Twitter 
before its release, cementing the series as a project that makes narrative and critical use of 
fractals in our relation to technology. Displaying the concern with the future of the book 
evident in his work on Neurofiction, this feeds into a broader trend on Twitter, and the digital 
medium more generally, that is expanding the notion of literature. Inspired by flash fiction34 
such as the six-word novel “For sale: baby shoes, never worn” attributed to Ernest 
Hemingway, twitter has formed a mediator for short poetry (particularly Haikus) and a 
semantic extreme of the term ‘short story’, such as @VeryShortStory who crowdsources 
creativity in an open call for nouns (Hill 2014). More overtly digital forms, commenting on the 
medium itself, include @tejucole’s Hafiz (2014) consisted of 35 tweets, retweeted from texts 
he asked friends to post. He said of the event: “I wrote a story, and we told it. Great thanks to 
                                                                    
34
 Fiction of extreme brevity. 
 181 
my generous and self-effacing collaborators” (Cole [@tejucole] 9 January 2014). This tale of 
the digitally (and subjectively) mediated responses to a man suffering a heart attack on the 
pavement returns the critical view of the technology in literature to a critical view of literature 
by technology. Such works “are forged from connectivity. They don’t, however, necessarily 
involve narrative in a conventional sense” (Armitstead 2014). This raises a problem of 
narrative in Twitter beyond the event of the work, whereby archived tweets must be read in 
reverse order (Baddeley 2012).  
The process of time moving backwards displays the inversion of Existence and Meaning 
in the digital realm applied to the curvature of space-time. While earlier artistic interventions 
such as Barbara Rauch and Dew Harrison’s PHYSICAL_CHAT (2002) established parallel 
oneiric narratives scrolling downwards through time as a collective consciousness, this is now 
a common mode of reading socio-cultural space-time in the reverse-chronology of social 
media feeds (in, for example, Facebook and Twitter). This relativistic extrapolation of 
narrative, disrupting the flow of causality, references what Deleuze and Guattari identify in 
“Einstein and his deterritorialization of the representation of the universe” (1986, 24). The 
criticism of present technological culture is extended beyond SF itself, echoing the 
deterritorialisation of the foundations of physics in hard SF with a deterritorialisation of the 
technological mediation of the work. The content of the narrative becomes less important 
than the mode in which it is expressed, inserting a minor culture within the major language of 
current technology, a deterritorialisation of narrative in which “fiction takes flight on Twitter” 
(Armitstead 2014). This draws out the need to reconceive our modes of literature for this new 
technology, designed for live-blogging and condensed fragments of meaning. 
This fragmentary narrative is seen throughout Rajaniemi’s work, where the complexity 
and displacement of explanations construct a causal loop of understanding. Just as the 
structure of the book requires it to have already been read, so do the concepts involved 
require a cyborg approach to rethinking subjectivity. This truth to the criticisms that the 
characters remain at an unrelatable distance is necessary for the SF utopian gesture, the 
desire for the impossible subject. However, while in his theoretical text “Jameson says little 
here about how to otherwise imagine the future” (Hamner 2008, 33), Rajamiemi’s 
construction of a purposefully impossible (to our contemporary minds) set of characters, 
technologies and societies is able to posit an array of different possibilities for posthuman 
society, each filled with fragments of desire, hope and despair and staged within the 
framework of games. Examples include: “you could introduce a narrative element to it 
[death]…every time you die you advance the storyline a little bit” (Rajamiemi 2014a, 71) or “I 
watch zoku children play global thermonuclear war” (Rajamiemi 2014a, 47). The terrifying 
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implications of these posthuman minds displays a celestial misuse of what Deleuze would 
describe as the “ideal game” (Deleuze 2004b, 71), played out in thought and resulting in art, 
rewriting its own rules with each move.  
This tension between ideas and their execution as games, injecting expressions of sense 
and nonsense, can be seen as an important issue in Rajaniemi’s scientific research. His interest 
in the role of games in tackling quantum problems extends to their use in educating the public 
about issues of quantum mechanics, staging concepts such as “quantum creativity”, a 
“collective of brains” or the “quantum hackability of games” (Rajaniemi in McEndoo 2013) in 
the form of scientifically rigorous games in order to explore and elaborate the impact of 
quantum theories on consciousness and social reality. Rajaniemi titles this social project, 
presented at the Games for Quantum Research Workshop 2013, ‘Just Add Quantum’, a notion 
that echoes fractally across his work. With all the implications of our interaction with quantum 
reality – social, material and cognitive ‘weirdness’ – his phrase can be seen to implore 
contemporary subjects to look radically beyond their current conceptions of reality, aligning 
their perspective and consciousness with that of a posthuman, to critically view the follies of 
humanity and engage thoroughly in the creative processes of instigating change in our current 
reality. 
 
5.5 INFINITE REGRESS? 
 
It is necessary to consider the nature of these processes of ‘futuring’ our perspective on 
technology and consciousness in relation to the ultimate progress of subjective reality and the 
effects of the present in defining such a future. If consciousness constructs itself 
simultaneously with the construction of the worlds it inhabits, the proliferation of theories 
proposing a calamitous end to the ultimate fate of the universe must be confronted if the 
subject is to place itself truly beyond the limitations of the current scope of human 
consciousness and into a posthuman assemblage of the cyborg. At first glance, this process 
seems inevitable, that we will all ‘burn out’ or ‘run out of steam’ over time, an unavoidable 
boundary on our conception of reality. As we have seen, this becomes a particular issue within 
the psychology of the immortal posthuman being trapped for eternity with the inexorable 
march of deterioration and madness. Indeed, the second law of thermodynamics asserts the 
eventual dominion of entropy over all things. Overcoming this ‘law’ is the ultimate dilemma of 
the existence of the physical universe, defined in Isaac Asimov’s ‘last question of humanity’: 
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“can this chaos not be reversed into the Universe once more?” (1956, 15). However, is a 
response to entropy possible beyond the fiction of a utopic parallax? 
While the reversal of entropy as such may still exist only in the realms of fictional A.I. in 
the hyperspace beyond the ‘heat death’ of the universe, the disruption of everyday causality is 
an important conceptual step towards undermining the second law of thermodynamics. The 
shift in consciousness of the nature of computing in time and energy aligns with alternative 
methods of viewing the role of forces in constructing order within both quantum and 
subjective realities. The quantum universe creates order out of chaos, just as the Deleuzian 
universe is “chaotic as well as probabilistic, where probabilistic means that the path of 
individual particles cannot be predicted, but their movement in aggregates can be predicted, 
and with a relatively high degree of probability” (Olkowski 2011, 121). This chaotic-
probabilistic nature of causality and measurement moves beyond Heisenberg’s uncertainty 
principle, as does the reversibility of collapse, suggesting an immanent reality with an 
emergent future. Entropy presupposes a closed system, but the utopic leap of the emergent 
nature of the universe as it appears to consciousness enables a step beyond any such 
subjective ‘heat death’ if loss is reversible. Through the utopic leap of reimagining the 
conditions of the current situation, perhaps the Real can also be reimagined and reversed in 
its role of underpinning causality in its relation to the Virtual of cognition. 
If the entropic causality of heat death can thus be overcome, or an energetic function 
inserted before it could occur, the question becomes: can the universe cope with continued 
expansion? Indeed, this question occupies a close position to the problem of posthumanism: 
can the ‘human’ subject cope with the continued expansion of consciousness? The risk of 
unbridled expansion without the utopic leap necessary to re-posit the social conditions for 
such rapid change is the doom of humanity in its own excesses of technology. The 
psychological capability of the subject to reimagine itself carries with it the potential of an 
apocalyptic collapse. This could lead to a final singularity35 that could cement our doom 
amidst the battle between entropy and technological advance. One such singularity is the ‘Big 
Rip’, in which all matter, from stars to atoms, is ripped apart by phantom energy, tearing apart 
the universe as gravity cannot keep up with expansion. In such a scenario, all structure 
becomes gravitationally unbound and “brings our brief epoch of cosmic structure to a close” 
(Caldwell et al. 2003) as the mass in the universe is not enough to hold itself together. If, 
however, the gravitational force in the universe remains higher than expansion (if the dark 
                                                                    
35
 A singularity would necessarily be not only technological but psychological, social, political 
and ontological, with implications for the very definition of humanity and its relation to the universe. 
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energy causing expansion reverses), then before the universe reaches heat death a massive 
contraction will occur, drawing all matter into the singularity of a unified black hole. This 
would create a ‘Big Crunch’, in opposition to the ‘Big Bang’, as all matter collapses into itself, 
perhaps warning us of the potential collapse into the void of a consciousness that too greatly 
expands itself. 
In this singularity the fundamental laws of physics, at both classical and quantum scales, 
would be drastically changed as the perceived constants (of, for example, the speed of light) 
become flexible under such extreme conditions. The extension to this ‘Big Crunch’ is that the 
unified singularity would lead to another expansion in a new ‘Big Bang’, an example of “cyclic 
cosmologies, which display phases of expansion and contraction” (Novello and Bergliaffa 
2008, 130), each destruction bypassing the impasse of the universal singularity into a new 
creation. Drawing on string theory, this “sequence of big bang/big crunch universes attached 
to each other at the singularities” (Elitzur et al. 2002, 27) enables a positing of entire universes 
as vacuum fluctuations between singularities, ‘virtual particles’ of evental Existence. Here we 
see Deleuzian repetition staged at the level of the entire universe. In this state even physical 
reality is a Virtual-Existence, drawing together the functioning of physical and digital worlds. 
We cannot see beyond our own Virtual universe, other than traces in the CMB, with each 
singularity unleashing a moment of the Real in the repetition of causality. Deleuze writes that 
the singularity of repetition “puts law into question, it denounces its nominal or general 
character in favour of a more profound and more artistic reality” (Deleuze 2004a, 3), and it is 
here that the causal Real of the event of Existence opens up possibility. Žižek insists that an 
event “exists only for those who recognise themselves in it. There can be no Event for a non-
engaged objective observer” (2011, xiv). This draws the subjective Real into the causality of 
the cyclical universe, whereby constant (re)creation comes to define the Virtual functioning of 
the universe (or subjective reality) as a whole. Amidst the doom of reality to collapse in upon 
itself, as with the potential for humanity to spiral into the cataclysm of rampant technological 
progress, lies a potentiality for the human subject to recreate its own conditions and thereby 
pass beyond the singularity into a posthuman consciousness of a new reality. 
 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, this chapter shows that the impossible view of the cyborg subject is a self-
conscious placing of its own perspective beyond the borders of current subjective reality, in a 
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utopic leap from which to view itself in the critical light of posthuman consciousness. By 
embracing the advancement of technology alongside a reimagining of the nature of the 
subject, new methods of constructing reality within the functioning of consciousness may 
emerge. This is fundamentally a creative endeavour, necessitating an act that releases an 
expression of sense, the underlying Real of the subject, within the utopic extension of the 
Virtual construction of consciousness. This must act not only upon the particulars of the 
subject’s current situation, but upon the framework within which the parallax subject 
presupposes its own conditions. Žižek insists that, “before we intervene in reality by means of 
a particular act, we must accomplish the purely formal act of converting reality into something 
which is objectively given into reality as ‘effectivity’, as something produced, ‘posited’ by the 
subject” (2008b, 247). This formal event is a conscious creative act upon consciousness, with 
the posthuman creative event positing an alternative mode of consciousness in apprehending 
reality.This is demonstrated in the staging of fictional worlds in SF constructing evolving and 
alternative relations of consciousness: to technology in the development of the cyberpunk 
canon; to the scientific principles of reality as a whole in hard SF; to the formation of 
posthuman subjects by Rajaniemi. In Žižek’s gesture of parallax and Jameson’s fictional 
utopia, “an act proper…retroactively creates its conditions” (Žižek 2011, 33), generating an 
effective, and indeed affective, retro-causality over the manner in which the current social 
situation is constructed and maintained, and also over the potential future(s) of such 
situations. Within the Virtual is always a stain of the Real, and it is the ‘impossible’ task of the 
creative subject to encounter this void of subjectivity within its technologically enhanced 
perspective, in order that a critique of consciousness and society might instigate genuine 
evolutionary change. The posthuman is thus the creative subject imagining itself beyond a 
resolution of the cyborg assemblage of consciousness, making contact with the Real that 
underpins the multiverse of particular realities at the singularity of subjective reality. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis presented an investigation into the construction of the cyborg subject as a set of 
relations between the functions of consciousness. Starting with the ontological dilemma of 
the contemporary subject caught between physical and digital worlds, the answer to the first 
research question – what constitutes the gap between physical and digital worlds within 
consciousness – rests within the subject itself. The thesis established a parallax between 
physical and digital realities, placing the gap of the subject as the inaccessible point of 
reference from which an epistemological position can create consciousness of both worlds. It 
is within consciousness that physical and digital worlds are created in the ontological gesture 
of parallax whereby ontological shifts are created by a shift in the mode of thinking. The 
inaccessibility of the perspectival position of this parallax, as the gap between physical and 
digital worlds, raises the issue of the void of subjectivity, and the suggestion of a subject not 
decentred but desubstantialised. The nature of this void was questioned and a critical model 
suggested for analysing digital culture in a way that might establish a method of confronting 
the inaccessible void. To undertake this investigation, a number of functions of consciousness 
were delineated to enable the interrogation of the relations within the subject that constitute 
the formation of physical and digital worlds as different spaces and modes of thinking. 
The second research question – how does the functioning of consciousness construct 
the parallax subject between physical and digital worlds – was developed through the 
analytical framework of four functions of consciousness: Existence (the being-function of 
consciousness), Meaning (the communication-function between consciousnesses), Virtual 
(the function-function of consciousness itself) and Real (the void-function whereby the 
inaccessible core of the subject may be confronted within consciousness). The relative 
alignments of these functions construct physical and digital realities within consciousness: 
Real-Existence and Virtual-Meaning in the physical world; Real-Meaning and Virtual-Existence 
in the digital. The terms for the functions were expanded and redefined across Žižekian, 
Deleuzian and quantum physical concepts to allow for an integration of these three core 
theories used throughout the thesis. Specific relations between the terms were assessed 
through an analysis of various digital technologies and cultures to develop a theoretical 
understanding of the self-posited construction of consciousness: an assemblage formed 
between physical and digital worlds around the void of subjectivity. This formation of the 
subject is a pure Virtuality; it exists only within the self-perpetuating functioning of 
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consciousness outside of materiality, in an epistemic causality at the quantum level of the 
appearance of the universe. For this reason, the core relation of the subject to be considered 
in its formation and the formation of reality was between Virtual, the functioning as such of 
consciousness, and Real, the objectification of the void as the ‘reality’ of the subject. 
This critical framework was established in order to answer the final research question – 
how the cyborg subject of digital-physical parallax can creatively and critically intervene in its 
own functioning. This enabled an analysis of the digital in-itself within consciousness, 
expressed through but not dependent on specific manifestations in culture. For this reason, 
film, photography and performance were used sparingly throughout the thesis, as these 
media have been discussed elsewhere in terms of the impact of digital technology on pre-
existing physical paradigms, viewing the digital through lenses of embodied or cinematic 
materialism. The aim of this thesis was to move beyond the materialist hegemonies in current 
scholarship, to analyse contemporary subjectivity as cyborg and in which physical and digital 
are equal, yet irresolvable, modes of consciousness. Through such analysis, the research 
uncovered methods of critically confronting the cyborg subject by creating a space in which to 
view the parallax position from which the Virtuality of consciousness thinks. The 
inaccessibility of the parallax void of subjectivity necessitates an interrogation of the role of 
fantasy, beyond its status as the imaginary, as the structures of desire within consciousness. 
This is the fantasy both in and of digital technology, the traversal of which allows a 
confrontation with the self-mediation of consciousness. Analyses of specific creative practices 
in digital culture were undertaken in order to allow a critical antagonism within the subject, 
through which self-mediation and the relation of the subject to its own position of parallax 
can establish a new mode of philosophy concerning the digital in relation to the subjective 
reality of a cyborg consciousness. 
To answer the core research questions, five subsidiary questions were posed to focus 
the discussion guiding the five chapters. The first stage in rethinking our relation to digital 
technology was to define the ontological difference to consciousness between physical and 
digital worlds that instigates the appearance of the gap within cyborg reality. This formed the 
first chapter of the thesis in a discussion of the inversion of Existence and Meaning, whereby 
the physical mode of reality presupposes the appearance of an external world (precedence of 
Existence) and the digital mode presupposes a communicable truth of code (precedence of 
Meaning). The alignment of these functions with the Real, as presupposed, followed by 
Virtuality, in the completion of a given world, was postulated as the process by which 
consciousness mediates itself through engagement with either form of reality. This 
conception of the formation of consciousness as part of a set of realities underpins an 
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understanding of the appearance of ontological difference between physical and digital 
worlds while placing this difference within the functioning of consciousness, exemplifying the 
ontological impact of the epistemological shift in the gesture of parallax. In Deleuzian terms 
this is desire as a machinic process, and the constant disruptive power of the war machine in a 
nomadology of subjectivity applied here to the shifting subject across physical and digital 
territories that are themselves ever shifting within consciousness. In quantum physical terms, 
the formation of these two realities appears as parallel universes, as well as the shift between 
classical and quantum levels of reality that inhibits a critical viewing of the mediation of 
observation for the spectator within reality. These findings provided analytical tools for 
assessing creative interventions in digital culture, using Benayoun’s art practice to generate a 
conception of digital technology as a cognitive/psychological construct forming a shifting 
collective cyborg subjectivity constantly rewriting the landscape of the digital. The chapter 
showed that to critique the mediation of consciousness by digital technology in art and 
culture necessitates a critique of the mediation of consciousness by itself, if the functioning of 
the subjective assemblage is to be analysed and the void of subjectivity confronted. 
The second chapter interrogated further the emergence of the Virtual as the 
functioning of consciousness, assessing the formation of the subject as an assemblage. The 
relation between Virtual and Real becomes instantly clear as the surface of consciousness 
conceals the void of the parallax position. The Virtual process by which consciousness 
emerges from the void is a necessary consideration for the construction of the subject. 
However, it is through the Virtuality of consciousness that the void becomes inaccessible and 
the Real appears as the objectification of the void as lost. The formation of the surface was 
theorised as a Deleuzian Body without Organs, a seamless surface which itself resists 
mapping. This necessitated new cartographies for the shifting territories of the subject that 
were demonstrated in Chapter 1, derived from and informing mappings of the ephemeral 
spaces of the digital. The constantly fleeing landscapes of this surface proved that the Virtual 
itself takes on the role of lost object, bound to the Real that it attempts to conceal as the BwO 
forms itself as always-already lost. In order to comprehend both functions, the chapter 
suggested that a space of the Real must be opened within the surface of consciousness, 
through which the process of Virtuality and the nature of Reality can be critically confronted. 
This was expanded through the problematic relations between fundamental forces and 
matter in quantum physics, most notably the inaccessibility of vacuum states and the many 
unknowable particles forming much of the universe. These objects that are perceivable only 
through the traces they leave upon visible particles function as lost objects, objectifications of 
the void, and the steps theoretical physics takes to comprehend these incomprehensible 
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forces was found to be instructive in conceiving the inaccessibility of the void of our own 
consciousness. This concept was applied to an analysis of digital art works that negotiate 
digital processes defying epistemological reckoning, the inaccessibility of code made manifest 
within gallery spaces. The art works of Dombis in particular formed a study of the direct 
relation between code, visual expression and subjectivity through digital technology. The 
findings of this analysis led towards a new conception of the contemporary subject as a 
BwOwB: desubstantialised rather than decentred; constantly removing itself as a lost object 
in its Virtual formation around the void of subjective parallax; for which a consideration of the 
psychological and cognitive inaccessibility of its nature is integral to renegotiating our 
understanding of it. 
The third chapter returned an interpretation of the Real to the relation between 
physical and digital worlds, in particular the problematic position of nostalgia in which the 
contemporary subject holds physical ‘reality’. Issues of embodiment were challenged in both 
the digital and physical realms, towards a suggestion of disembodiment as a necessary 
viewpoint for confronting the engagement of consciousness across worlds. Representative 
bodies constructed within digital spaces were revealed as lost objects, embodiments of the 
Real of the subject and the structure of desiring a body that drives us to create substitutes 
with which to engage with a physically inaccessible cognitive space. Through this problematic 
construction of the digital body a perspective on our physical bodies provided an instructive 
counterpoint. The body in general was thus proven to be a lost object bound into our 
conception of what is Real to the subject, leading to an interrogation of what remains within 
consciousness between physical and digital worlds. Deleuze’s conception of difference and 
repetition established the illusion of identity in embodiment, placing the repetition of the Real 
within consciousness as the true substance of the subject rather than the Virtualising 
differentiations that define and create the lost characteristics the subject hopelessly desires to 
regain. Deleuze and Guattari’s faciality, a relation between white wall and black hole, was 
found to provide further theorisation to the Virtual-Real relation of surface and void in 
constructing digital faces as shifting illusory masks. The inherent antagonism within identity 
was explored through the wave-particle duality of quantum physics, along with the notion of 
superposition and the role of the engaged spectator. Avatar-mediated spaces provided a 
setting for this analysis, in particular Second Life as a space for creatively engaging with 
digital embodiment as objectification, expression and interface. The impossibility of a 
complete avatar and its perpetual antagonism with the physical body of the user was shown 
to require hypertextual methods of viewing our engagement with any given space, and the 
chapter suggested a move away from embodied thought towards a disembodied view of the 
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contemporary subject as it moves freely between physical and digital realities as modes of 
consciousness. Finally, the chapter proved the integral role of Virtuality and desire in the 
structures that enable embodied thought, emphasising the need to look beneath these 
structures of consciousness to approach the core of the cyborg subject. 
This structure between the Virtual and the Real was the topic of the fourth chapter, 
which moved beyond Žižek’s use of cyberspace to stage and traverse the fantasies of the 
physical subject (in Wright and Wright 1999) to focus on the fantasy of the digital itself. This 
was undertaken through the disruption of human mortality in relation to digital technology, 
with an uploaded consciousness able to be copied and restored indefinitely. The alignment of 
the Real as death-drive and the Virtual as the desire for life in functioning consciousness 
showed a confrontation with immortality as the potential horror of the digital within the 
structures of fantasy surrounding the humanity of the cyborg subject. The relation of desire to 
death was interrogated through the Deleuzian notion of becoming, extended through 
becoming-animal towards a becoming-death in the digital in general, and computer games in 
particular, whereby a series of lives sustain immortality with death never achievable. The 
impact of this in relation to the parallax of the cyborg was shown through consideration of the 
return to the physical world: it is the frail mortal body of the physical player that persists once 
the character is killed, the game lost and the computer turned off. This was furthered through 
an extension of parallel universes into the quantum immortal, in the problematic relation of 
the subject to viewing its objectified death on screen, and an exploration of the possibility of 
staging an immortal subject outside of physical space-time in the digital world. A study from 
the Portal series then proved instructive, in the analysis of the character GLaDOS as an 
immortal bio-computer hybrid turned monster. The psychological impact of transcending the 
physical-digital divide and achieving immortality through technology was found to reveal the 
necessary rupture of parallax in the subject between worlds, as human mortality becomes the 
lost object of desire for such a monstrous being. This fantasy of technology was drawn back 
into the relation between Virtual and Real in their simultaneous formation within 
consciousness, finding the necessary emergence of the void as the presupposed horror of 
existence: the monster is the emergence of subject itself. This notion that “the X beyond 
words is a pure effect of words” (Žižek 2011, 68) extends throughout the structure of fantasy 
and, as has been shown in Chapter 2, the creation of the void of subjectivity objectified as lost 
in the Real is a necessary effect of the emergence of the Virtuality of consciousness. 
The final chapter confronted the necessity of an antagonism between Virtual and Real, 
using Jameson’s notion of utopia in SF literature to establish the role of desire in transcending 
the current conception of the subject in relation to digital technology. By constructing 
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fictional alternative modes of subjectivity, a critical distance towards our current state of 
consciousness was found to emerge, traversing the fantasy of the subject while maintaining 
the necessary antagonism of Virtual and Real. This enabled the parallax position to be viewed 
as a critical renegotiation of the Virtual-Real relationship and reconception of the cyborg 
subject. This critical process demonstrated the need for both cognitive and cultural 
reorganisations of our approach to technology beyond nostalgic fetishisation, informed by a 
critical view of the functions of consciousness. This used an analysis of SF concerning the 
digital and our relation to it, even if not necessarily presented in a digital format. Deleuze’s 
propositional logic and minor literature informed an assessment of the development of 
cyberpunk fiction and the changing relation of the digital as it has been integrated into our 
culture, suggesting the need for alternative manifestations of such relations and stated the 
emergence of a minor culture as the becoming-otherwise of the current digital archetypes of 
mass culture. Expanding this through hard SF into the relation between human mastery over 
technology with human mastery over the quantum universe raised the problematic 
psychological issues of such shifts if alternative modes of subjectivity are not developed. This 
analysis of SF writing was applied to the explicit confrontation of the cyborg subject as a 
posthuman expression of physical-digital unity in our modes of consciousness and existence in 
Rajaniemi’s fiction. The critical power of the distance of such subjects was proven as the 
analysis returned to critiquing and expanding our current relations to the culture and 
consciousness of technology. The chapter concluded by asserting the need for a constant 
positing of alternative modes of subjectivity with a critical distance to our own situation. 
Through this, a flight from the self can enable the creative reconstruction of consciousness 
and draw the cyborg subject into thinking otherwise about its own internal relations, in turn 
providing a framework for rethinking our relations to physical and digital realities beyond the 
structures of parallax that define contemporary cyborg subjects. 
 
CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
 
The research questions investigated in this thesis offer an original contribution to knowledge 
across three key fields. The conceptual framework developed as a method of establishing the 
basis for a philosophy of the digital has an impact on consciousness studies in reimagining the 
relation of digital ontology within consciousness and placing the subjective parallax as central 
to a cognitive theorisation of physical and digital realities. The analysis of texts using and 
concerning the digital has relevance for cultural theory, utilising the functions of 
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consciousness to psychoanalyse works across the varying disciplines that use digital 
technology, drawing out critical themes and raising theoretical issues across disciplines in the 
representation of the digital in contemporary culture. Finally, the application of the thesis 
impacts upon the use of digital technology in creative practices that seek to further 
understand the relations of digital and physical mediation within subjectivity, and without the 
nostalgic aesthetics that often places digital practice at odds with traditional physical culture. 
This method of inquiry has already begun alongside the theoretical text of the thesis, in the 
interactive game-based piece Psycosmorrery (Benjamin 2013) as part of an ongoing research 
show, and Augmented Headspace: Digital Parallax (Benjamin 2014) presented at the 
International Žižek Studies Conference on the theme ‘Parallax Future(s)’, paving the way for 
further explorations of the impact of this research project for creative practice by the author 
and others. The thesis proposes a new mode of conceiving the contemporary subject as a 
cyborg in relation to consciousness and suggests the need for a new culture of the cyborg in 
which its necessary antagonisms are sustained while inserting a self-critical rupture through 
which the further evolution and expansion of human consciousness might be creatively 
manipulated. 
The application of Žižek’s notion of parallax to the split between physical and digital 
worlds has not yet been undertaken, and the thesis offers an initial investigation into this 
method of examining digital technology within a psychoanalytical framework beyond 
conventional materialities that dominate current debates in the field. By placing the 
ontological difference of the digital within consciousness, as defined by the epistemological 
parallax shifts of the subject, the thesis suggests a reassessment of the relation of the 
individual subject to its engagement with digital technology. The conceptual framework of 
the functions of consciousness is itself an original contribution to knowledge, redefining the 
parameters of both Virtuality and Reality according to an inversion of Existence and Meaning. 
This schema draws out the particularities of a digital parallax and explicates the internal 
relations of subjectivity that form such a position.  
The use of these terms across their definition by Žižek and Deleuze brings together two 
current expansions to our conceptions of digital technology that have thus far remained 
detached. While a critique of the term ‘Virtual Reality’ has been established (for example 
Murphie in Massumi 2002b, 188-214), the focus has rested on a disruption of either the Virtual 
from a Deleuzian perspective or the Real from a Žižekian-Lacanian perspective. This thesis, 
however, draws its critique from both perspectives, inserting a rupture not only in the term VR 
but in the relation of Virtual and Real to any objective external referent, in order to insist upon 
a subjective critique of the socio-cultural construction of the digital realm. The discussion of 
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this antagonism between the philosophies of Žižek and Deleuze is itself contributed to by the 
thesis, which places the critique not from one position or the other, but from an anti-
materialist perspective that aligns the two theorists within discussions of subjectivity. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of quantum physics as a theorisation of the unseen forces defining 
reality goes beyond Žižek’s and Deleuze’s allegorical use of such developments in physics to 
an acknowledgement of the parallax relation of the ontological impact of the epistemic 
subject to its entire gamut of realities. The use of the three theories to assess the digital is a 
further development in the study of digital culture, establishing an original methodology for a 
philosophy of digital consciousness. 
Throughout the analytical application of these theoretical developments, the thesis 
offers a number of additional contributions to knowledge in the form of a series of critiques of 
current modes of thinking the digital. The conception of the engaged spectator moves beyond 
the current debates surrounding interactivity, interpassivity and immersion, in searching for a 
term that allows an adequate confrontation with the subject’s relation to participation and 
observation of digital technology and culture. The antagonism between Deleuze’s BwO and 
Žižek’s OwB has been expanded as the BwOwB that maintains the antagonistic and circular 
proceses of loss and desire forming the contemporary subject. The phrase objet a-vatar 
provides a much needed disruption of digital embodiment if cognitive and psychological 
theorisations of the digital in-itself are to occur. The application of Deleuze’s becoming to 
becoming-death enables a critique of the computer gaming medium as the suspension of 
mortality in the digital medium, sustaining the state of critical intervention in its unachievable 
disruption of objective-based game mechanics. Finally, the extension of Žižek’s void of 
subjectivity into a full desubstantialisation of the subject enables a view of the ‘nowhere of the 
subject’ as the fundamental state of consciousness in an anti-materialist gesture of 
contemporary ontology. The thesis thus contributes to the extension of the term ‘cyborg’ in 
relation to the subject of the digital age, reasserting its role in expanding consciousness and 
enabling an embracing of the technological and cultural evolution of humanity. 
 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
This study of the cyborg subject in relation to the construction of consciousness and parallax 
has a number of intended applications for scholarly and practical research. The aim of the 
thesis is that by establishing new modes of critique for digital technology and its theorisation, 
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a framework has been provided with which to assess future philosophies of the digital and 
assist scholars in the fields of digital technology, consciousness studies and cultural theory in 
developing digital theory beyond the current materialist and often film-based models. The 
method of moving beyond Žižek, as well as the negotiation of a position between his own 
work and that of Deleuze, develops a cultural application of the two thinkers to issues of 
twenty-first century subjectivity. It is also intended that the thesis provide a theoretical 
consideration for digital practitioners in illuminating the forces at work within a subjective 
relation to digital technology, and as a method for renegotiating the differences between 
physical and digital cultural practices. 
Certain directions of the discussion have remained beyond the scope of this text, as set 
out in the introduction. For example, the range of media upon which the analyses presented 
here has focused does not extend to issues of film, photography or performance in the digital 
age. It is left to further research for the theoretical position expounded in this thesis to be 
applied to these media. However, the framework offered provides an informative structure for 
the continued development of these fields. The boundaries of the thesis apply also to the 
philosophical position. As stated in defining the research questions, this project does not 
attempt a complete philosophy of the digital. What it seeks to provide is a consistent 
framework of the subject’s position between physical and digital ontologies, through a 
critique of commonly perceived notions in the current culture of the digital. The development 
of the functions of consciousness and the parallax of the digital establishes a ground upon 
which further research might expand this philosophical position. The specific conditions under 
which the research is primarily valid are therefore the internal relations of consciousnessin the 
context of digital technologies, formulating the cyborg outside individual embodiments in the 
cognitive processes at work beneath contemporary subjectivity. 
This grounding provides a number of specific avenues for direct future development of 
the research project. Each chapter has proposed a defined theoretical exposition in relation to 
a given strand of digital culture, unveiling new methods of thinking our relation to digital 
technology that could be expanded into medium-/discipline-specific work. Issues raised, such 
as hyper-cartographies, the objet a-vatar, the big Other in computer games or the shift in 
cyberpunk fiction from hacking code to hacking culture, are each deserving of further 
investigation as a potential basis for postdoctoral research projects. This has also prepared a 
ground for a practical development of the research, applied directly to the creative practice of 
digital culture. There is a current need in scholarship and creative practice for the application 
of a futuring of the notion of parallax, the conception of the subject and our relation to digital 
technology, to which this research both contributes and raises new challenges.  
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To offer a concluding remark, this thesis is intended as a confrontation with the smooth 
functioning of the contemporary subject and a mode of rethinking our relationship towards all 
manner of physical and digital realities in order to create the conditions of possibility for the 
development of future culture of the cyborg and its technologies.  
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